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ABSTRACT
KENOSIS AS PERFORMANCE OF POWER
IN THE THEOLOGY OF JULIAN OF NORWICH
By
Patricia Donohue
May 2008

Dissertation Supervised by Dr. William Thompson-Uberuaga
No. of Pages in Text: 258

This dissertation examines models of power and submission in the writings of
Julian of Norwich through the symbol of kenosis. Chapter 1analyzes kenosis in its
original context (Paul’s letter to the Philippians) where it expresses the “self-emptying”
movement of a divine person becoming human, suffering a violent death and returning to
an exalted state. It then examines uses of kenosis as a model of power and submission in
late 20th century thought and proposes critical questions from a feminist standpoint,
specifically its potential to justify or re-enforce abuse. The therapeutic context of
recovery for survivors of abuse is proposed as a test case for determining the value of
kenosis as a model of power in relationship.
Chapter 2 examines the ways in which Julian of Norwich negotiated the conflict
between her assertion of theological authority and her submission to Church teaching.
Writing in the vernacular as a woman visionary in late medieval England placed Julian in
an unprecedented and precarious position and enabled her to develop a creative dialectal
theology that enacted her negotiation of power and submission.

iv

Chapter 3 investigates Julian’s presentation of kenosis within her parable of a lord
and a servant. In retelling the story of God’s relationship to humanity, Julian reinterprets
kenosis by rejecting an exclusively patriarchal, hierarchic concept of power. Extending
this close reading of Julian’s revisionary approaches to kenotic tropes, chapter 4 explores
Julian’s figuration of God/Jesus as mother, arguing that Julian offers a distinctive model
of kenosis that significantly alters the meaning and performance of power and submission
as traditionally interpreted. Maternal kenosis entails placing one’s power at the service of
a more vulnerable other within a dynamic process of assertion and submission that is
oriented toward growth.
Drawing on Judith Herman’s study of trauma and recovery, the final chapter
applies Julian’s models of kenosis to the therapeutic context of survivors of abuse. The
study concludes that while traditional models of kenosis are harmful in this context, the
maternal model offers ways of understanding power and submission that can aid the
survivor’s process of recovery.
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DEDICATION

for Daniel
and all the brave survivors of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church
some of us are listening.

And for those who did not survive
we remember.
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Introduction
Julian, Kenosis and Abuse
1. General Themes
The issues explored in this work, center around the three terms that title this
introduction: Julian, kenosis and abuse. The writings of Julian of Norwich are the
principal resource, kenosis refers to various relations of power and submission that are
explored in Julian’s work, and the context of recovery from abuse provides an ethical test
case for determining the legitimacy of kenotic models. In what follows, I briefly expand
on each of these themes and then sketch the argument that structures the work as a whole.
I begin with Julian of Norwich. Women did not write theology in late medieval
England. Some women were avid readers of it and had books written for them, but
medieval English women had no tradition of theological writing comparable to those
developing on the Continent throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
Nonetheless, sometime in the late fourteenth century and into the beginning of the
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fifteenth, an anchoress attached to Saint Julian’s church in Norwich set out to write a
book. Without model or precedent, this anonymous woman decided to record in English
her visionary experiences and her own creative interpretations of the visions’ theological
implications.1
We know nearly nothing about this woman beyond what she tells us in her
writings. Certainly, she herself had to have been a reader (of English and probably Latin)
and she had to have received a decent level of education (however informal). She was
practiced in thinking and speaking about complex theological subjects and she addressed
her writings to others who were similarly preoccupied. She thought and wrote in an
engaging style with significant creativity and boldness. To have written at all, she would
have been uniquely determined, singled minded, indeed, driven.
The defining institution of Julian’s life and world was the Catholic Church. In the
late fourteenth – early fifteenth centuries the church was divided by schism and
threatened by large-scale social and economic changes that the churchmen in the period
could hardly understand, let alone control. At the political and economic levels, power
was shifting due to changes in political and economic organization, urbanization, and the
rise of a middle class. In the cultural sphere, the renaissance was well underway and the
vernacular languages were emerging to challenge the dominance of Latin. In the
religious realm, the frustrations and yearnings that would coalesce in the reformations of
the sixteenth century were already stirring (most notably in England, among the followers
of John Wyclif). Still, the late medieval church had tremendous power and could
exercise it in a far- reaching ways. As an anchoress, Julian was directly under the

1

The lack of precedence regards not only writing as a woman and in English, but also writing in the
visionary genre. These issues are explored more fully in chapter 2.
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authority of the bishop of Norwich and as a writer of vernacular theology, she would
have had to engage in various submissions to the teaching authority invested in him. At
the same time, the production of her writings required a significant degree of selfconfidence and self-assertion. The careful negotiation between these two performances
of power – submission to Church authority and assertion of her own authority –
structures Julian’s writings.
The symbol of kenosis originates in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians. Translated
into English as “self-emptying,” it signifies the profound movement of Christ’s
incarnation: from a position of divine power and status, he moved to a position of human
vulnerability and powerlessness ending in a violent death. The kenotic movement was
completed by exaltation and return to power. Kenosis is a distinctive way of performing
power in relation to others. It is an intentional renunciation of power, entailing both
submission and vulnerability, that ultimately aims at a renewal or transformation of
power. Within Christianity, Christ’s humble human life and his violating death provide
the exemplar of kenosis. It is Christ’s kenotic performance of power that is meant to
redeem and transform all human relationships. As such, Christ’s kenosis functions as a
model for Christians; in conforming their lives to Christ’s, Christians are performing their
own kenotic movement and thus partaking in the redemptive power of Christ’s kenosis.
Though the symbol of kenosis is distinctively Christian, the power relationships it
signifies are far more general. Whenever a person intentionally reduces his or her power
in relation to another, embraces vulnerability and engages in submission – and this
performance is viewed as an ethical ideal that is meant to lead to transformation – the
relationship can be characterized as kenotic. Most of the great religious traditions include
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some form of this ideal.2 But even on a mundane level, many human relationships can be
characterized as at least partially kenotic. All relationships entail negotiations of power.
Within these negotiations, one often chooses (or struggles to choose) to forgo an assertion
of power, or chooses a submission of some kind, or gives way in the face of some one
else’s assertion of power. When this performance is intentional and is experienced as
ethically charged, it can be called kenotic. Experiences of “pouring oneself out” for the
sake of some one (or some thing) other, can also be considered kenotic. Kenosis implies
the valorization of intentional submission and vulnerability. A kenotic standpoint sees
these as purposeful and meaningful; one engages in kenotic performances in order to
bring about some change or transformation in oneself or others.
The ideal of kenosis has not gone unchallenged within Christian theology.
Theologies of protest (e.g., liberationist, feminist, womanist, African-American, postcolonial) know that historically, Christian valorizations of submission, powerlessness and
vulnerability have functioned to re-enforce and justify systemic domination and abuse.
Internalized by oppressed people, Christian kenosis has been an effective means of
political and social pacification (e.g., in the context of colonization, slavery, and more
generally, the subordination of women). This brings me to the third general theme of the
project, abuse.
The central image of kenosis is a violated, dead man on a cross. This image is not
innocent. It is, on one level, quite obviously an image of abuse: the historical Jesus was
tortured and executed by the imperial powers; crucifixion was one of the principal tools

2

Ideals of kenosis are found, e.g. within Jewish mysticism, Sufism, and Buddhism. See Karen
Armstrong’s treatment in A History of God, 130, 267, 349 – 50. I examine the kenotic symbol in its
Christian form at length in chapter 1.
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the Romans used to pacify and control the Jewish people.3 Even outside of this historical
context, the traditional crucifix is an image of an abused dead man. While clearly a
symbol of an abused person, the cross has also been used throughout Christian history as
an instrument of abuse; it has functioned as a rationalization for abuse, a justification of
abuse, a glorification of abuse. Because its central image is not innocent, kenosis requires
both a political and an ethical critique. In my work, I focus on the ethical, and propose as
a test case, the usefulness of models of kenosis for survivors of abuse. Abuse survivors
have been forced to perform submission to a more power other; their vulnerabilities have
been manipulated and exploited; they have been reduced to positions of extreme
powerlessness and terror. Put simply the test is this: can any valorization of kenotic
submission and vulnerability serve an abuse survivor’s process of recovery, or will it
simply valorize and thereby re-enact the abuse itself?
In exploring this question, I turned to Julian’s theology of kenosis. Julian presents
two primary images of God’s relationship to humanity: a lord and a servant and a mother
and a child. In the lord-servant image, Julian follows the outline of the Philippians hymn:
Christ freely decides to become a human servant, suffers a painful death, and is finally
returned to his rightful position of divine sonship. With Julian’s telling of the Christic
story however, she largely moves outside of traditional, hierarchic, patriarchal models of
power The lord/father does not demand obedience or justice; his primary way of
performing power is as constraint and anticipation as he waits for the servant/son to finish
the task so that he can reward him. The Son’s kenotic performance, though entailing pain
and suffering, is not characterized as violation. He labors, suffers, and eventually dies.
3

According to the Jewish historian Josephus, so many Jews were crucified during the siege of Jerusalem
that “there were not enough room for the crosses, nor enough crossed for the condemned.” Josephus, The
Jewish War, 5.11.2.451. Quoted by Franklin Sherman in “Speaking of God after Auschwitz,” 206.
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But his performance in relation to the Father is characterized by eagerness, good will, and
hard work. Most significantly, in God’s relationship to humanity there is no judgment,
no wrath, no punishment or blame. God is only loving: merciful, compassionate and
generous.
Julian’s most creative re-interpretation of kenosis is in her presentation of Jesus as
mother in relation to his human child. In this model, kenosis is seen primarily as the
action of a powerful mother responding to the powerlessness, vulnerability, and
dependence of her child. Motivated by a divine maternal love, Christ becomes human in
order to mother humanity more intimately and fully. Julian presents maternal power as
active, dynamic, and highly adaptive to the needs of the child. Mother Jesus births,
nourishes, protects and educates. He is an attentive, active Mother putting all his power at
the service of the child’s growth and development. Jesus’s mother-love is unfailing: he
never judges, punishes, or abandons his children to their own fates, even when they stray
or fall (or especially when they stray or fall). Above all, he is powerful in his ability to
protect his children and keep them safe.
In the final chapter of the work, I draw on the ideas taken from Julian’s theology
and apply them to the context of recovery from abuse. Drawing on the work of Judith
Herman, I argue that kenosis in its traditional form cannot function as a model of power
in the context of recovery. On the contrary, in this context, kenosis mimics the experience
of abuse itself and thus can only re-enforce and internalize the psychological mechanism
of abuse. There is a place, however, for a model of power drawn from Julian’s concept
of maternal kenosis; not as a model for abuse survivors, but as a model for persons
committed to supporting abuse survivors in their work of recovery. Maternal kenosis
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consists in putting one’s greater productive power (i.e, intelligence, training, capabilities,
status, wealth) at the service of others who are less powerful. Ideally, it is non-coercive
and non-manipulative, and aims at the greater empowerment of others.
The context of abuse recovery may seem too far from Julian’s late Medieval
world, and asking of her writings that they address this context may seem anachronistic
and unfair. Yet Julian the writer is read far more widely today then in any time in
history. Her thoughts, her words, her images console and inspire people, both Christian
and non-Christian alike. Julian herself seemed to have been familiar with experiences
that we would readily classify as anxiety and depression. She was seeking safety and

healing in her relationship with God and she wrote her book for other like-minded
seekers. The basic assumption of this work is that Julian’s writings, while clearly
products of her time, nonetheless do contain resources for rethinking relations of power
and submission.

2. The Structure of the Work
In chapter 1, I present a definition of kenosis as a relational performance of
power. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, I assume that all relationships are
structured by power and can thus be defined in its terms. Within a kenotic relationship, a
significant transfer of power occurs when one of the persons (the kenotic subject)
intentionally reduces his or her own power in relation to the other. In doing so, the
kenotic subject becomes subordinate to the now dominant other. This position of
subordination opens the possibility of an abuse of power; it necessarily entails the risk of
violation or domination. The kenotic performance is not an end itself; it is a dynamic
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movement that ends in a restoration to the original relation (the original configuration of
power), or a reversal (the formerly kenotic subject becomes dominant), or some other
reconfiguration or transformation of power.
With this definition in mind, I analyze the meaning of kenosis in Paul’s Letter to
the Philippians. I distinguish three interrelated models of kenosis in Paul’s letter:
communal, political and Christic. Because Christic kenosis is the exemplar, it acts as the
model for the other two. In the closing section of the chapter, I propose a series of ethical
concerns regarding the morality of kenotic performances, motivated primarily from a
feminist standpoint. Specifically, I argue that performances of kenosis must be
concretely situated in order to be ethically evaluated, since most relationships are
premised on already existing power differentials. In structurally asymmetrical
relationships (ones in which one person has significantly more productive power vis-à-vis
the other), kenosis as an ethical ideal is particularly problematic since the power
differential in such relationships always entail the possibility of exploitation and
violation. Finally, I propose the therapeutic relationship of an abuse survivor with his or
her therapist as a test case for the validity of kenotic performances.
Chapters 2 – 4 focus exclusively on Julian of Norwich and her writings. In
chapter 2, I examine Julian’s performance of power and submission in relation to Church
teaching authority. Julian’s life choices required a distinctive set of power negotiations.
In the first place, she chose the life of an anchoress, which required submission to the
bishop of Norwich and to the community that supported the Church of Saint Julian’s.
This submission entailed profound vulnerabilities; as an anchoress, she was completely
dependent on the Church community for her basic needs and she was unable to move
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outside the confines of her cell. The extreme submission entailed in entering the
anchorhold however also enabled a profound freedom; once within the confines of her
cell, Julian was freed from the tasks that would have defined her life within the two other
social locations available to women: the domestic sphere or the monastery. The
anchorhold allowed Julian the freedom to devote herself to the things that interested her
most: writing and seeking God in prayer. Her submission thus empowered her as a writer
and theologian.
After examining the three defining vulnerabilities of Julian’s life: her gender, her
visionary experience, and her decision to write as a vernacular theologian, I turn to a
close reading of parts of Julian’s texts concerned with the possibility of universal
salvation. In engaging this theological issue, Julian confronts two sources of knowledge
and two authorities: personal prayer and church teaching. She sets these two
sources/authorities in a dialectical relationship that entails submitting the claims of each
to the other. While careful to submit to the teachings of the church, Julian’s dialectical
theology creates a space for intellectual exploration and holds out the hope that God’s
salvific plan encompasses all. Julian’s dialectical approach allows her to affirm the
Church’s teaching while at the same time relativizing it in relation to the deeper, more
ultimate teaching made available to her in prayer.
Chapter 3 examines Julian’s example of a lord and a servant within the context of
the theology of prayer, the theme of the 14th revelation. The example is interpreted in
terms of three theological frames: the doctrine of original sin, the Adam/Christ topos and
the myth of kenosis. In her presentation and interpretation of the example, Julian
reconfigures the power relations of Christic kenosis by collapsing the hierarchic binaries
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of domination and submission and largely moving out of a fixed patriarchal model of
power. God’s relationship to humanity is without wrath or judgment; humanity is seen as
inseparable from the divine Son and thus undeserving of blame or punishment. Human
vulnerability and weakness elicits mercy and compassion on the part of God, not
punishment and Christ performs his kenosis as an active working that reconciles
humanity with God.
Chapter 4 analyzes Julian’s second model of kenosis, maternal kenosis. The
chapter begins by examining medieval portrayals of Jesus as mother and indicating the
creativity and originality of Julian’s development of the theme. I then turn to
contemporary feminist re-appropriations of the maternal in order to draw out some of the
ambiguities of the symbol and to articulate some feminist cautions regarding its use in
theological contexts. Finally, I turn to reading passages of Julian’s text where the
motherhood theme is developed explicitly, tracing the complex performances of power
that Julian’s maternal symbol encapsulates and comparing them to the Christic models of
kenosis found in Philippians and in the example of a lord and a servant. I argue that, in
presenting Jesus (and God) as a mother in relation to a child, Julian radically reconfigures
kenotic performances of power. On the maternal model, kenosis is seen primarily as a
willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the vulnerabilities of a less powerful other and
to place one’s superior power (e.g. maturity, intelligence, status, etc) at the service of the
other. The explicit goal of the kenotic performance is the empowerment of the other and
the establishment of a relationship of mutuality.
Chapter 5 turns to the context of abuse recovery and examines the legitimacy of
kenotic models in this context. Drawing on the work of Judith Herman, and arguing
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against Aristotle Papanikolaou, I argue that since the task of recovery is empowerment
and the renewed ability to from relationships, Christic kenosis cannot serve as a model
for the survivor and can only re-enforce the psychological mechanism of abuse.
Nonetheless, Julian’s maternal model does offer an alternative way of performing power
in relation to a less powerful other. It thus may serve as a model for the therapist in her
relationship to the survivor.

11

Chapter One
Defining Kenosis
“He Humbled Himself, Becoming obedient to Death,
Even Death on a Cross”

1.1 Introduction
Arguably the central symbol of Christianity, kenosis has at its focal point a
violated dead man on a cross. Even though Christ’s incarnational journey ends with
resurrection and exaltation, a violent, self-sacrificing death is both literally and
symbolically at the center of the kenotic myth. 4 In the kenosis of incarnation as presented

4

Though Philippians 2: 5-11 is more typically referred to as a hymn, I refer to Philippians 2: 5–11 as myth
in order to emphasize its dramatic narrative character and its symbolic power, following Wayne Meeks and
Nicholas Watson. On the hymnal structure of the passage, see R. P. Martin, Carmen Christi: Philippians
2:5-11 in Recent Interpretation and in the Setting of Early Christian Worship. On the use of myth, see
Wayne Meeks, “The Man from Heaven in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians”; and Nicholas Watson,
“Conceptions of the Word: The Mother Tongue and the Incarnation of God.” When kenosis stands alone as
a concept, functioning independently of the narrative frame of Philippians 2, I call it a symbol. When it is
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in the ur-text of Philippians, a being who is “in the form of God” reduces himself in
terms of power and status (“empties himself”) by becoming a human of the lowest order
(“taking the form of a slave”). In this reduced state, he subordinates himself to God and
death (“he humbled himself becoming obedient to death”) and allows himself to be
subject to human violence (“death on a cross”). Because of this obedience, he is
ultimately exalted by God and given supreme power (given “the name above every
name”), as all creation now owes him submission (before him “every knee should bend,
of those in heaven, on earth and under the earth”). This divine kenosis serves as the
archetypal model of both the Christian’s journey towards death and resurrection, and the
Christian’s way-of-being in relation to God and others.
Kenosis is a complicated, paradoxical symbol that, like all rich symbols, covers
manifold meanings. In the long history of its Christian interpretation, kenosis has been
used to express both the metaphysical mystery of the incarnation, and the moral attitude
or stance that the incarnation quite literally embodies.5 Modern exegesis of Philippians
tends to interpret this self-emptying principally in moral terms: as an ethical act of selfabnegation or servant-like service to others, a political act of relinquishing status and
power, or an existential state of lowliness and obedience.6 In the context of the

explicitly placed within the narrative context of Philippians 2, I refer to the narrative as a whole as the myth
of kenosis. Its “mythic” character thus derives from the broader narrative or story presented in Philippians
2. On differentiating symbol and myth in this way, see Paul Ricoeur’s “Introduction” to The Symbolism of
Evil, part II.
5

This distinction between metaphysical kenosis and moral kenosis, though somewhat simplified, is a
helpful way to categorize the many uses of the symbol. The metaphysical symbol explores the relationship
between divinity and humanity in Christ, centering on the question of how the two can co-exist in the same
person. The moral symbol, representing the set of virtues or the fundamental stance that informs the action
of divine kenosis, is in some sense meant to provide an imitative model for Christians.
6

See Martin, Carmen Christ; the various articles in Martin and Dodd, eds., Where Christology Began:
Essays on Philippians 2; and Gordon Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians.
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Christological controversies of the fifth century, kenosis was understood to signify
principally the mystery of incarnation — either symbolically, as the descending
movement from divine sonship to incarnate humanity and death, or metaphysically, as the
assumption or “addition” of human weakness, suffering, and death on the part of the
divine son.7 Further interpretations along metaphysical lines, including the idea of
kenosis as a renunciation of divine omnipotence and omniscience on Christ’s part, were
developed within seventeenth-century Lutheran thought and among the self-named
kenoticists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.8
Late twentieth-century thought evinces a further range of interpretive meanings,
having to do not only with Christ’s actions, but also with God’s own being and relation to
the world. For Thomas Altizer, kenosis is the culminating symbol of the death of God,
signifying “the absolute absence of God from our history and consciousness.”9 Ian
Barbour, on the other hand, proposes a process interpretation of kenosis that “offers a
path between omnipotence and impotence by reconceptualizing divine power as
empowerment rather than overpowering control.”10 Jürgen Moltmann and Hans Urs von
Balthasar, though differing in important respects, both employ the symbol of kenosis to
7

On the Christological controversies of the fourth through the sixth centuries, see Frances Young, From
Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its Background, and Paul Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of
the Impassible God. The idea of Christic kenosis as “addition” rather than loss is found in both Cyril of
Alexandria and Leo the Great. See, e.g., Cyril’s “Third Letter to Nestorius” and Leo’s “Tome” in Edward
Hardy, ed., Christology of the Later Fathers. On Cyril’s Christology in general, see John McGuckin, St.
Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy. For a brief overview of the fathers on kenosis, see
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, 23–36. On liturgical uses of kenosis, see David Power, Love
without Calculation: A Reflection on Divine Kenosis.
8

For summaries of the Lutheran and British kenoticists, see Sarah Coakley, “Kenosis and Subversion: On
the Repression of ‘Vulnerability’ in Christian Feminist Writing,” 16-25; and Graham Ward, “Kenosis:
Death, Discourse and Resurrection,” 25-36.
9

Thomas Altizer, “Buddhist Emptiness and the Crucifixion of God,” 71.

10

Ian Barbour, “God’s Power: A Process View,” 20.
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express the very being of God as self-emptying love and thus as the paradigmatic form of
God’s presence in the world.11 In Balthasar’s words, “God is not, in the first place,
‘absolute power,’ but ‘absolute love,’ and his sovereignty manifests itself not in holding
on to what is its own but in its abandonment.”12 Hans Jonas uses the symbol of kenosis to
express the divine self-restriction that makes space for evolutionary processes and human
freedom,13 and as a way of salvaging a concept of the divine after Auschwitz:
So that the world might be, and might exist in itself, God renounced his
own being; he divested himself of his divinity in order to receive it again
from the odyssey of time, laden with the fortuitous harvest of
unforeseeable temporal experience, transfigured, or perhaps also distorted
by them. . . .14

In a similar vein, Emmanuel Levinas develops a Jewish concept of divine kenosis as selfrestriction that symbolizes God’s suffering co-presence with human suffering and links
kenosis with the radical religio-ethical stance of “being for the other.”15
As Levinas’s emphasis suggests, much of the late modern interest in kenosis
focuses on the moral meaning of kenosis. In its many reconstructions, kenosis is usually
defined as a relational “self-verb”: an action, virtue, or fundamental stance of the self in
relation to another such as, for example, self-emptying, self-limitation, self-sacrifice, selfsurrender, self-destitution, self-abandonment, self-humbling, and self-gift. In this

11

Jürgen Moltmann, “God Is Unselfish Love”, “God’s Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the
World”, and The Crucified God. Also Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, and his more thorough discussion of
divine suffering in Theo-Drama V: The Last Act, 212-47.
12

Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, 30.

13

Hans Jonas, Zwischen Nichts and Ewigkeit, quoted in Moltmann, “God’s Kenosis,” 147.

14

F. Stern and H. Jonas, Reflexionen finster Zeit, quoted in Moltmann, “God’s Kenosis,” 147.

15

Emmanuel Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 117.

15

contemporary context, kenosis is used to express God’s relation to the world generally,
the human relation to God (both communal and individual), and a variety of inter-human
relations. 16 For some, these terms have only a positive connotation: the actions or
attitudes they convey are essential to the formation of our deepest relationships as
persons. For others, especially feminist theologians, these are dangerous terms – whether
said of God or of humans – that invite violation and abuse. In either case, kenosis is
understood to entail relations of power, and their attendant vulnerability and risk.17
The aim of this chapter is to explore the complex meanings of kenosis in such a
way that the symbol can illuminate Julian of Norwich’s theology while at the same time
allowing Julian’s portrayal of divine-human relations to inform contemporary
understanding and discussions of kenosis. Julian offers two key symbols of God’s
relationship to humanity: Jesus as servant and Jesus as mother. The former, presented in
Julian’s example of a lord and a servant, directly employs the Philippians imagery; the
mother-child symbol, while containing certain kenotic elements, also describes a set of
relations far more complex than those contained in the typical interpretation of the myth.
In later chapters, I will argue that Julian’s de-centering and contextualizing of the kenotic
symbol can provide important resources for recovering the symbol in a way that pays
attention to its inherent risks. Here, my purpose is to construct a workable definition of
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kenosis. Because there is such a wide range of meanings and uses of the symbol of
kenosis, my first task is to narrow and specify the meaning as I intend to employ it. My
narrowing is principally on two grounds: In the first place, I analyze the concept mainly
in terms of power-relations; second, I firmly root the meaning of kenosis within the
Christian ur-text of Philippians. I begin with a preliminary definition of kenosis as
performance of power. I then, to both ground and expand my definition, turn to the
Philippians text and examine the meanings of kenosis in its context. Following this, I
engage in a critical analysis of Christian kenosis from a feminist perspective in order to
delineate key ethical questions that will guide my reading of Julian.

1.2 Kenosis: A First Definition
I define kenosis primarily as a relational performance of power. For many
readers, this will seem an odd or even distorted definition, since kenosis is often
understood as the opposite of power, a refusal of power, a stepping out of a power frame
altogether and into a frame structured on personal giving and receiving. In this latter
framework, power is associated with egoism, control, aggression, and domination, in
contrast to the selflessness and vulnerability of personal relationships structured by the
economy of the gift.18 I propose instead that kenosis itself is a distinctive way of
performing power-in-relation. As such, kenosis is certainly the rejection of control and
domination, but it is a performance of power nonetheless. To “empty oneself” in relation
to another presupposes the prior possession of power and the free decision to reduce or
restrict that power in relation to another. In doing so, the kenotic subject becomes
profoundly vulnerable to the other’s now greater power and the risk that this change in
18
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power entails. In the arc of the Philippians text, the Christ figure begins and ends with
supreme power. It is precisely because he has divine power that the Christ figure is able
to become a slave, subordinate himself, and allow himself to be violated and killed. All of
these performances are performances of power.
As the concept of power I am assuming here is influenced by the suggestive
comments of Michel Foucault, it will be helpful at this point to indicate my key
borrowings.19 In general, power is the energia or dynamism that creates and sustains
interpersonal relationships within larger fields of relations. In essence, power is the
ability to affect the actions of another: It is “a way of acting upon an acting subject or
acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.”20 Thus, in the first
place, power is always relational21 and personal,22 but never simply individual; it obtains
between and among persons who are embedded in webs of relations including one-onone, familial, social, political, and professional relations. Second, power presupposes
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freedom, since freedom involves the use of power, the direction of power, or, more
precisely, the performance of power. Where there is no freedom, there is no relationship,
and hence, no power in the sense in which it is used here.23 Finally, power is productive,
with the capacity to produce, create, sustain, animate, and affect the dynamics within a
given relationship. Without power, relationships are static and dead, devoid of energy and
dynamism. In a word, since relationships cannot exist without power, it is my premise
that a working definition of kenosis must, at a foundational level, take power into
consideration.
As I define it, kenosis is a particular performance of power-relations. It is
premised on a decision to fundamentally alter an existing relationship in such a way that
one of the subjects temporarily renounces a significant degree of power and status vis-àvis another, thereby making the kenotic subject vulnerable and subordinate to the power
of the other. In the Philippians myth, it is the decision on the part of Christ to renounce
his divine power and status vis-à-vis God (the Father). In doing so, Christ becomes
subordinate not only to the greater power of the Father and to death but also to human
performances of power, the most salient of which is the violent death Christ undergoes.
Thus, kenosis essentially entails submission and vulnerability. This change in power and
status, however, is not an end in itself: It is dynamic, temporary, undergone for a specific
purpose, and finally reversed. In the culmination of the Philippians myth, the power23

“Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual
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freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility of
recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination).” Foucault, “The Subject and
Power,” 221. See also, “The Ethics of Care for the Self,” 6.
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relations are both restored (Christ returns to his co-equal relation to God) and reversed
(Christ is no longer subject to human power): Christ is restored to his divine status (“he is
given the name above every name”) and is granted supreme power over all creation,
including those who violated him (“at his name every knee shall bend in heaven, on earth
and under the earth”). As a process, kenosis is a dynamic negotiation of power that
includes loss, restoration and reversal.

1.3 Reading Philippians
I now want to elaborate upon and justify this definition of kenosis by examining
the Philippians myth in more detail. Twentieth-century exegesis of the myth has been
extensive and contentious. A majority of scholars agrees that the kenosis myth probably
pre-dates Paul’s writing of the letter to the Philippians and that its original Sitz-im-Leben
was most likely liturgical (which accounts for its poetic or hymnic structure).24 While
earlier exegesis tended to extract the myth from the Philippians letter and focus on
questions of origin, form, and antecedents, recent scholarship situates the myth within the
specific concerns and purposes of the letter to the Philippians, including the letter’s social
and religious context.25 My own reading follows this latter approach.
Regarding the theology of the myth, earlier exegesis focused on the question of
whether the myth/hymn explicitly affirms the pre-existence of Christ as the divine son
24
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and, consequently, whether kenosis is a symbol of incarnation. If one reads the myth in
terms of the later doctrinal clarifications of Nicaea and Chalcedon, Christ’s kenosis in
Philippians is, obviously, incarnational: The pre-existing Son of God condescends to
assume human nature in all its lowliness, thereby submitting to human suffering and
death. However, reading the myth in a first-century context makes the reference to preexistence less obvious. The strongest alternative to the incarnational interpretation is one
that places Paul’s use of the myth within the frame of Paul’s Adam/Christ typology.26 On
this reading, the myth does not refer to the pre-existent Son who mysteriously empties
himself of divinity in order to become human but, rather, conceives of Christ as the last
Adam undoing the sin of the first by resisting the urge to grasp at the divinity he
possesses by virtue of having been created in the image of God and instead remaining
obedient to God, even to the point of death. Because of this obedience, he is exalted by
God through resurrection and has bestowed on him divine power and glory. Thus,
Christ’s kenosis, rather than being expressive of a change in “metaphysical” status,
symbolizes instead a profound self-humiliation and obedience that informs the whole of
Christ’s life as well as his death.27
My purpose here is not to take a position on the question of Paul’s Christology
generally and its relation to later doctrinal formulations. Nor do I mean to explore the
issues surrounding the myth’s origins. Instead, I read the myth in terms of Paul’s
purposes in the letter to the Philippians. On my reading, the myth does symbolically
express incarnation: It is a narrative of a divine being who, in Meeks’s words, “descended
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to earth in human form, obey[ed] the Father’s command to the point of suffering human
death,” was “rewarded by exaltation,” and was “enthroned above with even greater honor
than before.”28 However, the purpose of the myth in the context of the epistle is not to
express the “metaphysics” of incarnation, for Paul employs the myth (along with his own
story) as motive and model for the behavior of the Christian community itself. With
Meeks, I think that the “letter’s most comprehensive purpose is the shaping of a Christian
[phronêsis], a practical moral reasoning that is ‘conformed to [Christ’s] death’ in hope of
his resurrection.”29 At the same time, I want to highlight the political context of this
phronêsis, a context that requires a response to coercive political power. The Philippi
community is confronted with such power, and Paul is instructing them, by his own
example and above all by the example of Christ, on how they are to respond.
To reiterate, focusing on the moral and political meanings of kenosis does not
exclude an incarnational interpretation of Philippians. On the contrary, it assumes the
symbol of incarnation as expressive of Christ’s intentional humiliation and renunciation
of divine power. Nonetheless, my concern is not with the metaphysics of incarnation, or
questions of how the divinity and humanity of Christ inform and relate to each other.
Rather, my reading concentrates on the inner dimension of the incarnational movement,
namely the fundamental decision or stance that Christ assumes in his descent and the
virtues that inform his obedience to death and response to political violence. In other
words, it focuses on Christ’s art of dying, which is meant to infuse meaning, form,
motive, and enabling power into the phronêsis of the Christian community. In what
necessarily functions as a narrative of the Philippian community’s colonial existence,
28
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Paul is proposing a collective way of living towards death and resurrection in which his
addressees are encouraged to perform their community as a sustained movement towards
death and hoped-for resurrection.

1.4 The Political Context
The Philippi church was one of the first that Paul founded, and from the
beginning, he (and presumably the community itself) faced public, overt opposition in the
city (Acts 16:11-40; 1 Thessalonians 2:2).30 As a Roman colony, Philippi and its citizens
had strong ties to Rome and enjoyed special privileges and rights. Perhaps most
importantly for the nascent church, the imperial cult was particularly strong in Philippi.31
The emperor was worshipped as supreme kurios and sôtêr, and this worship both testified
to and confirmed Philippi’s special status.32 In Tellbe’s words:
In Hellenism, gods, heroes and rulers were called “saviors” because they
delivered people from different kinds of distress, infirmities, and
oppression. Above all σωτηρ was one of the most popular terms for deified
rulers, depicting the ruler as the political and material “savior” who brings
peace and order.33
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The citizens of Philippi were particularly conscious of their status as a Roman colony.
Drawing on Bormann’s study of the imperial cult at Philippi, Tellbe notes further that
“oaths to the emperors played a significant role to express loyalty and were required to be
taken not only by citizens but also by non-citizens.”34
Paul’s Christian converts in Philippi were most likely Gentiles, at least some of
whom were probably Roman citizens (cf. Paul’s own claim at Acts 16:35–39); at the time
of the writing of the Philippians’ letter, the community, probably not particularly large,
was already experiencing opposition and the threat of persecution.35 Paul himself writes
the letter from a Roman prison (the precise location is unknown) where he is under the
threat of capital punishment. The Philippi church is thus a fragile community in a hostile
environment that is experiencing inner division and conflict. The church members clearly
fear losing Paul and are concerned about the prospects for their own survival both
without his leadership and because of it: it is not clear who would lead the church without
Paul — an ambiguity exacerbated by the fact that Paul’s fate (imprisonment and possibly
death for his “defense of the gospel”) could well forecast that of other Christians in
Philippi.
Paul never explicitly names the opponents of the Philippi Christians, but it seems
that they consisted of both non-Christian inhabitants of Philippi who are threatening the
nascent church, and preachers of the gospel who are proposing alternative models to that
of Paul. In broadest terms, Paul tells the small Christian community that they must
34
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recognize that they live in the midst of a “crooked and perverse generation” and should
therefore expect opposition (2:15).
Two passages seem to address these struggles with non-Christian opponents. At
1:28–30, Paul urges the Philippi Christians not to be “intimidated in any way by your
opponents (tôn autikeimenôn) . . . for you have been granted, for the sake of Christ, not
only to believe in him but also to suffer for him. Yours is the same struggle (ton auton) as
you saw in me and now hear about me.” Thus, according to Paul, who is the primary
model here, preaching Christ entails suffering and struggle. Given that the Philippi
Christians have witnessed his struggles in Philippi and now know that he is in prison
facing execution, Paul reminds them that they share in this struggle. What was the precise
nature of these “struggles”? According to the account in Acts, it seems that Paul is
accused of practicing customs (identified as Jewish) “not lawful for Romans” (Acts
16:20–21) as well as silencing a slave girl possessed with a “pythonic spirit.” Because of
these charges, Paul is beaten and thrown into prison (Acts 16:22–24). The “Jewish
customs” probably referred to the Christian practices of gathering together for prayer and
eating. The silencing of the slave girl caused financial problems for her owners (they
made money from her powers of divinization), which is their stated reason for bringing
Paul before the courts. Tellbe suggests a larger threat in Paul’s action, however, for
being possessed with a pythonic spirit meant that the slave girl, “like the oracle of Delphi,
was inspired by Apollo, one of the many gods attested at Philippi.”36 The Philippian
protectiveness of other deities implies that Paul’s preaching could also have been viewed
as threatening the imperial cult. Thus, this account (as well as Paul’s reference to his
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Philippian experience in 1 Thess. 2:2) suggests that the public preaching and practice of
the gospel in Philippi was viewed as socially and politically disruptive and subversive. As
a consequence, the community faced public opposition, mistreatment (1 Thess. 2:2), legal
prosecution, and possible imprisonment.37
The second probable reference by Paul to opposition from non-Christians is at
3:18–19: “Join with others in being imitators of me, brothers, and observe those who thus
conduct themselves according to the model you have in us. For many . . . conduct
themselves as enemies of the cross of Christ.” These “enemies of the cross” (echthous
tou staurou) are described in stark contrast to the ideal Paul proposes for the Philippi
Christians: “Their God is their stomach; their glory is their shame. Their minds are
occupied with earthly things.” As with the opponents mentioned in 1:28-30, Paul predicts
that their end will be “destruction” (telos apôleia).38 He goes on to conclude with an
implied political contrast: when he writes that “our [the Christians’] citizenship
[politeuma] is in heaven,” he suggests that, while these opponents can claim Roman
citizenship and can regard the Lord Caesar (kurios kaisar) as savior, the Christians “await
[their] savior, the Lord Jesus Christ (kurios christos)”; and when he writes that the
Christians await Christ’s coming when he will “bring all things in subjection to himself
(3:20 –21), he implies that the Christians’ mandatory subjection to Caesar is merely
temporary. The strong political language (“citizenship”, “lordship”, “subjection”) echoes
that of the Christic myth/hymn of chapter 2 and supports the interpretation that these
37
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“enemies” correlate specifically to the opponents mentioned at 1:28 and, more generally,
to the “crooked and perverse generation” (2:15) among whom the Christians find
themselves.
When read against the background of the political situation in Philippi and the
pressure on citizens to honor the imperial cult, it seems likely that Paul is contrasting two
cults and two forms of citizenship: the cult of kurios kaisar and its attending social and
political privileges, and the cult of kurios christos. The Christians, in worshipping Christ
as kurios, can expect to be opposed, mistreated, legally prosecuted, and potentially
executed in a humiliating spectacle. At the same time, in doing so, they honor their true
citizenship and will share in Christ’s resurrection and exaltation. And with the exaltation
comes reversal: The opponents’ present claims to political power and the right to
persecute the Christians will bring them to destruction (1:28; 3:21), since they will
ultimately be subjected to Christ as cosmic Lord (2:10; 3:21).
The second group of opponents disturbing the Philippi community consists of
rival preachers of the gospel (1:15–18; 2:21). These Christian opponents seem to be
attacking or challenging Paul personally rather than theologically (Paul says that they
think that “they will cause me trouble in my imprisonment”). Paul identifies them by
their motives for preaching (envy, rivalry, selfish ambition, self-interest) in contrast to
those, like him and his followers, who preach out of good will and love. The implication
is that these rival preachers see Paul’s imprisonment as perhaps warranted by Paul’s
particular model of preaching or that they at least view his imprisonment as an
opportunity to assert their own power and authority within the churches Paul founded.39
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Paul does not criticize the content of this rival preaching (“What difference does it make,
as long as in every way, whether in pretense or in truth, Christ is being proclaimed?”);
instead, he highlights the underlying motivations in order to distinguish these inner
attitudes from the phrônesis that Paul proposes (with himself as model).
A final group of opponents threatening the Philippian community is a group
(presumably Jewish) advocating the necessity or expediency of circumcision (3:2-4).
This group provokes an anti-Jewish tirade on Paul’s part; he warns the Philippians
against these “Judaizers”40 in the harshest terms, calling them “dogs” (tous kunas) and
“evil-workers” (tous kakous ergatas) (3:2). What seems to provoke Paul’s ire is this
group’s advocacy of circumcision (what he disparagingly calls “mutilation”) and also
their claim to authority based on circumcision, an authority that rivals his own. Paul
interprets this conflict as one between “flesh” and “spirit” (“Beware of the mutilation!
For we are the circumcision, we who worship through the Spirit of God, who boast in
Christ Jesus and do not put our confidence in the flesh”), clearly with the intention to
reassure his gentile converts that “spiritual circumcision” — not physical “mutilation” —
is the true mark of following Christ. But his greater concern seems to be with claims to
authority based on circumcision. Paul seems to want to undermine the “authority from
circumcision” principle while at the same time basing his own authority on that principle:
“If anyone else thinks he can be confident in flesh, all the more can I. Circumcised on the
eighth day, of the race of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrew parentage,
in observance of the law a Pharisee [this is the only place in Paul’s letters where he
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explicitly identifies himself as a Pharisee] in zeal I persecuted the church, in
righteousness based on the law I was blameless.”41
There is no scholarly consensus on the identity of this group, particularly
regarding whether they are Jewish Christians or, rather, a rival group of Jewish
proselytizers.42 Whether they are Christian or not, Paul’s vehement polemic against this
group implies that members of the church in Philippi found their advocacy of
circumcision appealing, if not for theological reasons, then certainly for purposes of
political expediency.43 Within a sociopolitical interpretive frame, circumcision may have
appealed to the gentile Christians of Philippi as a clear way to establish a social identity
that was more legible and acceptable to Roman authorities.44 As Tellbe suggests, the
gentile Christians’ social location was doubly precarious: “At the same time as they were
rejected by Jews as not belonging to the Jewish tradition, they were being held
responsible by the civic community for withdrawing from the traditional and civic cults
and disturbing the pax deorum.”45 Circumcision, associated with Jewish identity, could
thus function as a protection against some of the harsher consequences of preaching the
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gospel, and since many Christians already were Jewish (most notably Paul himself), there
seemed to be no theological reason for opposing a ritual (however painful) that could
ensure the survival of the church in the midst of an increasingly hostile society.
In light of these circumstances, Paul’s harsh polemic against this option (even
though he himself could appeal to it, just as he could appeal to his Roman citizenship) is
in need of explanation. It certainly needs to be placed within the larger context of Paul’s
struggle to assert his authority in relation to the original followers of Jesus and to justify
his mission to the gentiles; moreover, it needs to be understood as one of the many
theological and practical issues concerning the relationship between faith in Christ and
fidelity to the Torah.46 Within the context of the Philippi church, however, these larger
issues do not seem to be at stake. I suggest that Paul’s opposition to circumcision may
have been deeply embedded in his concept of kenosis: Since, in his view, to have the
mind of Christ is to live towards death and thus reject any claim to status that might act as
a protection against persecution or even execution, the circumcision option is motivated
by a kind of political expediency that undermines conformity to Christ’s subjection and
death.
In summary, Paul’s precarious situation, along with these various “enemies” and
“opponents”, contributes to the instability and anxiety of the Philippi community. In
response to these external threats, the Philippi Christians are internally divided (hence
Paul’s repeated plea for unity), dispirited (thus his persistent call for rejoicing), and
engaged in petty squabbling (witness the “murmuring and complaining” of 2:14). Paul
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writes his letter to this community, his expressions of love touchingly repeated
throughout, in order to plead for a kenotic phronêsis that embraces political
powerlessness and practices mutual submission in hopes of attaining Christ’s ultimate
resurrection and exaltation. Only by sharing in Christ’s suffering and “being conformed
to his death” will they truly know Christ “and the power of his resurrection” (3:10–11).
While Paul is their model in this (as are Timothy and Epaphroditus), the Philippians are,
above all, to look to the model of Christ himself and draw on his power through his
Spirit.
I turn now to a closer examination of the phronêsis of kenosis. While this
phronêsis constitutes a complex whole, I distinguish three dimensions as a way of
analyzing it with more precision. I call “communal kenosis” the performance of power
that is meant to structure the inner life of the community such as, for instance, the
Christians’ daily interactions among themselves. Second, I distinguish as “political
kenosis” the Christians’ practice in relation to the larger Philippi community, including
their response to their political powerlessness and the threat of persecution. Finally, I
refer to Christ’s archetypal performance of kenosis as “Christic kenosis,” a form of
kenosis that is meant to both guide and empower the kenosis of the community. Thus,
communal kenosis, as the performance of power that informs the inner structure and life
of the community, is contextualized by the community’s response to their political
powerlessness (political kenosis) and, more broadly, by the community’s orientation
towards Christ’s death/resurrection (Christic kenosis). While the term kenosis is used
explicitly only in reference to Christ, the “mind” that informs Christ’s kenotic
performance is proposed as the archetype and the spiritual source of the life of the
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community. Like Christ, and more importantly in Christ, the Philippi community (both
individually and collectively) is called to live selflessly and obediently on the way to
death and a hoped-for resurrection.

1.5 Communal Kenosis
Paul describes communal kenosis in two principal passages that surround the
presentation of Christic kenosis. The first mention is the lead-in to the kenotic myth,
where he instructs the community to
[be] of the same mind [to auto phronête], with the same love, united in
heart, thinking one thing [to hen phronountes]. Do nothing out of
selfishness or out of vainglory [kenodoxian]; rather, humbly regard others
as more important than yourselves [tapeinophrosynê], each looking out
not for his own interests but everyone for those of others. Make your own
the mind of Christ Jesus [phroneite en humin ho kai en Christô Ihsou].
(2:2-5)
In this passage, I want first to draw attention to the language of mind and thinking. In the
context of Greek ethics (whether Stoic, Platonic, or Aristotelian), the language of
phronêsis indicates a practical wisdom that informs the inner orientation and organization
of the self in terms of virtue. It is not simply about right thinking, though this is essential,
but refers to a holistic ethic that is manifested in right conduct (1:27; 3.17). The Philippi
Christians would have been familiar with this language in its Stoic-Roman form, and Paul
uses this language throughout the letter (1:6; 3:15; 4:8) to indicate the Christian’s
distinctive way of living.47 In particular, Paul’s virtue-list at 4:8 expresses the Stoic ideal
infused with the distinctively Christian orientation towards suffering and death.
Consequently, Christian virtues include the decidedly unstoic virtue of “humbly
47
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regarding others as more important than oneself” (2:3).48 In other words, it includes the
general orientation of kenosis.
The strongest mark of a kenotic community is an all-encompassing unity of spirit,
mind, and heart (1:27; 2:2), and it is clear from Paul’s letter that the Philippi church is
struggling to demonstrate this unity. Along with the community as a whole (1:27; 2:2),
two members in particular (the women Euodia and Syntyche) are urged to “come to a
mutual understanding” (4:2). We can assume that these two were leaders in the
community -- for Paul describes them as co-workers who “struggled at my side in
promoting the gospel” (4:3) – and that their discord was particularly divisive for the
community as a whole. In any case, the unity of the community is to be expressed above
all in mutual agreement regarding their proselytizing activities: They are to struggle “side
by side” to advance the Gospel (1:27).
Communal unity is principally achieved through tapeinophrosynê (regarding
others as “better” or “more important than” oneself) and a mutual deferring to one
another’s interests rather than privileging one’s own (“each looking out not for his own
interests but everyone for those of others”). Together, these virtues constitute, in
Engberg-Pedersen’s words, a mutual “interpersonal subordination.”49 It is here that we
see the focus on kenosis as a communal performance of power. Unified in the work of
promoting the gospel, the members of the community are to be without personal
ambition, self-assertion, or claims to status or precedence within the community itself.
48
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Power is performed through humility and service, each deferring to others and looking to
their needs rather than his/her own. Overall, Paul seems to be describing an ideal
community that is without hierarchical structure, one in which status and authority are not
claimed or asserted, and in which leadership is performed by example (3:17). Though in
the greeting Paul mentions both bishops and deacons in the Philippi church (1:1), there is
no indication in the letter of a hierarchical structure to the community or of particular
leaders having an authority to which others should defer. Euodia and Syntyche are
clearly important members of the church, yet they are not presented as having authority
over others. As we shall see shortly, Paul does later command obedience — and
obedience does, after all, figure centrally in Christ’s kenotic performance —, but a
hierarchical structure of authority is not understood as that which enforces and ensures
communal kenosis. Rather, Paul calls for a community based on mutuality and equality in
which power is performed through humility and mutual subordination.
How realistic was this ideal? Presumably, members of the community came from
different socio-economic strata within Philippi itself, a status differential that would not
have been easily left behind.50 Merk argues that Paul’s invocation of tapeinophrosyne
(humbly regarding others as more important than oneself) and kenodoxia (vainglory) in
this passage refers directly to this problem. In Roman society, including colonies like
Philippi, “an order of gradations” prevailed “in which a person was regarded or valued
according to his social standing. Accordingly, Paul’s exhortation in 2: 2-4 (as well as at
Rom. 12:16) is a call to the readers not to disqualify fellow church members on the
grounds of their social standing. Rather, they are to show true humility, regarding others
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better than themselves.”51 Significantly for feminists, the mention of three women by
name in the Philippi church (Euodia and Syntyche in Philippians, Lydia in Acts) without
restrictions on their activities (as is found in Paul’s letter to the church in Corinth) also
supports the notion of Philippi as an ideal community that explicitly rejects claims to
status or authority.52
The second passage, which completes Paul’s description of communal kenosis,
immediately follows the account of Christic kenosis:
So then, my beloved, obedient as you have always been (hupêkousate), not
only when I am present but all the more when I am absent, work out your
salvation in fear and trembling. For God is the one who for his good
purpose, works in you (energôn en humin) both to desire and to work. Do
everything without grumbling or questioning, that you may be blameless
and innocent, children of God without blemish in the midst of a crooked
and perverse generation. . . .
Following the evocation of the Christic myth (“he was obedient to death, even death on a
cross”), Paul here emphasizes the language of obedience. To whom is this obedience
due? On one level, it is obviously due to the authority of Paul’s teaching as contained in
the letter itself. However, when linked with the theme of obedience as expressed in the
Christic myth, it is not so much obedience to an authority (Paul’s or anyone else’s in the
community) as it is a profound submission to the power of God working within his
people toward their salvation. Just as Christ was obedient to God even to the point of
death on a cross, so too the Philippi Christians are to submit to this death orientation in
the hope of resurrection. Obedience is thus central to a kenotic performance of
community, yet this obedience is not at the level of the political (that is, following a
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command/submission model of communal organization); it is, rather, a profound
submission to suffering with Christ, and an acceptance of this suffering as a gift and,
ultimately, a means of power (1:29; 3:10). Thus, the mutual interpersonal subordination
that is the practice of power in a kenotic community has at its core a deeper submission:
kenosis as a submission to the power of God working within the self, a power that leads
inexorably to suffering in conformity to Christ’s death and resurrection.
In summary, the letter presents an ideal of communal kenosis premised on
mutuality, without ranking according to status (Paul’s typical language is that of
partnership: 1:7; 2:22; 2:25; 4:3-4). It underwrites a non-hierarchical community in which
power is performed through the perception of others as better than oneself and the
concern for their needs over one’s own. It is, furthermore, the ideal underwriting a
community in which leadership is exercised principally by example (3:17). Despite the
ideals underwriting this community, members nonetheless must deal with the constant
temptation to take advantage of the vulnerability inherent in kenosis by manipulating this
communal structure for their own advantage and interests (hence the warnings against
self-assertion and vainglory in 2:3; 3:21).

1.6 Political Kenosis
The political dimension of kenosis may appear less explicitly in the epistle than
does the communal dimension, yet, as I have argued throughout, the political realities of
the Philippi community are very much at the forefront of Paul’s concerns and
inextricably bound up with his instructions to his co-religionists. The Philippi church is
experiencing harassment, persecution, and possible execution for preaching the gospel in

36

conflict with the Imperial cult; the orientation to death that is the core submission of
kenosis is not simply a submission to the inevitability of death but, more specifically, to a
potentially violent death at the hands of political authorities. It is with this acute
awareness that Paul eagerly anticipates the great reversal of the “day of Christ,” or the
coming of Christ as cosmic Lord, and the resultant subjection of all other powers to him
(in the great and final cosmic completion of kenosis).
The key passages that express this political kenosis are those explicitly related to
Paul’s imprisonment and possible execution. In this situation, Paul presents himself as a
model for the Philippi Christians. For Paul, his imprisonment, rather than being a
hindrance to his work (or more precisely the work being done through him by God), is in
fact advancing the gospel (1:12); it is thus cast not as an unfortunate result of preaching
Christ but as part of God’s larger purpose (2:13). Though Paul clearly hopes for release
from prison in the short term so that he can continue this work (1:25–26), he expresses an
extraordinary indifference to death. In part because of this, the following passages are
striking in their energy and enthusiasm, giving profound expression to Paul’s own
experience of faith in Christ:
My eager expectation and hope is that I shall not be put to shame in any
way, but that with all boldness, now as always, Christ will be magnified in
my body, whether by life or by death. For to me life is Christ, and death is
gain. If I go on living in the flesh, that means fruitful labor for me. And I
do not know which I shall choose. I am caught between the two. I long to
depart this life and be with Christ, that is far better. Yet that I remain in the
flesh is more necessary for your benefit. (1:20–24)
But whatever gains I had, these I have come to consider a loss
because of Christ. More than that; I even consider everything as loss
because of the supreme good of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord. For his
sake I have accepted the loss of all things and I consider them so much
rubbish, that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having any
righteousness of my own based on the law but that which comes through
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faith in Christ, the righteousness of God, depending on faith to know him
and the power (dunamis) of his resurrection and the sharing of his
sufferings by being conformed to his death, if somehow I may attain the
resurrection from the dead. (3:7-11)

Though not marked particularly by humility or submission, these passages do express
essential elements of the kenotic myth. In relation to the archetypal Christic kenosis, they
highlight the great reversal that concludes the kenotic journey: After humiliation,
suffering, and submission to death comes exaltation and a reversal of power relations.
Because Paul lives in the tangible hope of sharing in Christ’s exaltation, he does not fear
death or the “loss of all things,” particularly the loss of the status and authority he could
claim by virtue of his standing as a Pharisee and, implicitly, his standing as a Roman
citizen (of which he boasts elsewhere).53 Paul, like Christ, does not claim the status and
power that is rightly his. Like Christ, Paul submits to persecution, imprisonment, and the
threat of death at the hands of the political powers. In doing so, he hopes to share in
Christ’s power: a power over death itself and its destruction of bodily life, and more
generally, a power that will subject all other powers to itself. Thus, the kenotic
submission to political power (Caesar’s power) entails an intentional abnegation of
worldly power (such as that granted by Caesar) that one could rightly claim. The ability
to perform this submission is through Christ’s power, which, paradoxically, submits to
the power of Caesar (Christ’s own death) and yet will eventually (at the “day of Christ”)
triumph over that of Caesar. If the divine Christ kenotically renounces the status and
power that is rightly his and submits himself to the violence of an unjust death at the
hands of the Roman authorities, and Paul (a Roman citizen and a Pharisee) renounces his
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claims to status and power by sharing in Christ’s renunciation, then surely the Philippi
Christians are exhorted to do so, assured that they share in Christ’s power.54
The political message here is that the Philippi Christians should not be claiming
status (either on the basis of Roman citizenship or through Jewish identification) in order
to protect themselves from political persecution and the possibility of a humiliating death.
Instead, they should kenotically embrace their powerlessness and submit to the coercive
power of the authorities in the hope of sharing in Christ’s greater power when he comes
again.
Paul first uses this political language at 1:27–28, where he exhorts the Philippi
Christians “as citizens of heaven [to] live in a manner that is worthy of the Gospel of
Christ.”55 Their temptation is to claim another citizenship (Roman) so as to assert the
rights that come with it. Paul insists that, since their opponents’ worldly power will in the
long run lead to their destruction, the temptation to claim it should be resisted. In
contrast, the Christians are to claim a heavenly citizenship that is expressed in a conduct
“worthy of the gospel of Christ” and leads to salvation.56 The contrast between the claims
of two kinds of citizenship and their outcomes (destruction or salvation) is made even
stronger at 3:20–21: Unlike that of those who claim status based on Roman citizenship,
the Christians’ “citizenship is in heaven, and from it [they] also await a savior, the Lord
Jesus Christ. He will change our lowly body to conform with his glorified body by the
power that enables him also to bring all things into subjection to himself.” The language
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of subjection clearly echoes the cosmic subjection stated in the end of the Christic myth
when “at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, those in heaven, on earth and under
the earth” (2:10). Thus, Christ performs power in two ways: first as renunciation and then
as dominance, namely a dominance over death and all other powers.
In summary, Paul’s use of political language and metaphor to express belief in the
return of Christ and the resurrection of the dead has real-world political consequences.
Because of this belief, Christians will face suffering and death. In conformity with
Christ’s own suffering and death, they are to kenotically submit to the political powers. If
their submission is truly through the power of Christ, they will also go on to share in his
power over death and over all other powers. The anticipated “day of Christ” (1:6; 1;10;
and 2:16) will mean not only life and glory for the Christians, but death and destruction
for their present persecutors (1:28 and 3:19). Thus, the political dimension of kenosis
entails submission to political power to the point of death even — or especially — when
one has grounds for claiming rights based on status. This submission, however, is not
final, nor is it an end in itself. The power to perform this submission comes from Christ
and is the same power that will eventually triumph over all other powers — including
that of death itself.

1.7 Christic Kenosis
The great kenotic myth/hymn (2:5–11) stands at the center of the letter to the
Philippians, giving it its focus and structure. It celebrates the central event of Christian
faith and provides one of its most powerful significations: The One who is in the form of
God becomes a lowly human, dies an ignoble death, and is consequently exalted as
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cosmic Lord and Christ. The central symbols of the myth are slavery (subjugation,
powerlessness), death by crucifixion (condemnation, violation), elevation (attainment of
supreme power), and a cosmic “bending of the knee” (submission, obeisance, honor).
It is interesting to note that Christ’s resurrection from the dead is symbolically
missing from the myth (though arguably implied by the fact of exaltation), even though it
figures centrally in Paul’s preaching of the gospel elsewhere in Philippians and in his
other texts.57 For Paul, the strongest motive for believing in Christ and conforming to his
death is the resurrection promise this belief entails (3:10-11, 21). Paul thus places the
fulfillment of Christic kenosis at the center of his exhortation to the Philippians — as
object of their faith, as motive for their conduct, and as source of the spiritual power that
makes both their faith and conduct possible and will lead to their own resurrection.
Turning now to the myth, I want to begin by highlighting the centrality of the
concept of power by briefly considering the myth against the background of the imperial
cult at Philippi and in terms of Paul’s use of political metaphors elsewhere in the letter
(most importantly at 3:20).
Even though the term “power” is not used in the myth, it figures prominently in
the soteriology of Philippians, either explicitly (3:10; 3:21) or in the language of God’s
“working” or “doing” in and with the community (1:6, 28; and 2.13). Divine power,
manifested in Christ, is at work within the Christian community moving toward its
triumphant manifestation on the day of Christ, when those who believe will be raised and
transformed with Christ and those who disbelieve will face destruction. As already noted,
emperors were cast as kurios and sôtêr within the context of the cult. Transforming this,
the myth professes Christ as the cosmic kurios (2:10–11), and Paul, in reminding the
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Philippi Christians that their true “citizenship is in heaven,” speaks of him as a sôtêr and
kurios who will “subject all things to himself” (3:20–21). Tellbe has argued further that
other conceptual elements of the myth also have imperial parallels. For instance,
emperors could be referred to as isotheos (“equal to god”), and Christ is described as isa
Theô (2:7). Further, Tellbe notes, forms of the verb harpazô (“to snatch”) were used to
express imperial abuses of power, and Christ is depicted as intentionally not grasping at
or “snatching” (harpagmon) his equality with God. Finally, the “origin and destiny of the
emperor in imperial ideology were often described in paradigms similar to that of Christ,
viz., pre-existence, incarnation, return to heaven and exaltation (apotheôsis).”58
Drawing principally on the works of Bornhäuser and Bormann, Tellbe argues that
the Christic myth contrasts two ways of performing power (imperial and Christic) and
concludes that
with this background in mind, Jesus Christ in Philippians is firmly
juxtaposed with the emperor, and even placed above in a way that
constituted an assertion whose boldness could not have been missed by
citizens of a colony where imperial ideology was everywhere. To confess
Jesus Christ as the sovereign and universal κυριος in this setting would
have relativized the authority of all earthly rulers and marked a strong
political demarcation against the divine pretensions of the Roman
emperors.59
Paul is thus presenting Christ’s performance of power as a radical alternative to that of
the emperor. In particular, Paul presents Christ’s performance of power as a profound
subordination to violation and death. This performance is then transformed into a
triumphant performance that can demand and achieve the submission of all other powers.
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The very same power at work in Christ is capable of working salvation in the believing
Christian (1:6, 28; 2:13): Through faith, the believing Christian can “know [Christ] and
the power of his resurrection” by sharing his sufferings and being “conformed to his
death” (3.:10). In other words, the Christian is meant to participate in Christ’s
performance of power, not only in his humiliating submission to suffering and death but
also in his exaltation.
In order to focus on these two performances of power (kenotic and
exalted) and their interrelation, we turn to the myth itself, beginning with the first
half, which dramatizes the kenotic performance of power.60
[Christ Jesus] though he was in the form of God [morphê theou] did not
regard equality with God something to be grasped [harpagmon]. Rather,
he emptied himself [heauton ekenosen], taking the form of a slave
[morphên doulou], coming in human likeness; and found humble in
appearance, he humbled himself [etapeinôsen heauton], becoming
obedient [hupêkoos] to death, even to death on a cross.
Christ, the central figure in the myth, is portrayed as a divine being who chooses not to
assert his divine power (his equality with God), instead reducing himself to the level of a
human being of the lowest class (a slave) and obediently undergoing a violent, ignoble
death. The myth thus contrasts two radically opposite forms (morphê) or modes of being,
divinity and human slavery, with the figure of Christ descending from the highest to the
lowest.
Though Paul never simply calls Christ “God”, since theos always refers to the
“Father,” there is no question that Paul attributes divinity to Christ; in Philippians this is
most clearly expressed in his use of the kurios title and his repeated references to “the day
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of Christ” (1:6,10: 2:16), a phrase that echoes the Old Testament references to the “day of
YHWH.”61 If the language of morphê is interpreted to mean “the manifestation of the
underlying being,” 62 then morphê theou and morphên doulou contrast two ways of being,
two types of status, two performances of power, that stand at opposite ends of the
spectrum: the supreme power of God and the powerlessness of an abject human being.
Thus, the pre-existent Christ manifested divinity in the sense that he enjoyed divine status
and power, and subsequently manifested humanity in his decision to “empty himself.”
This brings us to the explicit use of the concept of kenosis, a rather lowly word in
Greek that has come to take on such weight and importance. In Greek, the verb kenoô
means, literally, “to empty, or make empty” and, metaphorically, “to make of no
effect.”63 It is rarely used in Scripture (twice in the LXX, five times in the NT), and when
it is, it is always used in a metaphorical sense.64 How is the metaphor functioning in the
myth and within the context of Pauline theology? As O’Brien notes, the meaning of
Christ’s self-emptying is elaborated in the following two phrases: “taking the form of a
slave” and “coming in human likeness.” Thus, as metaphor, it expresses the profound
humiliation involved in Christ’s movement from divine to human form. He is “emptied
out” and made powerless or ineffective. Focusing on the “mind of Christ” (2:5) in the
kenotic movement, we can say that not only does he refuse to claim his divine status but
he also refuses higher human status, thereby subjecting himself to coercive political
powers that impose a shaming, violent death. Within the socio-political context of
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Philippians, the language of slavery powerfully expresses this humiliation. In this
context, as Moule points out, “slavery meant. . .the extreme in respect to deprivation of
rights. . . . Pushed to its logical conclusion, slavery would deny a person the right to
anything – even to his own life or person.” Thus, Christ’s “absolute and extreme selfemptying” meant that he “completely stripped himself of the rights and securities as to be
comparable to a slave.”65
What was “the mind of Christ” that informed this kenotic movement? In other
words, what kind of performance of power is involved in Christic kenosis? The first
thing to note is that the performance of “self-emptying” implies the prior possession of
status and the capacity to perform power — in this case, supreme divine power —
productively. Hence, “the mind of Christ” involves the knowledge that Christ can claim
divinity by right and by nature, yet does not.66

Second, the performance of kenosis is an

active decision, not something passively undergone: In Thurston’s words, “Christ
chooses to do this to himself; he is both subject and object of the verb.”67 Third, the effect
of this self-emptying is a change in status and productive power insofar as Christ is
reduced to the form of a slave, a condition characterized by humiliation, powerlessness,
and forced obedience. In doing so, his performative capacity is reduced or circumscribed
to that “of a slave.”68
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A fourth element of “the mind of Christ” is that Christ’s performance of kenosis is
oriented toward suffering and death, making him vulnerable to violence, domination, and
violation. Vulnerability lies at the heart of kenosis and is essential to its performance. It
permits and even provokes domination and violation; a public, painful and shaming death
is its inexorable nadir. As Osiek notes, in the empire of the first century, “death by
crucifixion was considered to deprive the victim of all honor and submerge him or her in
shame.”69
Fifth, the kenotic movement as exercised in and by “the mind of Christ” is
relational; it is not performed individualistically but in relation to God and God’s
purposes. At the beginning of the myth, Christ is acknowledged as having “equality with
God,” and after his death, he is exalted by God and given supreme power. Thus, Christic
kenosis is power-in-relation. Christ’s status vis-à-vis God (the Father) is profoundly
altered by his kenotic performance, as he places himself in a subordinate position vis-àvis the Father’s power. This subordination chiefly takes the form of obedience. It
additionally places him in a subordinate relation to human powers of various kinds,
especially and finally the powers of the Roman Imperium, which subjects him to a
shameful and violating death.

restraint, a profound decision not to act out of a power he nonetheless retains, or is it more appropriate to
speak of a reduction in his capacity to perform a divine power? The idea of God humbly refusing to
exercise his power in relation to humans, a power he nonetheless retains, is at the heart of the Jewish notion
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the World,” 142-44.) I do not consider these metaphysical questions here since my aim is to stay within the
symbolism of the myth, and the theology and purposes of Philippians. In this context, the central
movement is from a status of divinity to one of slavery, where slavery symbolizes a human position of
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Humiliating death is, of course, not the end of the story. The conclusion of the
myth reverses the kenotic movement through a movement of exaltation:
Because of this God greatly exalted him [Theos auton huperpupôsen] and
bestowed on him the name that is above every name that at the name of
Jesus every knee should bend, of those in heaven, on earth and under the
earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of
God the father.
Because of his willingness to relinquish his power and subordinate himself to the powers
of the world and the power of death, Christ is exalted by God. Not only is he raised from
the dead (implied by his exaltation) but he also has divine power restored to him and all
other powers subjected to him. Exaltation or restoration thus completes and reverses the
kenotic movement. Within the frame of Paul’s theology, it also provides the purpose of
the kenotic movement: Christ’s suffering and death mysteriously bring about the
salvation of those who believe. His return in power will bring about the great reversal
when those who now wield power coercively will be subject to the Cosmic Christ.
Therefore, the endpoint of Christ’s kenotic movement is a performance of power that
demands the submission of all other powers.
From this, we can identity two further elements of Christic kenosis. Sixth, the
humiliation and violation, though real, are only temporary, since Christ’s kenotic
performance of power is not an end in itself but is, rather, part of a larger purpose that,
once achieved, no longer requires the performance of kenosis. Seventh, in its completion,
the kenotic movement restores Christ’s equality to God the Father and subjects all other
powers to Christ’s supreme and universal power. Power performed kenotically is thus
not proposed as an ideal (Christian) performance of power in contrast to a productive
(dominating) power that demands submission. Rather, Christ performs power both
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kenotically and exaltedly, as both lowly servant and cosmic lord, within a power dynamic
that is fluid, negotiated, and reversible.
The theme of exaltation is essential to Paul’s theological purposes in Philippians.
Paul preaches conformity to Christ’s death in the hope of resurrection. Without the
completion of resurrection, suffering and death are without meaning or purpose. The very
power by which Christ subjects all things to himself is the power that will “transform our
lowly bodies to conform with his glorified body” (3:21). The elements of temporality and
reversal are essential to Paul’s message: Living in conformity to Christ’s death now will
lead to sharing in his cosmic lordship when all the powers that now oppress the Christian
community (not only political powers but also and especially the power of death itself)
will be subject to Christ. Those who have believed in him and suffered for/with him can
live in the hope of this transformation, while those who have denied him can expect
destruction and damnation.
This lengthy reading of Paul has provided a rich and complicated model of
power-relations. Communal kenosis is a model of interpersonal actions within a
communal frame; political kenosis provides a model for responding to oppressive
political structures; Christic kenosis is the model of divine-human interaction in its
various forms — including God’s kenotic action in relation to humanity (incarnation)
and, to reverse the direction, the human response to God’s action. Many other
relationships are left out of this picture. We do not know from Paul, for example, what it
would mean to practice political power from a position of dominance rather than from a
position of weakness, as Christianity will only confront this issue with the rise of the
imperial church. Furthermore, we are only indirectly presented with a model of one-on-
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one interpersonal relationships (in Paul’s references to individual co-workers and
friends). Still, Paul’s rendering of the kenotic myth contains all its essential elements -an intentional reduction of power; profound submission to others, violence and death; and
finally exaltation -- and therefore can be seen as the Christian kenotic model of power
performance.

1.8 The Ethics of Kenosis
I now turn to issues surrounding the ethics of kenosis. For many (mostly male)
modern and post-modern Christian theologians engaged in the recovery of the theology
of kenosis, the symbol is an unmixed good and functions as an antidote to the horrific
abuses of power that defined the twentieth century and are dangerously continuing into
the twenty-first. To image God’s power as self-limiting and made vulnerable, especially
by incarnation, offers an alternative to oppressive performances of power. As Coakley
points out, this theological move on the part of some of the most influential theologians
of the twentieth century (e.g., Barth, Balthasar and Moltmann) works to valorize
“Christic vulnerability” and to present submission as, paradoxically, identical with divine
power.70 A God who practices power kenotically counters human abuses of power,
offering models for human agency of performances of power that are relational, selflimiting, and self-gifting.
Because it is Balthasar and those theologians influenced by him (e.g., Ward,
Papanikolao, McIntyre) who, in a number of ways, push the notion of kenosis to its
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extreme, 71 I want to briefly concentrate on some Balthasarian formulations of kenosis
that are illustrative of this recovery. In the Balthasarian frame, kenosis is the ultimate and
all-encompassing symbol of reality itself, defining God, love, and personhood: Kenosis is
the very mode of being of the persons of the Trinity; it is identical with the energia of
love; it is the full actualization of personhood, both divine and human.
Balthasar’s recovery of kenosis is not principally Christic but, rather, Trinitarian
in that Christ’s kenosis in incarnation, suffering, and death is a continuation of the Son’s
relation to the Father within the Trinitarian processions, and is therefore expressive of the
Trinity’s very mode of being:
We shall never know how to express the abyss-like depths of the Father’s
self-giving, the Father who, in an eternal “super-Kenosis,” makes himself
“destitute” of all that he is and can be so as to bring forth a consubstantial
divinity, the Son. Everything that can be thought and imagined where God
is concerned is, in advance, included and transcended in this selfdestitution which constitutes the person of the Father, and, at the same
time, those of the Son and the Spirit.72
When we consider “all the contingent ‘abasements’ of God in the economy of salvation,”
Balthasar continues, we see that they all have their ultimate source and motivating power
within the Trinitarian super-kenosis. This is to say that kenosis is not, strictly speaking,
“the act of the Son”; rather, it is “the disposition of love within the trinitarian
community,” a community “constituted by differences which desire the other.”73 The
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Father’s kenosis is, in a sense, primary, expressing both infinite power and infinite
powerlessness:
The Father, in uttering and surrendering himself without reserve, does not
lose himself by self-giving, just as he does not keep back anything of
himself either. For, in this self-surrender, he is the whole divine essence.
Here we see both God’s infinite power and his powerlessness; he cannot
be God in any other way but in this “kenosis” within the Godhead itself.
(Yet what omnipotence is revealed here! He brings forth a God who is of
equal substance and therefore uncreated, even if, in this self-surrender, he
must go to the very extreme of self-lessness.)74

Proceeding from the primary kenosis of the Father, the Son’s kenosis is principally in the
form of receptivity and thanksgiving: “He receives this unity of omnipotence and
powerlessness from the Father.”75 Thus, the Christic kenosis celebrated in the Philippians
myth is “only the manifestation of the (Trinitarian) Eucharist of the Son: he will be
forever the slain lamb, on the throne of the Father’s glory.”76 It is an extension of the
divine kenosis into the realm of human experience with all its inherent risks. But “every
‘risk’ on God’s part is undergirded by, and enabled by, the power-less power of the
divine self-giving.”77
In this framework, kenosis is relational, ecstatic, self-gifting, and receptive.
While the Father’s defining mode of being in relation to the Son is “self-destitution” and
“self-abandonment,” the Son’s mode of being as response to the Father is defined in
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terms of total receptivity, obedience, and a “eucharistic” out-pouring of his very being.78
As Papanikolaou summarizes it, Trinitarian kenosis “refers to the ekstatic movement of
the one toward the other, the self-destitution in favor of the other,” which is, “at one and
the same time . . . a making-space for the reception of the ‘other.’”79 Not only does
kenosis define Trinitarian persons/relations, but it also defines divine love: As Ward
states, the “distinctive nature of love is to give, a continual act of self-abandonment.”80
Divine kenosis is thus identified with love itself, for it is the desire, the energia that
constitutes and differentiates the Trinitarian persons. As such, the kenotic movement
defines what it means to be “person”, both divine and human. In Papanikolaou’s words,
ultimately kenosis “is not primarily self-sacrifice, but a state of being that liberates eros,
the desire to be in relation with the other. It is a precondition for relations of love and
freedom, the only context in which the self is truly given.”81
Not surprisingly, many feminist theologians are deeply skeptical of this recovery
of kenosis, and not only because kenosis is typically expressed in feminine terms.82 While
sharing the project of criticizing interpretations of the classical concept of divine
omnipotence that lend themselves to glorifications of power performed as domination
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(e.g., McFague, Johnson, Case-Winters),83 many feminist and womanist theologians are
at the same time deeply suspicious of (particularly male, white and heterosexual)
valorizations of self-abandonment, suffering, and submission (e.g., Rita Nakashima
Brock and Rebecca Anne Parker, Shawn Copeland, Carter Heyward).84 As Coakley puts
the general feminist challenge: “How can the call for the liberation of the powerless and
oppressed, especially of women, possibly coexist with a revalorization of any form of
submission, divine or otherwise?” Does not “an abused God merely legitimate abuse”?85
Pressing this point beyond the question of gender, Coakley asks whether, given the
“hierarchy of oppressions” that structure our world, any defense of submission is
justifiable: “In the wake of the twentieth century’s shocking technocratic genocides, and
in the conditions of this new century’s frighteningly globalized economic power and
ever-more devastating fragilities (political, medical, ecological),”86 ought any form of
submission be proposed as an ideal performance of power?
In one of the most often cited feminist critiques of kenosis, Daphne Hampson
argues that the Christic model of self-sacrifice and voluntary powerlessness, while
perhaps meaningful for those in privileged positions of power, is not only inappropriate
but in fact deeply harmful for those who are struggling to overcome historical oppression
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and powerlessness. Women in particular, Hampson writes, have been socialized to
embrace this “gospel of powerlessness” by making self-sacrifice and living for others
essential to their identity.87 In being socialized in this way, women often struggle to
achieve autonomy, a self with clear boundaries, and the ability to productively and
creatively claim power. Hampson argues instead for a model of “empowerment” that
avoids the binary of powerfulness/powerlessness that the kenotic myth assumes:
“Empowerment implies a different understanding of the self from either the self-enclosed
self which dominates others, or the destroyed self which lives outside itself in mistaken
service to others.” 88
Many other feminist theologians have pursued a similar critique, particularly
problematizing the dialectic that opposes the omnipotent, impassible God of classical
theology, on the one hand, to the vulnerable, suffering (and feminized) kenotic Christ on
the other. Elizabeth Johnson neatly summarizes this ongoing feminist project:
In the long run the antidote to an impassible, omnipotent God is neither
the reverse image of a victimized, helpless one nor silence on the whole
subject. What is needed is to step decisively out of the androcentric system
of power-over versus victimization and think in other categories about
power, pain, and their deep interweaving in human experience.89
As Johnson’s comment makes clear, it is not simply a question of rethinking the concept
of power alone; it has to do with rethinking the roles and natures of vulnerability,
suffering, and pain in relationships that invariably involve power. Most of our
relationships are structured by power asymmetries – one person in the relationship is
more dominant, whether by virtue of position in the relationship, social and economic
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status, age, race, or gender -- or simply in terms of personality and character. Most
relationships consequently entail vulnerabilities of various kinds and the attendant need
to negotiate power. Kenosis offers a particular model for structuring relationships, a
model in which one person (or more — in the case of communal kenosis) intentionally
reduces his or her capacity for productive power and submits to the potentially greater
power of the other. In doing so, she makes herself vulnerable to the risks of violation and
domination. Ideally, this “power-in-vulnerability” does not entail violation and
domination, leading instead to a greater empowerment for all those involved.90
Because of the historical oppression of women and its justification by the kenotic
myth, the feminist criticisms of kenosis challenge the idea that the myth – with its central
symbols of slavery, violent death, and eventual exaltation – is the best way to envision
“power-in-vulnerability.” In what follows, I want to distinguish a number of ethical
considerations contained within this feminist criticism, which will guide my reading of
Julian’s re-articulation of the kenotic symbol. In the final chapter, I return to these ethical
issues by considering the adequacy of the kenosis model for victims of trauma and abuse.
Given that the kenotic myth and the reality of Jesus’s actual death by crucifixion
undoubtedly portray abuse and violence, the danger is that this central Christian symbol
unavoidably valorizes such experiences, imbuing them with ultimate meaning in such a
way that victimization becomes not only legitimized but also made normative. For this
reason, the ultimate test of the symbol is to assess what it might mean in the context of
trauma and abuse. Can the myth of kenosis be meaningful for those who have suffered
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abuse and trauma?91 The question to be explored in the final chapter is whether Julian’s
reconfigurations might be meaningful in such a context. At this point, however, I mean
only to clarify a number of ethical considerations that the feminist criticism entails.
The first set of ethical question regarding the value of the kenotic symbol involves
the consideration of context. Performances of kenosis cannot be considered without
reference to the social and political locations of the subjects involved. One must ask
questions about who is proposing kenosis, who is performing it in relation to whom, as
well as under what conditions and for what purposes it is being performed. Once kenosis
is situated in terms of class, gender, race, nationality, age, or factors leading to power
differentials, the ethical issues come into focus. Absent this contextualization, proposing
an abstract kenosis without considering the power relations already in place typically
functions as a rationalization for existing power-relations or as a cover for performances
of power that are profoundly interested and unethical, with the result that those in
dominant positions remain dominant, those in subordinate positions remain subordinate,
and the valorization of vulnerability and submissiveness serves to re-enforce the
imbalance of power. In summary, any proposal of kenosis as a model for performing
power must pay adequate attention to the material nature of the relationship at stake and
the social location of its subjects (and objects).
A second, related set of ethical considerations centers on the distinction between
structurally symmetrical and asymmetrical relations. Relationships are often, even
typically, unequal, the capacity to perform power unbalanced. Think, for instance, of
paradigmatic relationships such as parent-child, teacher-student, therapist-patient,
91
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employer-employee, or (patriarchal) husband-wife relationships. Each of these relations
is premised on and constituted by power asymmetry, in that one of the persons has far
greater productive power vis-à-vis the other. In contrast, other relations are premised on
or aim at symmetry: friendships, egalitarian marriages, or groups that intentionally aspire
to non-hierarchical and cooperative performances of power. In these relationships,
productive power is more equally distributed and (ideally) practiced cooperatively. The
ethics of kenosis takes on a very different form depending upon which type of
relationship is at stake, symmetrical or asymmetrical.
In asymmetrical relations, the dominant subject is more powerful in the sense that
s/he initiates, leads, and more or less determines the configuration of the relationship,
since s/he has the greater power to influence the actions of the other. Yet the subordinate
subject is not without power; were this the case, we would no longer be speaking of a
relationship. The dominant subject may have greater power to affect the actions of the
other, but the subordinate subject is not entirely devoid of power. The less powerful
subject may perform his or her power by following the lead of the more dominant
subject, or s/he may perform power through cooperation, submission, passive-aggressive
manipulation, or resistance. In all cases, s/he is performing power and thus constituting or
performing relationship. Yet, when kenosis is held up as an ideal in such relationships, it
is not clear who should be performing kenosis. The dominant subject, by virtue of having
great power, seems to be the one who is more capable of a kenotic performance. But if
this is the case, what does the kenotic model propose for the subordinate subject? How
ought s/he perform his/her real but relatively limited power? Is his/her acceptance or
willing submission kenotic in the strict sense? Or should s/he instead aim at performing
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power productively? Further, what form does the kenotic performance take on the part of
the dominant subject? Self-restraint? A transfer of power? Abdication of power? The
model/symbol/myth by itself does not immediately answer these questions; each would
have to be spelled out concretely in order for the model to be functional and meaningful
in its expression and application. In the concluding chapter, where I examine the model
of kenosis in the context of recovery from trauma and abuse, I argue that kenosis should
never be proposed as a model for survivors of abuse, though it may serve, in part, as a
model for the therapist’s performance of power in relation to the survivor.
On the other hand, relationships that aim at symmetry seem to be the ideal for
mutual, kenotic performances. This is what Paul had in mind with communal kenosis and
what the Balthasarian theologians assume about the relations among the Trinitarian
persons. Such relationships assume, or at least aim at, mutuality, equality, and a
negotiated power of give-and-take on the part of each of the subjects. Even here,
however, certain questions arise. Can relationships function and endure if both subjects
(or all, in the communal model) are consistently giving up productive power, reducing
their own capacities, giving way to the other? Is a relationship premised on mutual “selfabandonment” either realistic or ethically desirable? Put another way, are not productive
performances of power (e.g., taking initiative, being creative, resisting, challenging) as
essential to flourishing relationships as kenotic performances?
A third consideration concerns the recognition of the risk of violence inherent in
kenotic performances. Ideally, the more dominant subject in the kenotic relationship
does not perform his or her power as domination, and the kenotic subject does not
succumb to abjection or a passive-aggressive manipulation of his or her own relative
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powerlessness. Yet the threat of violence is always a real possibility; it stands at the
center of the Christic myth. Even if Christ’s violent death is interpreted as an unintended
yet unavoidable consequence of his kenotic performance, the violence and violation done
to him embody the nadir of his kenotic descent. Christ’s kenosis can be interpreted as
God’s response to human violence (rather than intervening on behalf of the powerless,
God chooses to suffer with them as a victim); but it is precisely his kenosis that provokes
and enables the violence done against him (if he had not given up his productive power,
he would not have been subject to the violence). Kenosis invites violence. To deny or
de-center the violence not only radically modifies the myth; it also makes kenotic
performances even more dangerous because the threat of violence remains implicit and
unacknowledged.
One of the ways by which violence becomes enabled within kenotic performances
is when the power relations become rigid and fixed (as is the case, e.g., in patriarchal
marriages, racism, and extreme gaps between rich and poor). As Foucault points out,
relations of power become structured by domination whenever the relations become rigid,
fixed, and unchanging.92 This rigidity is always a danger within asymmetrical relations,
where the risk is that the domination of one subject over another becomes a defining
feature of a given relationship. Yet it is also a danger within symmetrical relationships.
Whenever the kenotic subject is reduced to permanent subordination and the dominant
subject granted permanent domination, kenosis no longer can be ethical, enriching, and
positively purposeful. With rigidity, kenosis becomes a performance of domination and
abjection through the actual or implied use of violence on the part of the dominant
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subject. Thus, key to the ethical performance of kenosis is, first of all, an explicit
recognition of the threat of violence and violation, and secondly, a commitment to
dynamism and exchange within relationship. That is to say, the ideal is not the
transcendence of power itself but, rather, performances that are diffuse, fluid, and
dynamic.
A fourth issue is raised when kenosis is proposed as the central model in such a
way that other kinds of power, particularly performances that are creative and productive,
are denigrated as less ethical or not ethical at all. To take initiative in relationships, to
create and produce, to positively affect the actions of another, to teach and mentor others,
to work at relations that are mutually empowering, to resist and work to change unjust
relations — all these are equally ethical responses that are as essential to personhood as
are kenotic acts. To denigrate these as less than ideal is to present a very partial and
ultimately distorting view of human relations and human acting. On a social level, a
kenotic-ethics makes political action irrelevant or impossible, thereby breeding a kind of
apolitical quietism – a withdrawal from and an abdication of responsibility. On the level
of personal relationships, the kenotic ideal obscures the dynamic tension of relationships
that aim at mutual empowerment and, in doing so, can function to mask the actual
performances of power in the relationship. As much of feminist ethics has pointed out,
ethical demands on both the personal and social level often require that we act
productively, creatively, and forcefully – performances of power that also function as
ethical ideals. Speaking out against institutionalized injustice and working for change,
leaving an abusive relationship and learning to live independently, taking leadership roles
in organizations and communities, advocating for the marginalized and oppressed,
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creating and proposing solutions to social problems, all of these are ethically demanding
and ethically compelling performances of power quite different from that of kenosis. In
short, in proposing kenosis as ethical, we must not privilege it but should, rather, consider
it in relation to other, equally significant, performances of power.
A final set of questions centers on the symbol of exaltation. In the kenotic myth
and in the Pauline theology of Philippians, Christ’s abjection is finally overturned in the
end through a reversal of power relations; the risen Cosmic Christ has supreme power
over all other powers, in particular those imperial powers that put him to death.
According to Paul, the Christian’s faith in Christ will allow him/her to share in Christ’s
exaltation. But in contrasting imperial and Christic models of power and cult, it is
questionable whether Paul succeeds in freeing himself from the imperial symbols of
power and submission. As Watson points out, the myth (and its Pauline context) retains
“a profoundly hieratic picture of the universe, in which a top-down model of human
society and the operations of power remain firmly in place on the level of metaphor, even
as they seem to be challenged on that of meaning.”93 Recall that Paul predicts destruction
for Christ’s (and Paul’s) enemies and opponents in a final reversal whereby those who are
subordinate now will be exalted and those now in power will be destroyed. To what
degree does this really offer an alternative model of power? Are there meanings of the
myth that can truly escape the metaphors of slavery, violent death, and final triumph? Is
the cosmic Christ any less imperial in the end than the prevailing Roman emperor?
Watson remarks that it “is not surprising that both secular and ecclesiastical authorities
(from emperors and popes on down) have so often exploited the possibilities presented
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[in the myth], repatriating the language of power from the heavenly back to the earthly
order by asserting that their own exaltation. . .is an earthly symbol of heavenly reality.”94
This presents a fundamental dilemma for any reading of the myth: Either we accept that
exaltation and power reversal are essential to the myth, or we fail to take the myth, its
original context, and its history of interpretation seriously.95 Christic kenosis is
completed by reversal and exaltation – as such, does it really offer an alternative model of
power?
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Chapter Two
Negotiating Submission to Church Authorities
“And now I yelde me to my modyr holy chyrch
as a sympyll chylde owyth”96

2.1 Introduction
Throughout A Book of Showings, Julian repeatedly yields to Church teaching and
instructs her readers to do so as well, presenting as a model a child’s submission to a
wise, loving mother. Yet this conventional language of childlike submission masks a far
more complex set of relations and performances of power, particularly regarding the
relationship between personal experience of God in prayer and official Church teaching.
Julian self-consciously strives to remain within the bounds of orthodox belief and
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practice, yet she continually pushes those boundaries by encouraging an intellectual and
psychological boldness, revealing a fundamental confidence in the validity of personal
experience. While never expressly undermining Church authority, Julian’s strategy
works to valorize personal experience through prayer while relativizing Church teaching
and practice. Julian’s model child is bold and precocious, confident that her true
“mother” Jesus encourages growth and maturation –not only fearful submission.
This chapter serves to introduce Julian and her writings and to examine Julian’s
performances of power in relation to the Church. After a brief presentation of
biographical and manuscript material, the chapter examines a number of kenotic
performances on Julian’s part in terms of the Pauline categories explored in chapter 1. In
the first place, it examines Julian’s communal context and the ways in which she
practiced and proposed communal kenosis. Second, it explores the ecclesiastical politics
that circumscribed her personal decisions to become an anchoress and a vernacular
theologian, as well as her apparent decision not to circulate her writings. The final section
of the chapter moves within the writings themselves, centering on a fundamental tension
between what Julian knows through her experience of personal prayer and what she
knows through Church teaching; such a tension parallels the line Julian walks between a
profound impulse towards universal salvation and the caution with which she ultimately
curtails but does not cancel out this impulse. In a word, the writings present Julian’s
complex performances of power in which she balances the assertion of her own authority
with her submission to the authority of the Church.
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2.2 Biographical Gleanings
We know very little about the woman behind A Book of Showings or even behind
the name, Julian of Norwich.97 Neither of the two texts ascribed to her survives in its
original form, and of the six extant manuscripts, only one dates from the early fifteenth
century.98 Even the name, “Julian of Norwich,” is not her Christian name; it is, rather, the
name of the Church to which the author attached herself on becoming an anchoress.
Along with her name, the details of her history remain hidden from view.
In many ways, this concealment suits Julian’s life choice and also her genre of
writing. As an anchoress, Julian chose a “living death,” a retreat from the world and its
activities into the narrow confines of a grave-like cell.99 Her genre, visionary or
revelatory writing, required that its author subordinate herself to the divine source and
content of her teaching, becoming a mere, ideally anonymous, mouthpiece. As Jennifer
Summit points out, a medieval woman visionary writer becomes an author “by negation”:
She “establishes her authority on the basis of her self-effacement, in order to show that
97

Since Julian seems not to have titled her writings and they survive in two versions, there can be some
confusion in referencing her work. Following College and Walsh, I refer to the writings as a whole
(incorporating both versions) as A Book of Showings, abbreviated as Showings. When referring specifically
to the different versions, I refer to the shorter of the two as “The Short Text” (ST) and the longer as the
“Long Text” (LT). See College and Walsh, Julian of Norwich: A Book of Showings, “Introduction.”
Watson and Jenkins use the scribal titles to differentiate the two versions: “A Vision Showed to a Devout
Woman” (ST) and “A Revelation of Love” (LT). See Nicholas Watson and Jacqueline Jenkins, eds., The
Writings of Julian of Norwich.
98

The earliest manuscript (BL MS Additional 37790, Amherst Library) is a copy of the ST, dating circa
1435; it is contained in a Carthusian manuscript collection along with selections from 22 other spiritual
writings. Two complete versions of the LT date from the middle of the seventeenth century (Bibliothèque
Nationale, Fonds Anglais MS 40 and BL MS Sloane 2499), and one complete version dates from the
eighteenth century (BL Sloane 3705). There are also two excerpts, one dating from circa 1500
(Westminster Treasury MS 4) and the other, circa 1650 (Upholland Manuscript). For an overview of the
manuscripts, see College and Walsh, Julian of Norwich, “Introduction”; Watson and Jenkins, The Writings
of Julian of Norwich, “Introduction” and appendices A, D and E; Marion Glasscoe’s “Visions and
Revisions: A Further Look at the Manuscripts of Julian of Norwich”; and Alexandra Barrat, “How Many
Children Had Julian of Norwich?: Editions, Translations, and Versions of Her Revelations.”
99

Anne Savage and Nicholas Watson eds., Anchoritic Spirituality, “General Introduction,” 16, 18.

65

her writing issues not from her individual consciousness but from a heavenly source.”100
Despite Julian’s will to anonymity, there is still some information to be gleaned about her
from the surviving manuscripts and from a few external historical references. Most
importantly, one can learn about Julian from the autobiographical details within the
writings themselves, for, despite the self-effacing demands of the genre, a distinctive
voice asserts itself in A Book of Showings and invites the reader to envision Julian not
only as an anonymous conduit of a divine message but also as a self-conscious writer and
theologian carefully crafting her text and its theological content.
Outside of the texts themselves, what we know of Julian comes from a number of
wills leaving her bequests and from the account of her meeting with Margery Kempe
recorded in Margery’s autobiographical The Book of Margery Kempe.101 The wills
indicate that Julian was known as an anchoress attached to St. Julian’s Church in
Norwich as early as 1393 and as late as 1416.102 As an anchoress, Julian would have been
expected to devote herself to praying for the community of the Church of Saint Julian’s
and for her benefactors in particular. This is because entering an anchorhold in
fourteenth-century England was not an idiosyncratic or solitary decision. It required its
own liturgical form as well as the approval of the bishop and was premised on a
contractual relationship between the anchoress (or anchorite) and the church community:
The anchoress’ prayers and holiness supported the local church, and in exchange, the
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local church provided for the anchoress’ practical needs.103 As Watson and Jenkins point
out, the solitude assigned to anchoresses “was metaphoric, not physical: far from living in
isolation, anchorites were public figures, performing every Christian’s need for
detachment from the world and inner solitude before God.”104
From Margery’s account, we can also assume that Julian’s reputation for wisdom
and holiness had spread beyond Norwich. In her quest for certainty regarding the validity
of her own visionary experiences, Margery was prompted by “our Lord to go to an
anchoress in the same city [Norwich], who was called Dame Julian” some time in
1413.105 Margery describes Julian as “expert” in spiritual discretion and known for giving
“good counsel.”106 The two women spent many days together in “holy dalliance,”
discussing the “marvelous goodness of our Lord” and the right response to his many
spiritual gifts, most importantly his “visitations”, Margery’s term for revelatory or
visionary experience.107
What further biographical details we possess regarding Julian come from the
writings themselves. A Book of Showings survives in two forms, A Vision Showed to a
Devout Woman, or the short text (hereafter referred to as ST), and A Revelation of Love,
or the long text (LT).108 The scribal note that opens ST describes Julian as a devout
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woman and a recluse at Norwich “still alive, A.D. 1413.”109 According to the LT, the
visions Julian received while undergoing a near-death experience occurred in 1373, when
Julian was thirty-and-one-half years old.110 Accepting this dating, we can assume that
Julian was born in 1343 and was still living as late as 1416 (the year of the last recorded
bequest to her). Thus, Julian’s long life spanned a period defined by the devastation of
the plague, the great schism within the Western Church, the ongoing Hundred Years War
between England and France, and the Peasant Revolt in England.111 These tumultuous
events led many religious thinkers to focus their attention on last things and inspired
apocalyptic interpretations of the present age.112
According to Julian’s account, as a young girl she had prayed that she be granted
a near-death experience and a vision of Christ’s passion when she reached the age of
thirty.113 By the time the prayer was granted (in her thirty-first year), Julian had forgotten
about her youthful request and thought that she was indeed dying. During this
experience, she received “bodily sight” of the Passion, though the visions were not
simply a straightforward “seeing”; as Watson describes it, Julian’s initial experience was
“a disparate series of glimpses of Christ’s passion, strung like beads along her life-saving
gaze at a crucifix, and interspersed with other, more abstract sights, as well as with a few
109
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pregnant words passed from Christ to her and sometimes back again.”114 On the basis of
this experience, Julian eventually constructed two texts that describe and interpret the
experience, and, especially in the LT, elaborate on the theology latent in the experience
itself.115
The initial visionary experience likely occurred before Julian entered the
anchorhold; she describes her deathbed scene as one attended by a group of people
including her mother and a local curate, which would have been unlikely had she already
been an anchoress.116 Since the first recorded bequest given to Julian occurs in 1393,
scholars assume that Julian was in her fifties when she entered the anchoritic life.117
There is no indication of the form of Julian’s life before her entry. Some have argued that
Julian was a laywoman and, given the sympathy and precision with which she uses
maternal symbolism, most likely a mother.118 Others argue that she more likely had
belonged to the Benedictine Nunnery of Carrow. The latter claim would account for her
apparent education and her choice of anchorhold, since Julian’s cell belonged to the gift
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of the Carrow Benedictines.119 Julian herself implies that she served God from her youth,
which could well indicate that she had dedicated herself to religious life from a young
age.120 In any case, nothing precludes Julian having been a mother, a widow and then a
Benedictine nun before entering the life of an anchoress, particularly if we accept the
assumption that she did not enter the anchoritic life until she was in her fifties. The
maturity and richness of Julian’s writings suggest such a relative breadth of life
experience.121
This scanty information about Julian the woman leaves us finally with a few
comments about the texts themselves. Both the ST and the LT recount an extraordinary
visionary experience, taking place in Julian’s thirty-first year. The LT organizes this
experience as a series of fifteen consecutive “shewynges [showings]” that occurred
within an eleven-hour period followed by a sixteenth the following evening.122 These
“showings”, “revelations”, or “visitations” include a complex variety of experiences.123
Julian differentiates at least three: “bodily vision,” “words formed in my understanding,”

119

The case for Julian’s high level of education is most thoroughly argued by College and Walsh,
“Introduction,” 43–59; Watson and Jenkins summarize the evidence for Julian’s Benedictine background in
“Introduction,” 4. On the Benedictines of Carrow, see Norman P. Tanner, The Church in Late Medieval
Norwich, 1370–1532, 59–62 and Christopher Harper-Bill and Carole Rawcliffe, “The Religious Houses,”
88 – 101. If indeed Julian had been a Benedictine sister at Carrow, she would have likely belonged to one
of the wealthier families of Norwich or its surroundings. See Harper-Bill and Rawcliffe, “The Religious
Houses,” 93, 99.
120

BS 351/JNS 203. See also Julian’s reference to those who “voluntarily choose God,” BS 627/JNS 308.

121

“Julian’s writing is saturated with images drawn from being a woman in the world; allusions to
childbirth, motherhood, sexuality and domesticity.” McAvoy, Authority and the Female Body, 69.
122

BS 281–84/JNS 175–77.

123

The term “revelations” is also used by Julian; the language of “visitations” is used by Margery Kempe.
See The Book of Margery Kempe, chap. 18, excerpted in Watson and Jenkins, The Writings of Julian of
Norwich, 436.

70

and “spiritual vision.”124 While it is no simple matter to describe the actual experiences
represented by these phrases, Julian clearly differentiates among a complex of external
images, internal images, words “heard” internally, and immediate understanding, all of
which she attributes to divine communication. Julian’s writing, however, is not simply a
record of these complex visions; she is above all concerned with their theological
meanings and practical application. Julian claims to have been, through prayer, “inwardly
instructed” by God on the meaning of the visions, and to have spent between fifteen and
twenty years meditating on them and articulating their theological implications.125
Because the writings exist in two forms, a longer and a shorter version of
basically the same material, we can observe Julian’s process as a writer and editor of her
own work. It is commonly accepted that the shorter version (ST) was written first, soon
after the visionary experience itself and thus before Julian became an anchoress, while
the longer version, with its careful editing and lengthy expansions, was written anywhere
from fifteen to thirty years later.126 The ST survives in a single complete manuscript
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dating from around 1435 (Additional); excerpts of the LT are contained in a fifteenthcentury manuscript (Westminster), and two complete versions of the LT, both of which
were copied by English nuns in France, date from around the middle of the seventeenth
century (Paris and Sloane).127 The scholarly consensus is that Julian indeed wrote both
texts, since there is no indication of either having been dictated to a scribe (as was more
typical for fourteenth-century women visionaries such as Catherine of Siena, Brigit of
Sweden, and the later example of Margery).128 This would make Julian – a contemporary
of Walter Hilton, William Langland and Geoffrey Chaucer – the first identified woman to
have written in the English language.

2.3 Communal Kenosis: Julian and her Circle
Based on the small number of surviving manuscripts and the late dating of the LT
manuscripts, we can assume that Julian’s writings were not widely circulated in her own
lifetime or even for many centuries after her death (Julian’s writings are far better known
in the twentieth century than in any previous one). This raises difficult questions about
the community within which Julian developed her theology and the particular audience to
whom her teachings were addressed. Regarding the first, we can assume a particular
reading and praying community of which Julian was a part, even if we have little
evidence with which to reconstruct it. A first model for this community, proposed by
College and Walsh, is constructed from what we know of the religious and ecclesiastical
institutions of the city of Norwich and from the evidence in Julian’s writings that suggest
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a deep grounding in the standard works of the Western spiritual tradition.129 The city of
Norwich included 46 parish churches, three colleges of secular priests, a Benedictine
priory, an Augustinian house (just across the street from Julian’s anchorhold), a
Franciscan studia generale, and Carmelite and Dominican houses.130 The only women’s
religious house was that of the Benedictines, just outside of Norwich at Carrow.131 In the
later part of Julian’s life, there were as many as eight hermits or anchorites within the
confines of the city, perhaps inspired, as Tanner proposes, by Julian’s own example.132
Assuming that Julian grew up in Norwich, she would have been exposed to the preaching
of members of these houses and may have received spiritual direction from her parish
priest or a member of one of the mendicant orders. After entering religious life
(assuming she did so), Julian would have received instruction and direction from
religious persons trained in the direction of women religious and anchoresses. She would
also have had access to the library at Carrow and perhaps to the libraries of the men’s
houses as well. Based on their reading of her text, College and Walsh argue that, when
young, “Julian had received an exceptionally good grounding in Latin, in Scripture and in
the liberal arts, and that thereafter she was able and permitted to read widely in Latin and
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vernacular spiritual classics,” even, they suggest, after entering her cell.133 On this
model, Julian’s textual community was clerical, learned and monastic; she was firmly
installed in the institutionally sanctioned, clerically guided, tradition-rooted male world
of readers and writers of books on the spiritual life.
In contrast, Riddy proposes a distinctively female model of textual community.
Surviving manuscript collections and women’s wills clearly indicate that women in late
medieval England commissioned manuscripts, owned books, and shared them with other
women.134 This female literary culture was “inhabited above all by recluses, nuns,
vowesses and chaste widows.”135 Within these female reading communities, women
shared their intense interest in the spiritual life, “their members teaching one another,
sharing books and discussing them together.”136 This oral tradition, Riddy proposes, “lies
behind Julian’s prose” and expresses the “tradition of the speech community to which she
belonged, a community in which women heard and remembered English texts read aloud,
in which they listened to English sermons, but above all in which they were accustomed,
in Bunyan’s phrase, to ‘talking about the things of God.’”137 On this model, Julian
inhabited a predominantly female “oral-literate”138 subculture informed by books written

133

College and Walsh, “Introduction,” 44.

134

Riddy, “’Women Talking About the Things of God’,” 104–27. See also Riddy’s “Julian of Norwich and
Self-Textualization.”
135

Riddy, “’Women Talking About the Things of God’,” 112. Since it was not uncommon for wealthy lay
women to live periodically in religious houses as tenants or to retire there as widows, the boundaries
between religious and lay women were often fluid. The Benedictine sisters at Carrow routinely took in
“high status tenants and boarders.” See Harper-Bill and Rawcliffe, “The Religious Houses,” 94 – 95.
136

Ibid., 109.

137

Riddy, “’Women Talking About the Things of God,’” 113.

138

Riddy, “Julian of Norwich and Self-Textualization,” 108.

74

specifically for anchoresses (Ancrene Wisse, Sawles Warde, Aelred of Rievaulx’s De
Institutione Inclusarum, Book One of Hilton’s Scale of Perfection), and books that were
thought to appeal especially to women (e.g., Rolle’s works in English translation and, in
the fifteenth century, English translations of writings by continental women visionaries
like Mechthild of Hackeborn, Bridget of Sweden and Catherine of Siena). 139
A final model, proposed by Watson and Jenkins, taking Margery Kempe’s
experience as an example, suggests that Julian and her text may have interacted with an
informal mixed group of readers, consisting of lay persons, clerics, religious, and
anchoresses/anchorites. These “lovers of God,” as Margery calls them, read and
circulated books “through an informal countrywide network of similarly minded
people.”140 Such textual communities “cut across institutional, as well as geographical
boundaries.”141 On this model, Julian’s immediate circle consisted of clerics, religious
and lay persons, both women and men, who were bound by their desire to advance in the
spiritual life and who shared a passion for books on devotion and prayer. Margery’s list
of books includes the English writers Richard Rolle and Walter Hilton as well as English
translations of two continental texts, Stimulus Amoris (falsely attributed to Bonaventure)
and Bridget of Sweden’s Liber Revelationum Celestium.142 Given Julian’s literacy, it is
highly likely that she too was familiar with the writings of Richard Rolle and the Stimulus
Amoris. Since Hilton was probably writing Scale of Perfection at the same time that
139
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Julian was composing A Book of Showings, direct influence is unlikely, but given the
popularity of Hilton’s works in the fifteenth century, it is possible that Julian became
familiar with the text after completing her own work. “Bride’s Book” (as Bridget’s text
was known in England) did not circulate until after Julian had finished writing her own
work, but, again, it is possible that Julian became familiar with it later. In any case, the
conclusion to be drawn from this mixed, eclectic model is that Julian the anchoress may
well have been part of a praying/reading community that included both women and men,
religious and lay, and that she may have written her own texts with this reading group
specifically in mind.
These three models, subtly distinct yet overlapping, allow us to speculate about
Julian’s actual practice of communal kenosis. Recall that the basic notion of communal
kenosis found in Philippians is that of a community based on mutuality, one in which
power is performed through humility and mutual subordination. In such a community,
hierarchical structures, if present, are not the principal means through which authority is
recognized or asserted; rather, status and authority are subordinated to the common
purpose of suffering with Christ in the hope of sharing in his resurrection. Each of these
models presents performances of power in different ways. The first, traditional, clerical
model would be the most hierarchical; it has clearly differentiated boundaries of male and
female, clerical/religious and lay, and is careful to maintain the authority of the
priesthood and sacramental mediation while at the same time recognizing charity as the
sole criterion for holiness. On this model, Julian’s authority as a visionary and holy
woman would have been recognized as “higher” in the order of charity yet nonetheless
dependent on and subordinate to the clerical, sacramental structure of the Church.
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Intellectually, this model puts great weight on knowledge of the tradition and would be
careful to subordinate Julian’s claim to auctoritas to that of the great writers and
theologians of the Western spiritual tradition.143 The second model – that of a
distinctively female textual community – would have constituted a subculture that
developed more fluid and relational performances of power. Though entry into this
community was premised on the “ideology of virginity” (or chastity) and thus would
have largely excluded married women, this model was comparatively open and
informal.144 According to Riddy’s description, this type of community would have been
structured on friendship as well as on the traditional relations of mother/daughter,
lady/servant, prioress/nun, with authority established in terms of experience.145 The final,
mixed, model is perhaps the one that comes closest to the Pauline ideal community; such
a community would have included people from various ranks within the Church (clerical,
religious, lay), yet all members would have been joined by a mutual subordination to the
pursuit of holiness and the desire to grow closer to God.
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As has already been mentioned, the earliest surviving manuscript of the ST is
found in a fifteenth-century Carthusian collection, which suggests something about the
contemporary reception of Julian’s writings. The collection consists of some 22 works,
including selections from English translations of Marguerite Porète’s Mirror of Simple
Souls (without ascription to Marguerite), Ruusbroec’s The Treatise of Perfection, and
Rolle’s The Fire of Love and Emendatio Vitae. While the Carthusian scribe probably
copied and collected these texts principally for the use of fellow religious, the
Carthusians were known to have lent their books to lay persons, including laywomen.146
The Carthusian manuscript places Julian’s ST in the middle of the collection,
presenting it as “a bridge between the sensory language of Rolle and the emphasis on the
unsayability of the divine” that characterizes the continental texts.147 We can surmise
that, in Carthusian reading circles, Julian’s ST was seen as an important primer in the
spiritual life, more advanced than Rolle but not as sophisticated as Ruusbroec and Porète,
and thus was deemed appropriate for both male and female, religious and lay, readers.
Turning now to the model of community internal to Julian’s writings, we begin
with the question of audience. Julian clearly addresses her teachings to a select group,
those lovers of God who “wylfylly chosyth god in this lyfe for loue [voluntarily choose
God in this life for love]”.148 Yet the category, “lovers of God,” is not specifically
identified with a particular status or role in the Church. In contrast to The Cloud of
Unknowing and book 1 of Hilton’s Scale of Perfection (but similarly to book 2 of the
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Scale), Julian is not laying out a program of prayer particular to those who have chosen
the hermetic or anchoritic life. Rather, she explicitly addresses her teaching to “my
evynn Christians” – that is, “my fellow Christians” or, more generally, her “every
Christian” –, and she proposes herself as model: “Everything that I say about me I mean
to apply to all my fellow Christians.”149 In this way, Julian’s internal model of
community comes closest to the external mixed model. It is inclusive in scope, and
though boundaries of gender and ecclesiastical status are not completely eliminated, they
are made fluid and subordinate to performances of community measured in terms of an
inclusive love:
For [y]yf I loke syngulerlye to my selfe I am ryght nought; botte in
genereralle I am in anehede of charyte with alle myne evynn cristene. For in
the anehede of charyte standes the lyfe of alle mankynde that achalle be
safe. For god is alle that ys goode, and god has made alle that ys made, and
god loves alle that he had made, and [y]yf anye man or womann departe his
loveo fra any of his evynn crysten, he loves ryght nought, for he loves
nou[gh]t alle.
[If I pay special attention to myself then I am nothing at all; but in general I
am in the unity of love with all my fellow Christians. For it is in this unity
of love that the life consists of all men who will be saved. For God is
everything that is good, and God has made everything that is made, and
God loves everything that he has made, and if any man or woman
withdraws his love from any of his fellow Christians, he does not love at all,
because he has not love towards all.]150
At the same time, Julian’s innovative use of the mother-child relationship to
express God’s relation to humanity, along with her dialogical style of writing, also
reflects the sociality of the female textual community. As has often been pointed out,
Julian’s development of the maternal symbol goes far beyond that found anywhere else in
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the tradition.151 There is a realism in Julian’s portrayal of maternal practice, a studied
attention to its details and an appreciation of its value, that reflects a long immersion in
its social structures. This observation does not necessarily imply that Julian was a
biological mother; rather, it points to Julian’s immersion in the social world of mothers
and daughters, whether in a household, a convent, or in an informal community of
women. Similarly, as Riddy observes, the dialogical, even conversational, style of
Julian’s writings replicates that of the “oral-literate” culture characteristic of female
communities. Still, in terms of audience, there is no indication in the writings that Julian
means to address an exclusively female audience; her inclusive “evynn christian”
transcends the boundaries of gender as well as the boundaries of status within the Church.
Julian’s practice of communal kenosis is more directly evident in her selfdeflection and self-deprecation. Communal kenosis requires subordinating oneself as
individual to the community as a whole and deferring to the other as more worthy or
“better” than oneself. We see this performed in the Showings as Julian struggles with the
problem of her own uniqueness as a visionary. Throughout the writings, Julian
continually deflects her reader’s attention from herself (as someone granted a unique
experience or as someone having special status in relation to God) by insisting that the
content of the visions is meant for all Christians. Even the visionary experience itself is
potentially “general”: Her hearers and readers are meant to take the teaching “as if” Jesus
had shown it to them along with Julian:
Alle that I sawe of my selfe, I meene in the persone of alle myne evynn
cristine, for I am lernede in the gastelye schewynge of oure lorde that he
meenys so. And therefore I praye [th]owe alle for goddy’s sake, and
cownsayles [th]owre awne profit, that [th]e leve the behaldynge of the
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wrechid wr(m)e, synfulle creature, that it was schewyd vnto, and that [th]e
myghtlye, wyselye, lovandlye and mekelye be halde god, that of his
curtays love of his endless goodness walde schewe generalye this visyonn
in comforthe of vs alle. And [th]e that hyerys and sees this vision and this
techynge that is of Jhesu Cryste to edificacion of [y]oure saule, it is
goddys wille and my desire that [y]e take it with als grete ioye and
lykynge as Jhesu hadde schewyd it to [y]owe as he dyd to me.
[Everything I say about myself I mean to apply to all my fellow
Christians, for I am taught that this is what our Lord intends in this
spiritual revelation. And therefore I pray you all for God’s sake, and I
counsel you for your own profit, that you disregard the wretched worm,
the sinful creature to whom it was shown, and that mightily, wisely,
lovingly and meekly you contemplate God, who out of his courteous love
and his endless goodness was willing to show this vision generally, to the
comfort of us all. And you who hear and see this vision and this teaching,
which is from Jesus Christ for the edification of your souls, it is God’s will
and my wish that you accept it with as much joy and delight as if Jesus
had shown it to you as he did to me.]152

In the ST, a tension between “the general” (connoting universality, something
common and open) and “the special,” (connoting singularity, uniqueness, and
hiddenness) structures both her visionary experience (as simultaneously singular and
representative) and the content of the teaching. Julian, “the wretched worm” and “sinful
creature,” is at the same time representative of every Christian, and her unique vision is at
the same time “shown generally.” The strategy of self-deflection entails moving away
from a focus on Julian’s singularity (as a person, as a visionary) toward seeing and
hearing Julian as the representative “every Christian,” the general, even generic Christian
who is loved, made safe, and addressed by God. Thus, her auctoritas is tempered by her
claim that she “writes as the representative of [her] fellow Christians.”153 Self-deflection
intensifies into self-deprecation when Julian describes herself as a “wretched worm” and
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“a sinful creature.” This mortifying language, too, can be seen as a way to move from
singularity to generality; every Christian should see him- or herself as the undeserving
recipient of God’s love. Julian reinforces this idea by insisting that the visionary
experience does not mark her as uniquely or particularly loved by God:
For sothly it was nought schewyd vnto me for that god loves me bettere
thane the leste sawle that is in grace. For I am sekere that ys fulle many
that nevere hadde schewynge ne syght botte of the commonn techynge of
haly kyrke that loves god better [th]an I.
[For truly it was not revealed to me because God loves me better than the
humblest soul who is in a state of grace. For I am sure that there are many
who never had revelations or visions, but only the common teaching of
holy church, who love God better than I.]154
Along with deflecting attention from herself, Julian tries to relativize the significance of
the revelations themselves by insisting here on the sufficiency of Church teaching in
bringing a believer to God. Thus, paradoxically, Julian is both compelled to make the
content of the revelations known to others because God wills it and to insist that, in the
end, the content of the revelations is not “special” and therefore different from what is
already known through the Church’s general teaching.
The tension between particularity and generality persists in the LT, as does
Julian’s insistence on the sufficiency of Church teaching. Yet Julian elaborates in the LT
on the purpose of her revelations by introducing a distinction not found in the ST:
I say nott thys to them that be wyse, for they wytt it wele. But I sey it to
yow that by simple, for ease and comfort; . . . for verily it was nott shewde
to me that god lovyth me better than the lest soule that is in grace.
[I do not say this to those who are wise, because they know it well. But I
say it to you who are simple, to give you comfort and strength; . . . for
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truly it was not revealed to me that God loves me better than the humblest
soul who is in a state of grace.]155
Julian’s revelations are thus for “the simple,” a group with whom she identifies. On its
face, this seems to imply that what Julian has to teach is already known to anyone who is
educated. Yet the contrast she draws between the simple and the elite also plays with the
paradox of power and vulnerability: If God makes known to the simple what he keeps
from the wise, then those who are wise in a worldly sense (theologians and prelates)
would do well to become simple in order to hear and experience what God conveys
through Julian.
The self-deflection and self-deprecation serve the universality of Julian’s
message, which in turn points to a profoundly communal identity. Later in the ST
chapter, Julian elaborates:
And so ys my desire that it schulde be to euery ilke manne the same
profytte that I desyrede to my selfe and [th]erto was styrryd of god in the
fyrste tyme when I sawe itte; for yt (ys) common and generale as we ar
alle ane. . . .
[And so it is my desire that it should be to every man the same profit that I
asked for myself, and was moved to in the first moment when I saw it; for
it is common and general, just as we are all one. . . . ]156
This communal identity intensifies Julian’s sense of her unexceptional position: “For
[y]yf I loke syngulerlye to my selfe I am ryght nought; botte in generalle I am in anehede
of charyte with alle myne evynn cristine [If I pay special attention to myself, I am
nothing at all; but in general I am in the unity of love with all my fellow Christians].”157
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Recall that Paul instructs the Philippians community to be “of the same mind, with the
same love, united in heart.” This unity is achieved by humbly regarding “others as more
important” than oneself. The praying community whom Julian addresses is a kenotic
community, and Julian’s difficult role is to teach with an authority grounded in her own
unique experience while at the same time modeling kenotic submission for the sake of
unity and love.

2.4 Political Kenosis: Gender, the Visionary Genre, and the Vernacular
From the standpoint of the early twenty-first century, it may be difficult to
appreciate the extraordinary self-determination required for Julian to perform as a
visionary theologian writing in the vernacular in late fifteenth-century England. The
visionary genre had no tradition in England and tended to be treated with suspicion;
women writers in any language were extremely rare, and Julian would have had no
English models; and the vernacular, only beginning to emerge as an acceptable vehicle
for theological ideas, was increasingly associated with heterodoxy. Given this threefold
vulnerability, it should hardly be surprising if Julian engaged in forms of self-censorship,
at least regarding the circulation of her texts. While we cannot say for certain that it was
indeed Julian’s decision to restrict access to her writings, there were sound political
reasons for doing so. In this section, I examine three vulnerabilities – Julian’s gender, her
working within the visionary genre, and her doing so in the vernacular – vulnerabilities
that, given her political context, may have necessitated the careful performances of
submission that inform her writings. Having discerned possible motives for Julian’s
circumscriptions, the next section examines the negotiated submissions in the texts
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themselves. While the focus is on Julian’s performances of submission to Church
authorities, we need to be reminded that this submission came from a person also capable
of a creative and productive performance of power sustained over decades. Julian’s
originality as an author and theologian, let alone the feat involved in a woman’s
producing a written text in this time period, testifies to performances of power that are
anything but submissive. Still, throughout the writings, there is a continual concern with
Church authority and submission; what we find is an author carefully negotiating the
assertion of her own authority with her submission to the teaching authority of the
Church.
The first vulnerability to be examined concerns the visionary genre. KerbyFulton argues that, in general terms, there were “three contested areas of freedom of
discussion in medieval thought: visionary experience, mystical theology, and apocalyptic
theology,” and each of these had “unpredictable relations. . .with the official theological
authorities.”158 As a writer of visionary and mystical theology, Julian inhabited this
“contested space” where tolerance for speculative ideas could quickly give way to the
threat of censorship or condemnation.159 Among other things, the concern of the
authorities focused on “novel theological perspectives arrived at via claims to visionary
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or mystical experience.”160 Such claims posed a profound challenge to discernment and
interpretation; no medieval believer would deny the possibility that God could indeed
speak directly to the Church through the prayers or visions of a sainted person, yet
whatever was spoken could not be inconsistent with what was known to be true through
formal revelation and tradition. Thus, Church authorities had to be open to the divine
message yet also capable of discerning its authenticity and “proper” interpretation. At
stake here were potentially conflicting authorities: those of the institutional, hierarchical
Church on the one hand and the authority of direct revelation by God on the other.161
According to Kerby-Fulton, there was in fact “a surprising degree of tolerance”
towards visionary texts, “alongside a serious degree of suspicion – a mingling of
ambivalence, fear, respect, contempt, mystery, and awe.”162 For example, Hildegard of
Bingen, whose writings circulated in fourteenth-century England, had won resounding
support for her visions from Pope Eugene and Bernard of Clairvaux, among others, and
her authority was never subsequently called into question.163 The teaching of Joachim of
Fiore, whose works were also influential in England, went from acceptance to suspicion

160

Kerby-Fulton, Books under Suspicion, 14. These concerns are well expressed in the Omne Bonum, a
collection of canon law sources compiled by James le Palmer between 1359 and 1375 (the years during
which Julian had her first visions). Definitions of “the heretic” include: “one who is doubtful in faith
(dubius est in fide); […] one who badly interprets scripture (male interpretatur Scripturam Sacram); one
who discovers a new opinion (nouam opinionem inuenit).” Quoted in Kerby-Fulton, Books under
Suspicion, 29-30.
161

This conflict was particularly pronounced in the case of women visionaries. See Voaden, God’s Words,
Women’s Voices, and Dyan Elliott, Proving Woman: Female Spirituality and Inquisitional Culture in the
Later Middle Ages.
162

Kerby-Fulton, Books Under Suspicion, 8.

163

“Hildegard’s Scivias was virtually the first medieval work of any genre to lay claim to Papal approval.”
Kerby-Fulton, Books Under Suspicion, 43.

86

and finally to condemnation.164 Bridget of Sweden encountered strong opposition to her
visions yet finally won approval for them and, ultimately, formal canonization.165
Claims to visionary authority were particularly suspect in the English context. In
contrast to the continent, England did not experience a flowering of women’s visionary
writings in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. According to Watson, “Julian’s
revelation of 1373 appears to be the first major English example of a female vision for
two centuries: the same centuries which on the Continent constituted a golden age of
women’s mysticism.”166 England’s influential spiritual writings of the period (especially
those written for women) focused on identification with Christ and his passion,
meditation, and contemplation. Yet, as Watson points out,
the same works are for the most part silent about specifically visionary
experiences – and on the rare occasion these do receive some notice, it is
invariably negative. Ancrene Wisse, Rolle’s Form of Living and the first
book of Walter Hilton’s Scale of Perfection all caution readers against any
visions they may have, on the respective grounds that their source is
certain to be diabolical, that while visionary dreams may theoretically be
from God it is impossible to be sure this is so in any given case, and that
they do not constitute “true” contemplation.167
If we assume Julian’s familiarity with these writings, we can also assume that she may
well have been aware of the suspicions her visionary claims might arouse on the part of
authorities and the misunderstandings they might provoke on the part of less-educated
readers. In any case, an initial unease with visionary experience is explicit in Julian’s
164
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writings, particularly when she tells us that, immediately after the visionary experience,
she was filled with physical pain and mental anguish, which caused her to doubt the
validity of the visions, explaining them away at first as a kind of raving or delirium. But
subsequently, Julian came to see the doubting itself as “a grett synne[great sin],” since to
doubt the visions was to doubt the truthfulness of God and his goodness in granting her
comfort.168 What is noteworthy about Julian’s resolution of her initial doubt is that she
does not seek discernment or confirmation from a priest or any other outside authority;
rather, she finds confirmation for the visions from within the visionary experience
itself:169
and he [g]awe me knowing truly [th]at it was he [th]at shewede me alle
before. And whan I had behold thys with avysement, then shewed oure
good lorde wordes fulle meekly, without voyce and without opnyng of
lyppes, ryght as he had done afore, and seyde full swetely: Wytt it now
wele, it was no raving that thou saw to day, but take it and beleve it and
kepe thee ther in and comfort thee ther with and trust therto, and thou shalt
not be ovyrcome.
[he gave me true knowledge that it was he who had revealed everything to
me before. And when I had contemplated this with attention, our Lord
very humbly revealed words to me, without voice and without opening of
lips, just as he had done before, and said very sweetly: Know it well, it
was no hallucination which you saw today, but accept and believe it and
hold firmly to it, and comfort yourself with it and trust in it, and you will
not be overcome.]170
This confidence on Julian’s part regarding her visions is striking, particularly in an
English context that did not produce a visionary tradition like that already flourishing on
the continent. Still, a concern with how her visionary experience might be interpreted by
168
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others may have contributed to Julian’s self-censorship in the form of an unwillingness to
allow her texts to be copied and circulated.
A second, perhaps greater, vulnerability inherent in Julian’s performance as a
theologian was the claim to authorship as a woman. Medieval women could not claim
theological auctoritas in ways associated with office: They could not be educated at the
universities (conferring the office of theologian), and they were excluded from any form
of clerical office. Their only possible claim to authority was a dangerous and contested
one, that of auctoritas ex beneficio, an authority of gift, or charism.171 In such a case, a
woman might be recognized as having been granted the charism to teach or even preach,
not through her own power or intelligence, but through a gift from God. The recognition
on the part of the medieval Church of such authority had its roots in Scripture, both in the
examples of the Old and New Testament women prophets and apostles (e.g., Miriam,
Deborah, the daughters of Philip, and Mary Magdalen) and in Paul’s theology of charism.
Nonetheless, such a gift was considered rare and always in need of careful scrutiny by
male theologians and clerics, who possessed the objectively verifiable auctoritas ex
officio.
The best-known medieval example of such female auctoritas ex beneficio was
that of Hildegard of Bingen, whose authority was officially recognized and uncontested.
But the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries produced some of the most famous women
authorities with mixed results, attesting to the danger inherent in such claims. At the
beginning of the fourteenth century stands Marguerite Porète, condemned to death for her
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refusal to submit to Church authorities regarding the content of her mystical writings, the
first person burned at the stake for mystical heresy.172 At the other end stands Joan of
Arc, also burned for her refusal to deny the validity of her visions and submit
unconditionally to Church authorities.173 In between the burnings, we find the
monumental figures of Bridget of Sweden and Catherine of Siena, both canonized by the
Roman Church but both of whose claims to authority were contested in their own
lifetimes and afterward.174
The case of Bridget is of particular interest because it provoked the Paris
theologian Jean Gerson to address the issue of women’s teaching and writing directly.
Gerson challenged the validity of Bridget’s visionary and prophetic claims, and partly in
response to her canonization, wrote his influential works on the discretion of spirits.175
With Bridget particularly in mind, Gerson wrote:
First, every teaching of women, especially that expressed in solemn word
or writing, is to be held suspect, unless it has first been diligently
examined by another. . .and much more than the teaching of men. Why?
The reason is clear; because not only ordinary but divine law forbids such
things. Why? Because women are too easily seduced, because they are too
obstinately seducers, because it is not fitting that they should be knowers
of divine wisdom.176
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Gerson’s list of characteristics that made women’s teaching and writing suspect – their
moral weakness, their threatening sexuality and their “unfitness” for wisdom – were
commonplace and in no need of argument. Nearly two hundred years earlier, Aquinas
with his typical thoroughness had summarized the case in scholastic form:
Speech can be used in two ways. In one way privately, to one or a few, in
familiar conversation. In this way the grace of speech becomes a woman.
The other way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole Church. This is
not conceded to women. First and principally, because of the condition of
the female sex, which must be subject to man, according to Genesis. But
to teach and persuade publicly in Church is not the task of subjects, but of
prelates. Men, when commissioned, can far better do this work, because
their subjection is not from nature and sex as with women, but from some
supervening accident. Secondly, lest men’s minds be enticed to lust. Thus
Ecclesiasticus, “Many have been misled by a woman’s beauty. By it
passion is kindled like fire.” Thirdly, because generally speaking women
are not perfected in wisdom so as to be fit to be entrusted with public
teaching. . . .women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge,
can impart these by teaching privately but not publicly.177

Aquinas makes explicit the basic assumption that women are by nature less rational and
therefore subordinate to men, an assumption that most, in his time period and long after,
took for granted.178 The belief in women’s natural inferiority and subordination was
deeply embedded in medieval culture both high and low, a common inheritance from the
Church fathers, classical writers, and the Scriptures.179 From this assumption follow two
of Aquinas’ conclusions: that women in general are not capable of wisdom (because less
rational) and that, in any case, they are not to assume the office of public teaching
(because subordinate to men). In a similar way, the threatening character of women’s
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sexuality was self-evident; the very presence of a female body in the context of public
teaching could threaten male sexual virtue.180 Finally, even in acknowledging the
possibility of auctoritas ex beneficio (the grace of wisdom or knowledge) for specific
women, Aquinas insists that a woman’s teaching ought to be restricted to the private
sphere.
While Aquinas’ concerns were general, Gerson’s focused specifically on the issue
of women visionaries. Despite the injunction against public teaching or preaching,
women visionaries in the late medieval period did speak out publicly regarding very
public issues, most notably the Avignon papacy, the Hundred Years War, and the Great
Schism.181 Gerson’s misgivings reflected those of many churchmen in the period who
were preoccupied not only with controlling the power of visionary women but also with
exploiting it to serve their interests in the great political and ecclesiastical battles of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.182
Thus, when women claimed to speak of or for God, they stood on shifting ground.
Their claims were prima facie suspect and required male clerical discernment. Marguerite
and Joan ultimately refused to submit when the choice was put in its starkest terms:
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Either submit to the Church’s judgment that their visions were not from God, or stand by
the validity of their own experience and suffer capital punishment. Alternatively, Bridget
and Catherine, renowned for their defense of Church authority, both had powerful clerical
supporters throughout their lives and after their deaths, which ultimately ensured their
canonizations. However, neither of them ever had the choice put as uncompromisingly as
it was put to Marguerite and Joan.
Though we have no evidence to believe that, before writing the Showings, Julian
knew of any of these women, their writings, or their fate, certainly she would have
imbibed the arguments formalized by Aquinas in her extensive exposure to preaching,
religious direction, and spiritual writings.183 And while it is unlikely that Gerson’s
writings on discernment would have impacted Julian directly, the suspicion of women
visionaries that motivated Gerson was widespread, and, in the English context, opposition
to teaching and writing by women hardened throughout the fifteenth century with the
suppression of the Lollards. Two burnings, two canonizations – these are the extremes
that marked the boundaries for women’s claims to theological speech in the late medieval
Church.
Unlike her continental sisters, Julian was neither exposed to the public sphere nor
did she expose her teaching there. As far as we know, she never sought to teach or
preach in public, and if her writings were circulated at all, they would have been limited
to a small, private circle. Compared to the voices of Marguerite, Bridget, Catherine, and
Joan, Julian’s is far more interior and privatized, kept within a supportive circle of those
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who knew her and, later in life, within the confines of her cell. This does not mean,
however, that as an anchoress she was beyond the reach of censorship or condemnation.
In fact, as an anchoress, Julian was under the direct oversight of the Bishop of Norwich;
she would have been examined for her orthodoxy before entrance. The very fact that she
wrote a book, even without wide circulation, indicates at least some level of official
support and approval.184
Julian’s language of self-deprecation (examined above in the context of
communal kenosis) comes into play regarding her authority not only as a visionary but
also specifically as a woman. In the ST, after deflecting her reader’s attention from her
uniqueness as a visionary, Julian addresses the issue of gender:
Botte god for bede that [y]e schulde saye or take is so that I am a techere,
for I meene nou[gh]t soo, no I mente nevere so; for I am a womann, leued,
febille and freylle. . . .Botte for I am a womann, schulde I therefore leve
that I schulde nou[gh]t tell [y]owe the goodenes of god, syne that I sawe in
that same tyme that is his wille, that it be knawenn?
[But God forbid that you should say or assume that I am a teacher, for that
is not and never was my intention; for I am a woman, ignorant, weak and
frail. . . .but because I am a woman, ought I therefore believe that I should
not tell you of the goodness of God, when I saw at the same time that it is
his will that it be known?]185
Julian’s vehement protest against any imputation of her as a teacher illustrates her
familiarity with the arguments formalized by Aquinas; her statement, “I am a woman,”
by implication entails an acknowledgement of ignorance, weakness, and frailty that she
quite readily spells out. At the same time, Julian lays claim to her gift as a visionary; she
is compelled to “tell of the goodness of God,” not through a decision of her own but in

184

In Riddy’s words, it is “inconceivable that [Julian] could publish a book in Norwich without official
sanction and, very probably, official assistance.” “Julian of Norwich and Self-Textualization,” 106.
185

BS 222/JNS 135.

94

response to God’s stated will. Julian thus perfectly expresses the woman visionary’s
dilemma: Disqualified by nature yet compelled by a special grace (indeed by God
personally), she dares, in Aquinas’ words, to address herself to the whole Church.
The visionary’s dilemma also served a deliberate strategy for claiming authority,
since, paradoxically, the visionary’s natural disqualification was a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition of her auctoritas ex beneficio.186 In other words, in order to assure
her hearer/reader that the teaching was truly from God, the visionary had to convince her
hearer/reader that the teaching was not the product of the visionary’s own intelligence or
understanding. Thus, Julian’s protestation, “I am a woman ignorant, weak and frail,” is
essential to the establishment of her authority, for, if a woman spoke prophetic truth and
was heard and acknowledged in this role, it had to be apparent to all that the content of
her speech had a supernatural source. Thus, a woman’s weakness as a woman became
paradoxically the source of an authority that was both hers and not hers: hers because she
was indeed the speaker; not hers because the impetus to speak and, more importantly, the
content of the speech came from God. Hence, in the ST, Julian wants her reader to both
ignore her gender, because Julian the woman is a mere mouthpiece for a divine teaching,
and to note it because it is a kind of by-default proof that the teachings must come from
God. As Lynn Staley observes, Julian is careful in the ST to identify God as the
“teacher” of the revelations, while positioning herself as mere “teller”, conduit, or
messenger.187
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When we turn to the LT (chapters 8 and 9), this same crucial explanatory passage
is significantly altered in both tone and content. Julian’s self-deprecation is not only
subdued but largely edited out of the longer version. Whereas, in the ST, Julian describes
herself as a “wretched worm” and a “sinful creature,” in the LT, the same sentence is
carefully edited: “And therefore I pray yow alle for gods sake, and counceyle yow for
yowre awne pro(f)yght, [th]at ye leue the beholding of a wrech that it was schewde to,
and myghtely, wisely and meekly behold. . .god. [I pray you all for God’s sake, and I
counsel you for your own profit, that you disregard the wretch to whom it was shown,
and that mightily, wisely and meekly you contemplate on God.].”188 The strategy of selfdeflection requires no more than the characterization of herself as a wretch.
More significantly, the passage on gender and authority that closes chapter 6 in
the ST is completely excised from the LT. Given Julian’s careful and deliberate editing
and additions throughout the LT, there must have been some motive for this deletion.
Most scholars agree that a principal reason for the omission of the gender passage is the
confidence Julian achieved as a theologian and writer during the time between the
composition of the ST and the LT, which, depending on one’s dating of the texts, was
anywhere between 20 and 30 years. The author of the LT is far more self-assured, the
theological developments more sophisticated, speculative, bold and, at times, startlingly
original. Julian’s self-presentation in the LT is deliberately multi-dimensional. She is
both the simple creature seeking an experienced comfort and safety in her relationship
with God and the theological interpreter of that experience who seeks to place it within a
comprehensive and universal theological frame. In the words of Watson and Jenkins,
188
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“Julian the participant [in the experiences she recounts]” is presented as motivated by
personal need and “creaturely desire,” whereas Julian the interpreter is represented as
“educated” and as “a specialist capable of justifying [the experience], expounding it, and
making it public.”189 The LT is structured by the dynamic relationship between these two
self-representations. In this version, Julian is no longer merely the humble “teller” of her
experiences but is also the authoritative explicator of those experiences’ spiritual
significations.
While Julian’s confidence as a thinker and writer in the LT cannot be denied,
there is still a frisson of anxiety that runs throughout the LT, a subtle awareness on
Julian’s part that her teaching and her claim to be a teacher could put her at odds with
“the common teaching of the church” and with the institutional authorities charged with
ensuring orthodoxy. Julian’s dual self-representation as “simple creature” and “teacher”
reflects this awareness. The “simple creature” is particular and specific (and therefore
rightly gendered as feminine); in contrast, the teacher’s voice must be “general” (and
thus, by default, masculine). In intentionally removing explicit reference to the issue of
gender and authority from the LT, Julian strives to speak in a more general voice rather
than in the voice of a specific woman (where femaleness is identified with specificity);
what results is the voice of a “theologian,” by implication male and clerical. Thus, the
establishment of this more “generic” voice, while expressive of her confidence as a
thinker, also reflects Julian’s awareness of the incongruity, incompatibility even, of
female specificity and theological auctoritas. In some sense, Julian submits to the
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expectation that the theological voice will not be specifically female and, in so doing,
cannot avoid adopting, to some degree, a masculine voice.
The third and final vulnerability to consider is that of vernacularity. Growing
concerns with Lollardy began to harden into specific directives on the part of Church
authorities, culminating in the Constitutions of 1409, promulgated by Thomas Arundel,
archbishop of Canterbury.190 While the Constitutions had the curbing of Lollardy
specifically in mind, they also assume and give expression to a much larger debate about
vernacularity vis à vis the control of theological language and thought. As Watson
argues, Arundel’s Constitutions are the “peroration of an intense, approximately sixtyyear cultural argument over the whole role of the vernacular in religious culture: an
argument that took in larger questions about the intellectual capacities of the laity, the
role of the clergy in ministering to them, and the suitability of vernacular language as a
vehicle for religious truth.”191
Many of the issues surrounding the suitability of the vernacular for theological
discourse were openly debated in Oxford between the years 1401 and 1407. The crux of
the debate concerned translations of the bible into English – a trend precipitated by the
popularity of the Wycliffite Bible – but behind this lay a more general concern with the
very idea of theologizing in the vernacular. Chief among the arguments against
translation were those focused on its “social consequences.” Watson summarizes the
Oxford arguments:
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Translation into the mother tongue will allow any old woman (vetula) to
usurp the office of teacher, which is forbidden to them (since all heresies,
according to Jerome, come from women); it will bring about a world in
which the laity prefers to teach than to learn, in which women
(mulierculae) talk philosophy and care to instruct men – in which a
country bumpkin (rusticus) will presume to teach. Translation will also
deprive good priests of their prestige. If everything is translated, learning,
the liturgy, and all the sacraments will be abhorred; clerics and theology
itself will be seen as useless by the laity; the clergy will wither; and an
infinity of heresies will erupt. Even the laity will not benefit, since their
devotion is actually improved by their lack of understanding of the psalms
and prayers they say.192

Along with expressing typical prejudices against the laity, the lower classes, and women,
these arguments highlight both the power and the vulnerability of vernacular writing as
well as the threat it posed to the educated clerical elite and, more generally, to established
social structures. Writing in the vernacular reflected and reinforced thinking in the
vernacular, and vernacularity, in contrast to latinity, was by definition democratic and
undiscriminating. Vernacularity thus raised issues not only of doctrine but also of
authority and social order. Latinity in itself signified education, office, and authority
while vernacularity signified non-literacy, lay status, and submission to authority.
Latinity kept theological speech and thought within a carefully controlled, known context
that clearly distinguished orthodoxy from heresy; vernacular theological speech evaded
these controls. Thus, because vernacular theology posed a profound threat to theological
and social order, clerical authorities were increasingly discomforted by its proliferation.
Arundel’s Constitutions attempted to re-instate control over theological language
and thereby maintain social order. The target of the Constitutions was the Lollards, but
as Watson points out, the Constitutions “at no point distinguishes Lollard from other
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vernacular theological texts; rather, its regulations apply to writers and owners of all
vernacular religious texts, except the simplest.”193 Principally, the Constitutions aimed to
sharply restrict the translation of the bible into English, to control public theological
teaching and preaching, and to restrict the ownership of vernacular theological texts.
Hudson argues that the ban on biblical translation applied even to single verses and
concludes that “the expression of ideas gained from Latin books and expressed in
[written English]” could be taken as “ipso facto evidence of heresy.”194
Based on his study of the broad affects of the Constitutions, Watson claims that a
primary result was that the fifteenth-century vernacular theology of self-defined orthodox
writers became far more conservative and less speculative than the works produced in the
latter half of the fourteenth century. Characteristic of this conservatism, the fifteenthcentury writers tended to maintain clear lines between clerical and lay, educated and
uneducated, upper and lower classes, women and men. They also tended to avoid
speculative theological questions, encouraging simple acceptance of Church teaching and
a return to a more affective, internalized piety. These orthodox vernacular writers
practiced a self-censorship informed by the strictures of the Constitutions. Again,
Watson:
For the most part, it seems the Constitutions worked (as was, no doubt, the
hope), not by being wielded in public, but by creating an atmosphere in
which self-censorship was assumed to be both for the common good and
(for one’s own safety) prudent. . . . 195
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Writings after 1410–15 are far more cautious, indeed conservative, and circulation far
more restrictive. Ambitious innovative writings like Pearl, Cloud, Scale of Perfection,
and Piers Plowman do not appear after 1415 – until the sixteenth century:

the composition of [vernacular speculative or innovative texts] became, in
principle, directly illegal: given their use of biblical quotations and their
extensive treatment of an array of theological subjects, none of these
works could have been written after the publication of the Constitutions
without contravening several of the articles therein.196
On Watson’s reading, the theological content of Julian’s writings belongs to the earlier,
innovative period that was hospitable to writers like Hilton, Langland, and the
anonymous authors of Pearl and The Cloud of Unknowing. In the LT, Julian clearly and
freely translates the Latin Bible into English;197 as a woman, she confidently “teaches” as
well as “tells” of her revelations, offering an extremely creative, original soteriology and
eschatology. At the same time, the elements of caution, the decision not to circulate the
LT widely, and the repeated protestations of orthodoxy indicate that Julian had indeed
internalized a program of self-censorship. Aware of the changed climate and resolutely
orthodox in her intention, Julian performed a studied but complicated submission to
“Holy Mother Church” that included carefully restricting access to her writings.
In summary, Julian contains her individual, original, creative voice within a
carefully performed submission to Church authority (the particulars of which I examine
in the next section). In keeping with her metaphor of mother and child, Julian insistently
instructs her readers to remain submissive sons and daughters of Holy Mother Church as
well. Yet this obedience is not simple or unquestioning, for, at the same time that she
196
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insists on submission, Julian simultaneously encourages an extraordinary internal
intellectual and emotional freedom. She wrote above all to encourage freedom from fear
and despair, a freedom grounded in a personal relationship with God. In doing so, Julian
instructs her readers to create an inner space of freedom in relation to God that does not
challenge Church authority but does nonetheless relativize that authority. In this way,
Julian places personal experience “above” authoritative teaching without ever overtly
challenging the latter.
Julian’s model of political kenosis is well symbolized by the anchorhold – a
Church-sanctioned retreat from larger institutional struggles that allowed for the
cultivation of an extraordinary inner (intellectual, psychological, emotional) freedom.
Yet, if indeed it was Julian’s decision not to circulate her text, she may have perhaps
feared the consequences of her teaching, that it could lead some readers to refuse that
freedom-in-submission and move beyond the bounds of orthodoxy. Such a fear is
expressed in the scribal closing of the LT: “I pray almighty God that this book may not
come except into the hands of those who wish to be his faithful lovers, and those who
will submit themselves to the faith of Holy Church. . .”.198 While these words reflect the
concerns of a later scribe, they may also coincide with Julian’s own anxieties about the
stability of her model, particularly in the hands of readers who would not so readily
submit. But in order to substantiate this interpretation, it is necessary to turn to Julian’s
text in some detail, examining the interplay between her careful submissions to Church
authority and her subtle assertions of personal authority.
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2.5 Church Authority, Personal Authority, and the Theology of Salvation
Within the Showings, questions of salvation theology provoke Julian’s greatest
theological creativity and require her most careful negotiations with Church teaching
authority.199 At issue is the fact that essential dimensions of the Showings – that God is
without wrath or judgment regarding human sin and that God will “make all things well”
– are seemingly in conflict with Church teachings regarding sin and its ultimate
consequence, damnation. Julian skillfully juxtaposes these two opposing beliefs, beliefs
that stem from her two sources of knowledge (what she understands from her experience
of God in prayer and what she understands from Church teaching), ultimately holding
them both as true, yet subordinating the latter (Church teaching) to the former in a way
that relativizes but does not cancel it.
Apprehension regarding salvation, both individual and general, lies at the heart of
the Showings. In exploring the questions raised by this apprehension, Julian moves
between two levels: the existential level of personal experience (individual salvation) and
the intellectual level of theological explanation (general salvation), between Julian the
simple believer (“my evynn Christian”) and Julian the theologian. Throughout both the
ST and the LT, Julian describes feelings of profound insecurity, fear, inertia, and despair,
expressing a deep psychological and emotional need for “safety”, which is nothing less
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than the existential correlate of assured salvation.200 Dark experiences of “wretchydness,
slowth and werynesse [wretchedness, sloth and weariness]” and “dispeyer or doughtfulle
drede [despair and doubtful fear]” alternate with experiences of security, peace, ease, and
rest.201 The positive experiences are associated with an awareness of God’s presence, its
bleak counterpart with being abandoned to oneself. In a stunning passage regarding the
Seventh Revelation, Julian describes herself rapidly alternating between these
experiences:
An after thys he shewde a sovereyne gostely lykynge in my soule. In thys
lykyng I was fulfyllde of the evyrlastyng suernesse, myghtely fastnyd
without[gh]t any paynefulle drede. This felyng was so glad and so
goostely that I was all in peese, in eese and in reste, that ther was nothing
in erth that shulde haue grevyd me.
This lastyd but a whyle, and I was turned and left to my selfe in
hevynes and werynes of my life and irkenes of my selfe, that vnneth I
could haue pacience to lyue. . . . And than the payne sheweth ayeen to my
felyng, and than the joy and the lykyng, and now that oonn and now the
other, dyuerse tymes, I suppose about twenty tymes.
[And after this he revealed a supreme spiritual delight in my soul. In this
delight I was filled full of everlasting surety, powerfully secured without
any painful fear. This sensation was so welcome and so spiritual that I was
wholly at peace, at ease and at rest, so that there was nothing upon earth
which could have afflicted me.
This lasted only for a time, and then I was changed, and abandoned
to myself, oppressed and weary of my life and ruing myself, so that I
hardly had the patience to go on living…. I felt the pain and then
afterwards the delight and the joy, now one and now the other, again and
again, I suppose about twenty times.]202
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From her reflection on experiences like this, Julian draws a number of conclusions. First,
she informs her reader that, “how so evyr thou do, thou shalle haue woo [whatever you
do, you will have woe.].”203 In other words, pain and suffering, especially mental
suffering, are unavoidably part of human existence (just as consolation and joy are), and
the deep desire for “surety”, for peace and ease, can only be met intermittently in this life.
Second, while pain and suffering are in a broad sense consequences of human sin, they
are not so much punishment for sin as they are profitable lessons intended by God to lead
to greater trust in God and, ultimately, to greater happiness. Throughout the Showings,
Julian encourages her reader to overcome feelings of guilt, shame, and fear in relation to
God, and, in particular, to avoid thinking that suffering of any kind is punishment for sin.
Third and most importantly, Julian understands that God’s love is constant and “kepyth
vs in lyke suer [keeps us safe at all times],” even when one feels abandoned and alone.204
For Julian, the constancy of God’s love is the absolute foundational reality that
undergirds all human experience. Julian concludes that, if one could truly trust in this
reality, then one would know existentially the meaning of the great “all will be well.”
The most startling part of Julian’s interpretation of her revelations here concerns
the way in which God views human sin:
… in falling and in rysyng we are evyr preciously kepte in o(ne) loue. For
in the beholding of god we falle nott, and in [the] beholding of oure selfe
we stoned nott; and boyth theyse be soth, as to my sight, but the beholding
of oure lord god is the higher sothnes.
[…in falling and in rising we are always preciously protected in one love;
for we do not fall in the sight of God, and we do not stand in our own
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sight; and both these are true, as I see it, but the contemplating of our Lord
God is the higher truth.]205
Underlying this quotation is a set of distinctions Julian will develop at much greater
length once she moves more thoroughly to the level of theological explanation: the
distinction between two perspectives on human sin and two truths or judgments. From the
human perspective (“our own sight”), human beings fall or fail with regularity; from
God’s perspective, humanity “stands” with a fundamental goodness and lovableness.
Both of these perspectives are true, yet the latter (God’s perspective) is “higher” than the
former, and therefore more ultimate in its meaning and significance. Seeing from both
perspectives produces the alternating experience of joy and pain, of safety and fear: “For
the hygher beholdyng kepth vs in gostly joy and trew enjoyeng in god, that other, [th]at is
the lower beholdyng, kepth vs in drede, and makyth vs a shamyd of oure selfe [for the
higher contemplation keeps us in spiritual joy and true delight in God; the other, which is
the lower contemplation keeps us in fear, and makes us ashamed of ourselves].”206
According to Julian, God desires that we maintain both truths, but in the right order: by
remaining much more in the “beholdyng of the hygher,” but not leaving “the knowyng of
the lower” until full unity with God is achieved in the life to come.207
On the existential level, Julian counsels that experiences of weakness and fear
(effects of sin) are necessary and profitable as long as they lead to “the remedy,” which is
to flee to God as a child flees to her mother:
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That dreed that makyth vs hastely to fle fro alle that is nott goode and falle
in to oure lordes brest, as [th]e chulde in to [th]e morders arme, with alle
oure entent and with alle oure mynde, knowing oure febylnes and oure
greate need, knowing his evyrlastyng goodnesse and his blessyd loue, only
sekyng in to hym for saluation, clevyng to with feythfulle trust.
[The fear that makes us hastily flee from everything that is not good, and
to fall into our Lord’s breast, as the child into the mother’s arms, with all
our intention and with all our mind, knowing our feebleness and our great
need, knowing his everlasting goodness and his blessed love, seeking only
in him for salvation, cleaving to him with faithful trust.]208
Since the constancy of God’s love is the absolute foundational reality, distrusting his love
because of an excessive focus on one’s sins is itself the most serious of sins: “It is a foule
blyndnes and a w(eke)nesse; and we can nott dyspyse it as we do another synne that we
know [It is a reprehensible blindness and weakness; and we do not know how to despise
it like any other sin which we recognize].”209 The fundamental failure in this case is a
failure to believe that God is love: “And of this knowyng are we most blynde, for some
of vs beleue that god is allmyghty and may do alle, and that his is alle wysdom and can
do alle, but that he is alle loue and will do alle, there we fayle [It is about this knowledge
that we are most blind, for some of us believe that God is almighty and may do
everything, that he is all wisdom and can do everything, but that he is all love and wishes
to do everything, there we fail].”210 Thus, if one believes that God is “all love,” then,
even in the midst of woe (fear, self-loathing, depression), one will have trust and joy:
“And whan we falle agayne to oure selfe by hevynes and gostely blyness and felynge of
paynes gostely and bodily by oure fragylte, it is goddys wylle that we know that he hath
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nott forget vs [And when we fall back into ourselves, through depression and spiritual
blindness and our experience of spiritual and bodily pains, because of our frailty, it is
God’s will that we know that he has not forgotten us].” 211
Above all, Julian counsels her reader to trust in the love of God. When this
fundamental trust is in place, experiences of the effects of sin (frailty, blindness, failure)
lead one to seek comfort in God rather than to fall into guilt, shame, self-loathing, and
despair. Confidence in God’s love is the surety that surrounds and supports the believer;
it keeps her safe and provides a foretaste of an ultimate happiness and security: “For he
wylle we kepe thus trustly, [th]at we be as seker in hope of the blysse of hevyn whyle we
are here as we shalle be in suerte when we are there [For he wants us to pay true heed to
this, that we are as certain in our hope to have the bliss of heaven whilst we are here as
we shall be certain of it when we are there].”212
When Julian moves to the level of theological explanation (and to the level of
general as opposed to individual salvation), the tension underlying this experience (the
experience of alternating fear and security) becomes more acute. The difficulty presents
itself as an opposition between what Julian knows from Church teaching and what Julian
understands from reflection on her experience of God in prayer. These two sources of
knowledge produce two opposing judgments, both of which are true: the Church’s view
that many will be damned and God’s repeated statement in visionary experience that “all
will be well.” In turn, the two judgments correlate to two perspectives, the human
(represented and embodied by the Church’s teaching) and God’s. Julian’s resolution of
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this aporia is to maintain both teachings as true but to place them in a hierarchical
relationship of higher and lower, a relationship analogous to that between eternality and
temporality.213 In explicit language, Julian acknowledges the judgment of the Church as
true but bound by the limits of a temporal perspective; it is thus a lower truth
circumscribed by the higher, ultimate truth that is only seen from God’s perspective.
Julian carefully constructs the dialectic of this argument, moving from one
perspective to the other, heightening the tension until it seems nearly impossible to
maintain the two truths at once. There are four major statements containing the aporia
introduced by Julian’s revelatory experiences. While, at first glance, these may seem
repetitive, in fact, each statement successively makes the aporia more explicit, thereby
heightening the tension and deepening the paradox. The repetition is also expressive of
Julian’s dialectical method. She theologizes in a spiral, returning repeatedly to the same
themes, each time on a deeper level. The final statement brings the aporia to a
culmination in the form of an example, or parable (the example of a lord and a servant),
whose multiple symbols, metaphors, and layers of meaning allow Julian to present her
most daring teaching in a way that remains paradoxical and enigmatic. The example of
the lord and the servant is the subject of the next chapter. Here, the focus is on The
Showings’ performance of the dialectic between Church teaching and God’s revelation
through prayer.

213

Julian does not use the Greek term aporia to define her method, yet it is appropriate. In the Platonic
sense, an aporia is a deeply perplexing issue that requires a dialectical method of reasoning. Typically, an
aporia allows for two or more interpretations or resolutions, each of which, considered in itself, seems true
yet, when juxtaposed, appears to contradict the other. Reasoning through the aporia requires a dialectical
method that may or may not result in resolution. There may be an affinity here with Derrida’s definition of
aporia in terms of “undecidability,” but I am not using it in a strictly Derridian sense. See Niall Lucy, A
Derrida Dictionary.

109

The dialectic is structured as a dialogue between Julian and God: God “shows”
Julian various truths (visually or as immediate understanding), and Julian questions God
about dimensions of the revelation that she does not understand. Since her questions
typically derive from Church teaching, Julian in effect confronts God with the teachings
of the Church and boldly beseeches him to resolve the seeming contradiction.
The first statement of the aporia occurs in the Third Revelation as Julian
contemplates the omnipresence of God: “I saw truly that god doth alle thing, be it nevyr
so lytyle. And I saw verily that nothyn is done by happe ne by aventure, but alle by the
for(eseing) wysdom of god [I saw truly that God does everything, however small it may
be, and that nothing is done by chance, but all by God’s prescient wisdom].”214
Immediately, this provokes in Julian the question of sin, for if God does everything, then
sin is either done by God or there is no such thing as sin. Convinced that both statements
are true (that God does everything and that there is sin), Julian introduces for the first
time the distinction between the two perspectives and two judgments (divine and human):
“For man beholdyth some dedys wele done and some dedys evylle, and our lorde
beholdyth them no so, for alle that hath beyng in kynde is of gods making, so is alle thing
that is done in properte of gods doing [For a man regards some deeds as well done and
some as evil, and our Lord does not regard them so, for everything which is done has the
property of being God’s doing].”215 That some deeds appear evil to us, Julian proposes, is
due to our limited, human perspective; if we could perceive from God’s perspective, we
would see that God is present in all things and. therefore, that everything that is done is
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“most good.” Julian is well aware that this is only a partial resolution to her question
regarding sin; after all, she is quite certain from her own experience and from Church
teaching that sin is real and cannot be simply “good”. Still, she does not doubt the truth
and validity of the revelation that God is present in all things and that this presence
necessarily makes all things good. Julian presents God as saying:
See I am god. See, I am in all things. See, I do allthyng. See, I nevyr lefte
my handes of my workes, ne never shalle without ende. See, I lede all
thing to the end [th]at I ordeyne it to, f(ro) without begynnyng, by all the
same myght, wysdom and loue that I made it with; how shoulde any thing
be a mysse?
[I am God. See, I am in all things. See, I do all things. See, I never
remove my hands from my works, nor ever shall without end. See, I guide
all things to the end that I ordain them for, before time began, with the
same power and wisdom and love with which I made them; how should
anything be amiss?]216
For Julian, however, things are amiss. While she wants to affirm the
omnipresence of God’s love and goodness, she cannot deny the reality of sin. She returns
to the question in earnest in the Thirteenth Revelation. Realizing that the only thing that
keeps her from joy and consolation in God is her own blindness and weakness (Julian’s
typical definition of sin), Julian wonders why God did not simply prevent sin and in this
way ensure that “alle shulde haue be wele [all would have been well].”217 In response,
Jesus tells her: “Synne is behouely, but alle shalle be wele, and alle shalle be wele, and
alle maner of thynge shalle be wele [Sin is necessary, but all will be well, and all will be
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well, and every kind of thing will be well].”218 The great “all will be well” is God’s
ultimate answer to Julian, the response given to “all the questions and doubts” Julian
raises.219 It is an assertion of God’s omnipotence, omnipresence, goodness, and love
against which everything human (sin particularly) pales and shrinks in comparison. God
is God, and in response to all Julian’s doubts and questions, he answers:
I may make alle thyng wele, and I can make alle thyng welle, and I shalle
make all thyng wele, and I wylle make alle thyng welle; and thou shalt se
thy selfe [th]at alle manner of thyng shall be welle.
[I may make all things well, and I can make all things well, and I shall
make all things well, and I will make all things well; and you will see
yourself that every kind of thing will be well.]220
For Julian, this is and is not an adequate response. As she moves from one side of
the dialectic to the other, from what God teaches her in prayer to what the Church
teaches, Julian’s questions and doubts intensify. She cannot doubt that God is love, and
that God can and will make all things well. At the same time, she cannot understand the
meaning of this revelation, given what she understands about the nature of sin and
damnation. Nonetheless, rather than bringing resolution and consolation, God’s response
only heightens Julian’s dilemma:
But in this I stode beholding generally, swemly and mornyngly seyyng
thus to oure lorde in my menyng with fulle gret drede: A, good lorde, how
myght alle be wele for the gret harme that is come by synne to they
creatures? And here I desyeryd as I druste to haue some more opyn
declaring wher with that I myght be esyd in thys.
[But in this I stood, contemplating it generally, darkly and mournfully,
saying in intention to our Lord with very great fear: Ah, good Lord, how
can all be well, because of the great harm which has come through sin to
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your creatures? And here I wished, so far as I dared, for some plainer
explanation through which I might be at ease about this matter.]221
Julian repeatedly assures her reader (and herself) that nothing in her revelations
contradicts Church teaching: “I was nott drawen ther by from ony pynt of the feyth [th]at
holy chyrch techyth me to beleue [I was not drawn by (the revelation) away from any
article of the faith which Holy Church teaches me to believe].”222 Yet Church teaching on
the matter of sin and its ultimate consequences is starkly unambiguous:

And one point of oure feyth is that many creatures shall be dampnyd, as
angelis that felle ou[gh]t of hevyn for pride, whych be now fendys, and
meny in erth that dyeth out of the feyth of holy chyrch, that is to sey tho
that be hethyn, and also many that hath receyvd cristondom and lyvyth
vnchristen lyfe and so dyeth ou[gh]te of cheryte. All theyse shalle be
dampnyd to helle without[gh]t (e)nde, as holy chyrch techyth me to
beleue.
[And one article of our faith is that many creatures will be damned, such
as the angels who fell out of heaven because of pride, who now are devils,
and many men upon earth who die out of the faith of holy Church, that is
to say those who are pagans and many who have received baptism and
who live unchristian lives and so die out of God’s love. All these will be
eternally condemned to hell, as Holy Church teaches me to believe.]223
Later, she adds the Jews to the list of those who, the Church (though not her revelations)
insists, will also be eternally damned: “But I saw nott so properly specyfyed the Jewes
that dyd hym to deth; but nott withstondyng I knew in my feyth that they ware a cursyd
and dampnyd without ende, savyng tho [th]at were convertyd by grace [But I saw
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nothing so exactly specified concerning the Jews who put him to death; and nonetheless I
knew in my faith that they were eternally accursed and condemned, except those who
were converted by grace].”224
Thus, although – according to Church teaching – the fallen angels, all
pagans, unconverted Jews, and Christians who live an unchristian life are
condemned to eternal hell, the revelations resist confirming this. In fact, to Julian,
Church teaching seems to be in outright contradiction to God’s promise that all
will be well: “And stondyng alle thys, me thought it was vmpossible that alle
maner of thyng] shulde be wele [And all this being so, it seemed to me that it was
impossible that every kind of thing should be well].”225 When Julian presents this
contradiction to God in prayer, God’s answer is (once again) simply the assertion
that “all will be well”:
And as to thys I had no other answere in shewyng of oure lorde but thys:
That [th]at is vnpossible to the is nott vnpossible to me. I shalle saue my
worde in alle thing, and I shalle make althyng wele.
[And to this I had no other answer as a revelation from our Lord except
this: what is impossible to you is not impossible to me. I shall preserve my
word in everything, and I shall make everything well].226
Julian concludes this second treatment of the aporia by again affirming both truths: that
some creatures will be eternally damned to hell and that God will make all things well.227
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But Julian cannot rest here. If God assures her that both statements are true and that what
is impossible to the human mind is not impossible to God, Julian still wants God’s help in
understanding how this can be so. In particular, she wants to know how the Church’s
teaching regarding damnation could possibly be true, considering the fact that God (in the
revelations) never confirms it specifically but, rather, only instructs her to “keep steadfast
in the faith” (i.e., Church teaching) and be an obedient daughter of the Church. In a
word, the God of Julian’s revelations never explicitly confirms the truth of the Church’s
specific teaching that many will be eternally damned. Julian’s request for a vision of hell
or purgatory is denied her, as is any explicit statement regarding the reality of eternal
damnation for human beings.228 Thus, what troubles Julian now is not the meaning of “all
will be well” but the meaning of Church teaching, so she beseeches God to show her
what the teaching means from God’s perspective:
Then was this my desyer, that I myght se in god in what manner that the
dome of holy chyrch here inerth is tru in his sight, and howe it longyth to
me verily to know it, where by they myght both be savyd. . . .
[This then was my desire, that I might see in God in what way the
judgment of Holy Church here on earth is true in his sight, and how it
pertains to me to know it truly, whereby they might both be reconciled….]
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The desire to understand the meaning of Church teaching from God’s perspective leads
Julian to her third and most explicit statement of the aporia, in which she repeats the
distinction between the two judgments and her anxious need to affirm both:
The furst dome, whych is of goddes ryghtfulnes, and that is of his owne
hygh endlesse loue, and that is that feyer swete dome that was shewed in
all the feyer revelation in whych I say hym assigne(e) to vs no maner of
blame. And though theyse were swete and delectable, [y]ytt only in the
beholding of this I culde nott be fulle esyd, and that was for the dome of
holy chyrch, whych I had before vnderstondyn and was contynually in my
syght. . . . And therefore my desyer was more than I can or may telle, for
the higher dome god shewed hym selfe in the same tyme, and therefore
(m)e behovyd nedys to take it. And the lower dome was lernyd me before
tyme in holy chyrche, and therefore I myght nott by no weye leue the
lower dome.
[The first judgment, which is from God’s justice, is from his own great
endless love, and that is the fair, sweet judgment which was shown in all
the fair revelation in which I saw him assign to us no kind of blame. And
though this was sweet and delectable, I could not be fully comforted only
by contemplating it, and that was because of the judgment of Holy
Church, which I had understood before, and which was continually in my
sight. . . . and therefore my desire was more than I can or may tell, because
of the higher judgment which God himself revealed at the same time, and
therefore I had of necessity to accept it. And the lower judgment had
previously been taught me in Holy Church, and therefore I could not in
any way ignore the lower judgment.]229
The tension is enhanced further by the fact that, in contemplating God in prayer, Julian
can see no wrath in him, and more troubling for Julian, she cannot see him blaming
humanity for its sins. Thus, not only does it seem from her revelations that God will
make all things well; it also seems the case that God does not judge, punish, or blame
humanity for its sins.
The content of the two judgments are now laid out explicitly side-by-side. From
Church teaching, Julian concludes:
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And thus in alle this beholding me thought it behovyd nedys to se and to
know that we be sinners and do many evylles that we ou[gh]te to leue, and
leue many good dedys vndone that we ou[gh]te to do, wherefore we
deserve payne, blame and wrath.
[And so in all this contemplation it seemed to me that it was necessary to
see and to know that we are sinners and commit many evil deeds which
we ought to forsake, and leave many good deeds undone which we ought
to do, so that we deserve pain, blame and wrath.]230
From the higher judgment of God encountered in prayer, Julian understands the
following:
And nott with stondyng alle this I saw verily that oure lorde was nevyr
wroth nor nevyr shall. For he is god, he is good, he is truth, he is loue, he
is pees; and hys myght, hys wysdom, hys charyte and his vunte sufferyth
hym nott to be wroth. . . . God is that goodnesse that may nott be wroth,
for god is nott but goodness. Oure soule is onyd to hym, vnchanngeable
goodnesse. And between god and oure soule is neyther wrath nor
forgevenesse in hys sight. For oure soule is so fulsomely onyd to god of
hys owne goodnesse that between god and oure sould may be ryght
nought.
[And despite all this, I saw truly that our Lord was never angry, and never
will be. Because he is God, he is good, he is truth, he is love, he is peace;
and his power, his wisdom, his charity and his unity do not allow him to
be angry. . . . for God is nothing but goodness. Our soul is united to him
who is unchangeable goodness. And between God and our own soul there
is neither wrath nor forgiveness in his sight. For our soul is wholly united
to God, through his own goodness, that between God and our soul nothing
can interpose.]231
Thus, according to Church teaching, sinners deserve punishment and judgment,
while, according to the revelations, Julian comes to understand that there is no wrath in
God and, startlingly, no forgiveness. This is because God is only goodness and the
human soul is utterly united to God. While only mentioned here, later in the example of
a lord and a servant (God’s ultimate response to Julian’s questioning), the soul’s
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extraordinary union with God becomes the key to understanding God’s perspective. At
this point, however, God’s response leaves Julian at an impasse, where the two truths she
is intent on affirming seem in outright contradiction. Nevertheless, Julian concludes this
chapter by stating her confidence in both truths:
For all thyng that the simple soule vnderstode, god wyll that it be shewed
and knowyn; for those thynges that he wylle haue prevy, myghtely and
wisely hym selfe hydyth them for loue. For I saw in the same shewyng tht
moch pryvete is hyd whych may nevyr be knowen in to the tyme that god
of hys goodness hath made vs worthy to se it. And ther with I am well
apayde, abydyng oure lords wylle in this hye marveyle. And now I [y]elde
me to my modyr holy chyrch, as a sympyll chylde owyth.
[For everything which the simple soul understood, God wants that to be
revealed and known; for he himself, powerfully and wisely, out of love,
hides the things which he wishes to be secret. For I saw in the same
revelation that there are many hidden mysteries which can never be known
until the time when God in his goodness has made us worthy to see them.
And with this I am well satisfied, waiting upon our Lord’s will in this
great marvel. And now I submit myself to my mother, Holy Church, as a
simple child should.]232
Julian the simple soul is compelled to make the content of her revelations known to
others. At the same time, she grants that there are many things she cannot understand
because God has not revealed the meaning to her. For the moment, Julian is content to
leave the problem in mystery and (rather perfunctorily) concludes with an act of
submission to the Church.
Yet Julian is not “well satisfied” insofar as she returns a fourth and final time to
the aporia in the Fourteenth Revelation. The repetition of the aporia is both part of her
dialectical/dialogical method and expressive of her anxiety regarding its content. The
Fourteenth Revelation contains Julian’s most original and daring theological
explorations, which constitute the most significant additions of the LT. The overall
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theme of the revelation is the meaning of prayer, particularly the prayer that all will be
saved. In this context, Julian returns to the aporia with an urgency and anxiety that
compels her to plead with God for a fuller explanation of how the revelations and the
Church’s teaching can both be true:
But yet here I wondryde and merveyled with alle [th]e dylgence of my
soule, menyng thus: Goode lorde, I see the that thou arte very truth, and I
know truly [th]at we syn grievously all day be moch blame worthy; and I
may neyther leue the knowing of this sooth, nor I se nott the shewyng to
vs no manner of blame. How can this be? For I knew be the comyn
techyng of holy church and by my owne felyng that the blame of oure
synnes continually hangyth vppon vs, fro [th]e furst man in to the tyme we
come vppe in to hevyn. Then was this my merveyle, that I saw oure lorde
god shewyng to vs no more blame then if we were as clene and as holy as
angelis be in hevyn.
[But still here I wondered and marveled with all the diligence of my soul,
after this fashion: Good Lord, I see in you that you are very truth, and I
know truly that we sin grievously all day and are very blameworthy; and I
can neither reject my knowledge of this truth, nor see that any kind of
blame is shown to us. How can this be? For I know by the ordinary
teaching of Holy Church and by my own feeling that the blame of our sins
continually hangs on us, from the first man until the time that we come up
into heaven. This, then, was my astonishment, that I saw our Lord God
showing not more blame to us than if we were as pure and as holy as the
angels in heaven.]233
Now the tension is unbearable, and Julian will not be mollified with simply holding to
both and submitting (to both God and the Church) as a “simple child oweth”:
And between theyse two contraryes my reson was grettly traveyled by my
blyndnes, and culde haue no rest for drede that his blessed presens shulde
passe fro my sight, and I to be lefte in vnkowynge how he beholde vs in
oure synne. For eyther me behovyd to see in god how he seeth it, wher by
I myght truly know how it longyth to me to see synne and the manner of
oure blame.
[And between these two oppositions, my reason was greatly afflicted by
my blindness, and I could have no rest for fear that his blessed presence
would pass from my sight, and I should be left in ignorance of how he
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may look on us in our sin. For either I ought to see in God that sin was all
done away with, or else I ought to see in God how he sees it, by which I
might truly know how it is fitting for me to see sin and the way in which
we have blame.]234
The response that finally satisfies Julian is the example, or parable, of a lord and a
servant. Within the layered complexity of these images, Julian presents a salvation
theology that is profoundly hopeful and all-encompassing. The key to the teaching is the
way in which humanity is united to God, especially in the incarnation. Because of this
profound unity, the Son takes on all humanity’s blame, and thus, when the Father looks at
humanity, he always sees the Son: “And thus hath oure good lorde Jhesu taken vppon
hym all oure blame; and therefore oure fader may nor wyll nor more blame assigne to vs
than to hys owner derwurthy son Jhesu Cryst [And so has our good Lord Jesus taken
upon him all our blame; and therefore our Father may not, does not wish to assign more
blame to us than to his own beloved Son Jesus Christ].”235 With the idea of “our ryght
onying” (the way in which God is united to humanity in Christ), Julian seizes “the
beginning of the teaching” on how God sees human sin. God does not blame or punish
sinful humanity for two reasons: first, because God is love and incapable of anger; and
secondly, because humanity is utterly united to the Son in such a way that the Father
cannot separate humanity from his Son and therefore cannot blame or punish humanity.
The theology Julian derives from the revelations clearly implies universal
salvation: God is in all things; all humanity is united to the Son both in creation and
incarnation; God will make all things well. Yet Julian pulls back from drawing this
conclusion. In her glosses on the revelations and in her own teaching, she is careful
234

BS 55/JNS 266.

235

BS 535/JNS 275.

120

(nearly always) to insist that she only speaks of “those who will be saved.” She adopts
from Church teaching a theology of predestination whereby only some have been chosen
by God for eternal salvation and others (even the majority) will be damned.236 Early in
the Showings, Julian carefully limits the extent of her teaching: “I speke of them that
shalle be savyd, for in this tyme god shewde me no nother. But in all thing I beleue as
holy chyrch trechyth and techyth [I speak of those who will be saved, for at this time God
showed me no one else. But in everything I believe as Holy Church preaches and
teaches].”237 Even in the example of a lord and a servant, where the universalist thrust is
strongest, Julian is careful to qualify the teaching with the clause, “all who will be
saved.” 238 It is in this careful qualification that we witness Julian’s most significant
performance of submission to Church teaching. The expansive, inclusive teaching of the
revelations is circumscribed by the narrower, exclusive teaching of the Church. The
damned, she assumes (from Church teaching and not the revelations) are in the same
condition as the devil (whose condemnation God did show her in a revelation):
in whych sy[gh]t I vnderstond [th]at alle the creatures [th]at be of the
devylles condiscion in thys lyfe and ther in ending, ther is no more
mencyon made of them before god and alle his hlyn then of the devylle,
notwythstondyng that they be of mankynde, wheder they haue be cristend
or nought; for though the reuelation was shewde of goodness, in whych
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was made lytylle mencion of evylle, [y]ett I was nott drawen ther by from
ony point of the feyth [th]at holy chyrch techyth me to beleue.
[By this sight I understand that every creature who is of the devil’s
condition in this life and so dies is no more mentioned before God and all
his saints than the devil, notwithstanding that they belong to the human
race, whether they have been baptized or not; for although the revelation
was shown to reveal goodness, and little mention was made in it of evil,
still I was not drawn by it away from any article of the faith which Holy
Church teaches me to believe.]239 (234)
Whereas the revelations are only about the goodness of God and of humanity, it is
Church teaching that provides the counterpoint. At the same time, Julian carefully labels
the Church’s teaching as a lower judgment in that it correlates to the human perspective.
The higher truth concerns the nature of God (God is love, incapable of anger or blame,
and will make all things well); the nature of humanity in relation to God (Humanity is
united with God in creation but, above all, through the incarnation); and the way in which
God sees human failure (Since humanity is united to God the Son, God the Father cannot
judge or blame). In God’s perspective, which is higher and ultimate, God will make all
things well though how he will do this remains a mystery to Julian, who must accept her
restriction – revelations aside – to the human/Church perspective. In contrast to God, the
Church judges, blames, and punishes – rightly so, according to Julian. Without the
judgment of the Church, people would neither recognize their failures and weaknesses
nor turn to God for strength and forgiveness.240 And so, having worked through the
aporia as much as God will allow, Julian realizes that both truths are necessary; human
beings are to see themselves both as sinners and as God’s beloved, as both worthy of
blame and as innocent, worthy of judgment yet not judged. The duality of perspective is
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precisely what Julian wants to maintain, since, without it, human beings fall either into
despair or into arrogant presumption.241 Because it is the Church’s task to remind sinners
that they are in need of grace and forgiveness, the Church judges and blames but also
directs sinners to turn to God, who is all good and loving. Julian instructs her reader,
above all, to turn to God in prayer and to learn through personal relationship who God is
and who humanity is in relationship to God. In pairing the two judgments, her reader is
taught to think of oneself as a sinner (weak and frail) but to think even more of oneself as
the child of a loving Mother who will not fail her child and will – ultimately and finally –
make all things well.
In the end, this is a daring theology of salvation within a carefully constructed
dialectic that preserves Church teaching while at the same time holding out the hope of
universal salvation. Julian humbly insists that her revelations cannot, and indeed do not,
contradict Church teaching or in any way lead away from it. She counsels obedience and
submission to the Church yet encourages her reader to seek God in private prayer and
thereby overcome the fear and guilt that Church teaching typically provokes. The
Church’s teaching and sacramental practices are to instruct, aid, and support the Christian
in the struggles with sin. Yet, the implication is that the more one seeks God in prayer,
the more secondary the Church’s aids become. Even though Julian never goes so far as to
say that they are unnecessary (as the Lollards ultimately do), the Church’s teachings and
functions are, at this key point in the Showings, relativized and instrumentalized in
relation to the far greater reality of union with a God who is love.
Though other medieval mystics placed union with God above sacramental
practice (e.g., Marguerite Porète) and there are suggestions of universal salvation in
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other late medieval writings,242 Julian must have been aware that her teaching would have
been considered novel and dangerous by many. Her constant insistence that nothing in
the revelations is contrary to Church teaching, her careful qualification in terms of “those
who will be saved,” and her decision to restrict the circulation of her text are all careful
performances of submission to the Church authorities that serve to protect her theology
from charges of heresy. Yet, as Watson points out, even these submissions would
probably not have been sufficient:
It can be taken as read that the supple reinvention in A Revelation of what
it is to “submit […] to the faith of holy church” could not have gained
official approval, and that efforts to circulate the book widely as its appeal
to all Christians asks to be circulated would have led to accusations that
here was a vision “enclyned to […] error of hooli chirche,” as The
Chastising puts it: a “wondir or newe thing,” not a true expression of
God’s purposes. . . .in its elevation of a woman’s experience of God and
radical speculations about this experience’s meaning to the status of
ultimate arbiter of truth, the book does something extraordinarily daring,
reminding us in so doing of the restlessness, indeed the recklessness, of
the vernacular religious culture that gave it birth.243
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Chapter Three

Kenotic Performances of Power in the Example of a Lord
and a Servant
“He stode before his fader as a servant, wylfylly takyng
vppon hym alle oure charge.”1
3.1 Introduction
Julian’s primary presentation of Christic kenosis is her example of a lord and a
servant, a retelling of the kenotic myth using the imagery of a medieval relationship
between a lord and a servant. 2 God the Father is presented as a lord, the Son his servant.
In taking on the servant’s role, the Son temporarily renounces his divine power and status
and unites himself to humanity (also represented by the servant). When the lord instructs
the servant to fulfill a complicated task, the servant, in his eagerness, falls into a ditch and
is severely injured. This falling represents the incarnate Son’s willingness to suffer with
humanity all the weakness, blindness, pain, and finally death that characterize the human
condition. The Son’s kenotic descent into human servant-hood and death is completed by
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used to teach, often on the context of a sermon. See note 25 below.
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his restoration to a position of sonship, with (redeemed) humanity accompanying him as
his bride.
This deceptively simple story motivates the most creative and speculative
dimensions of Julian’s theology. Along with being the culmination of the aporia
concerning divine love and the human sin, the example leads Julian into her most unique
representation of divine-human relationship, a divine mother and her human child (the
subject of the next chapter). While all the formal elements of the Philippians myth are
present in the example, the performances of power by both the Father/lord and the
Son/servant subtly displace traditional, patriarchal models.
My purpose in this chapter is to explore the performances of kenosis in the
example, the gendering of those performances, and the theological purposes to which
Julian presses the example. I begin by reviewing key elements of the analysis of kenosis I
presented in chapter 1. I then turn to an examination of the fourteenth revelation and its
preoccupation with the aporia of divine love and the possibility of damnation. While the
previous chapter examined the aporia in terms of Julian’s negotiated submission to
Church teaching, in this chapter the aporia is presented in the context of Julian’s
performance of prayer. In developing the aporia, Julian engages in a dynamic negation of
power in relation to God, including both kenotic and productive performances. Finally, I
turn to an exegesis of the example and the ways in which Julian the theologian leads her
reader through a complex, layered meditation on its theological significance.
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3.2 Relations of Power, Christic Kenosis, and Gender
In chapter 1, I defined kenosis in general terms as a relational performance of
power by which a person intentionally reduces his or productive power vis-à-vis another.
Performing kenosis presupposes a relative degree of status (a particular standing vis-à-vis
the other) and productive power (the ability to act vis-à-vis the other and to effect
change). Thus the kenotic subject enacts a movement from a position of greater power to
one of lesser power vis-à-vis the other, and the other thereby becomes more powerful.
The initial relationship may be largely symmetrical (defined by a high degree of equality
and mutuality) or asymmetrical (unequal and unbalanced); in either case, the performance
of kenosis modifies the relationship by altering the negotiation of power within it.
In the paradigmatic case of kenosis (Christic kenosis), the Divine Son willingly
and intentionally repudiates his divine power and status temporarily, placing himself in a
subordinate and submissive relationship to God the Father. In doing so, he alters the
relationship from one of equality and mutuality to one of asymmetry and imbalance; he is
now disempowered, subordinate, submissive, humiliated. The Father’s power is enhanced
by the Son’s kenosis, putting the Father in a position of dominance; he now demands
obedience from the Son. The Son’s kenosis opens him to violation and violence, and he
ends his kenotic descent by being brutally executed by the agents of state power. The
kenotic position of the Son is only temporary, however, since ultimately he is not only
returned to his original position but also “exalted” and given power over all others,
including those responsible for his violent death. The great cosmic reversal that closes
the myth presents the whole cosmos submitting to the one who had been victimized and
recognizing him as lord.
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In Julian’s telling of the kenotic myth, humanity plays more of a role than it does
in Philippians. In fact, the lord and the servant represent three overlapping relationships
between God the Father and the incarnate Son, God the Father and humanity (a humanity
that is never separated from the incarnate son), and between the incarnate Son and
humanity. While the Son performs the kenosis, his performance affects each of these
relationships.
Julian also explicitly genders the kenotic performance in ways that are only
implicit in Philippians. Male figures predominate: a male lord and a male servant, the
Father and the Son, God the Father and Adam (representing humanity), Christ and Adam.
Only at the end of the example does a female figure appear, when humanity becomes
transgendered from the figure of Adam to that of a fair maiden.
Two interpretations of “Julian and gender” guide my reading of her text: One
functions as a caution, and the other as an indicator of the liberating potentialities of
Julian’s theology both in her own time period and in ours. The caution comes from
Nicholas Watson’s reminder that Julian, like other writers of her period, worked “within
the broad confines of an intellectual system which had no place for the idea that gender
is, in part, a social construct.” 3 What we would consider gender stereotypes, Julian and
her contemporaries would accept as natural fact. According to Watson, then, we should
not expect Julian to consciously reject or radically invert gender stereotypes; instead, we
find Julian, along with other medieval women writers, re-interpreting those stereotypes in
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ways that resist “both the passivity and the low prestige traditionally associated with
them”: 4
Medieval women writers often respond to the gender stereotypes which
they inherit from their culture neither by accepting nor by rejecting them,
but rather by thinking through them in as active and positive a way as
possible, identifying with them and even intensifying them to the point
where their “authorized” meaning (as understood, for example, by
institutionally powerful men) undergoes basic shifts. 5
Watson’s caution not only prompts us to resist abstracting Julian from her late medieval
context, but it also alerts us to the lasting allure of gender stereotypes themselves. As
Watson point out, de-historicized readings of Julian may work not to subvert gender roles
but to “sustain [them] largely unchallenged” in at least “some of the circles in which she
is presently being read.” 6
The second interpretation, offered by Lynn Staley, shares Watson’s concerns with
modern de-historicized readings of Julian. Yet on Staley’s reading, Julian, in her use of
the social categories of both gender and class, is doing more than creating space for
positive re-evaluations of the feminine within narrowly defined categories. In their
conventional use in late medieval English writings, pairs of terms like “head and heart,
authority and experience, gloss and text, masters and servants, male and female, father
and mother” were presented as oppositional and hierarchically ranked binaries. 7 Julian
uses these pairs yet resists relating them hierarchically and oppositionally. Instead, she
allows for a fluidity and movement within and between the pairs, blurring differences and
collapsing oppositions. According to Staley, Julian’s rhetorical purpose is to intentionally
4
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reformulate the terms of the conversation and thereby instruct her readers to “see” and
experience relationship to God in a broader and less constrictive way.
Both Watson and Staley alert us to the complexities of our own interpretations of
gender in Julian’s texts. Whether read in her late medieval context or in our late modern
one, Julian’s theological discourse remains both conventional and potentially liberating.
Where gender categories – and power categories more generally – are static, rigid,
hierarchical, and oppositional, power will be enacted in the classic binary of domination
and submission. Where gender/power categories are dynamic and fluid, enactments of
power open up potentialities for maturation, creativity, empowerment, and change. While
it would be anachronistic to assume that Julian is consciously subverting gender
stereotypes, it can be argued that her use of gender, both rhetorically and conceptually,
undermines interpretations of gender as rigidly fixed, hierarchic categories of power and
submission.

3.3 The Place of the Example in the Fourteenth Revelation
The Long Text (LT) of Julian’s Showings expands on the explication of the
revelations first recounted in the Short Text (ST), and the most significant thematic
developments belong to the fourteenth revelation, specifically the example of a lord and a
servant and Jesus as Mother. Neither the example nor the motherhood theme appear
explicitly in the ST or in the outline of the revelations offered in chapter 1 of the LT.
Perhaps more significantly, the ST barely hints at, and the outline gives no indication of,
the larger theme that occupies Julian throughout both the thirteenth and fourteenth
revelations: the tension between God’s loving will to save humanity on the one hand and
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the consequences of human sin on the other. As was discussed in the preceding chapter,
this tension is first introduced in Julian’s lengthy explication of the thirteenth revelation
and is summarized in the great “all will be well” theme. Julian is hesitant to state directly
her understanding of God’s “all will be well,” yet she often implies that it can only mean
that, ultimately, God’s loving will to save humanity will encompass all. This
understanding is both comforting and profoundly disquieting. If God wills to make all
things well, then what, Julian asks, is human sin? And what of the Church’s teaching
regarding the reality of eternal damnation? For Julian, God’s seemingly simple words
create a disturbing aporia: On one side is the affirmation of the all-encompassing love of
God and its consequence, universal salvation; on the other is the affirmation of the reality
of sin and its consequence, eternal damnation. In her explication of the thirteenth and
fourteenth revelations in the LT, Julian builds the tensions of this aporia to its climax in
the example of a lord and a servant.
The overarching theme of the fourteenth revelation in both the ST and the LT is
relationship to God in prayer. As Julian summarizes in her outline in chapter 1 of the LT:
The xiiii is that our lord god is grownd of our beseking. Heer in was seen
two fayer properties. That one is rightfull preaier; that other is verie trust,
which he will both be one lyke large. And thus our praier liketh him, and
he of his goodness fullfillyth it.
[The Fourteenth revelation is that our Lord God is the foundation of our
beseeching. In this two fair qualities were seen. One is proper prayer; the
other is true trust, and he wishes them both to be equally generous. And so
our prayer is pleasing to him, and he in his goodness fulfils it.] 8
At first glance, the subject of prayer seems unrelated to the theme of salvation and sin.
Yet in fact, the tensions of Julian’s aporia arise precisely in the context of prayer. Julian
believes that, when a Christian prays with true desire for what is good, the praying itself
8
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is already motivated by God and what is prayed for is already willed by God. This belief
contains its own tensions, which I will examine in a moment. But first I want to insert the
problem of universal salvation into this context. If a Christian prays with true desire for
the salvation of all (surely, something good and worthy of prayer), then both the prayer
itself and its content must be willed by God. But if universal salvation is willed by God,
then it must be the case that, ultimately, all will be saved. This is the conclusion that
Julian seems always on the verge of stating and yet nearly always pulls back from. From
the revelations themselves, this conclusion seems inevitable, and yet Julian cannot simply
affirm it (and in fact, finally does not) because of what she knows from her own
experience and from the teachings of the Church, namely that sin leads to eternal
damnation.
The ST presents Julian’s explication of the fourteenth revelation in a “first draft”
form: It is more unpolished, simplistic, immediate, and conventional. Despite, or perhaps
because of this, the ST has an immediacy and urgency that is, to some degree, edited out
of the LT. More significantly, the ST tends to make statements of universal salvation
more frequently and without qualification.
The content of the revelation itself is rather simple:
I am grownde of thy besekynge. First it is my wille that [th]ou hafe it, and
syne I make to will it, and syne I make the to be seke it. And [y]if [th]ou
beseke, howe schulde it than be that [th]ou schulde nought hafe thy
besekynge?
[I am the foundation of your beseeching. First, it is my will that you
should have it, and then I make you to wish it, and then I make you
beseech it. And if you beseech, how could it be that you would not have
what you beseech?] 9

9
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It is granted to Julian in response to a series of questions regarding the practice of prayer.
The first regards the experience of dryness, lack of trust, or weakness in prayer. The
second regards the purpose of prayer, given the fact that whatever God wills will be done
whether Christians pray for it or not. The third concerns the practice of contemplation
that goes beyond prayer, and the fourth concerns the practice of praying for the salvation
of all. I want to focus and the second and the fourth questions since it is these that, in
large part, generate the aporia.
Regarding the second question, Julian understands the revelation to mean that
“alle thynge that es done schulde be done [th]ow[e] we neuer prayed it [everything which
is done would be done, even though we had never prayed for it],” yet “the luff of god es
so mykille that he haldes vs parcyners of his goode deede [but God’s love is so great that
he regards us as partners in his good works].” 10 In other words, God will work his plans,
regardless of human prayer, and yet he wants humans to participate in “his goode deede.”
And further, he takes delight in rewarding those who pray: “and perfore he styrres vs to
praye that hym lykes to do, for whate prayere or goode wille that we hafe of his gyfte, he
will rewarde vs and gife vs endelese mede [and so he moves us to pray for what it pleases
him to do, for whatever prayer of good desire comes to us by his gift he will repay us for,
and give us eternal reward].” 11
The question concerning universal salvation is embedded in the content of
Julian’s prayer. As she states:
I sawe ij condicions in thamm that prayes, aftyr that I have felyd in my
selfe. Ane es thaye wille nought praye for nathynge that may be botte that
thynge that es goddess wille and his wirschippe; another is that thay sette
10
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thamm myghttelye and contynuely to be seke that thynge that es his wille
and his worschippe. … And thus we praye fore alle oure evenn christen,
and for alle manere of menn that god es wille es, for we walde that alle
maner of menn and womenn ware in the same vertu and grace that we awe
to desire to oure selfe.
[I saw two conditions in those who pray, according to what I have felt
myself. One is that we will not pray for anything at all but for the thing
which is God’s will and to his glory; another is that they apply themselves
always and with all their might to entreat the thing which is his will and to
his glory. … And so we pray for all our fellow Christians, and for every
kind of person as God wishes, for it is our wish that every kind of man and
woman might be in the same state of virtue and grace as we ought to wish
for ourselves.] 12
Julian thus feels compelled to pray for salvation, not only for her “evenn christen,” but
for “alle maner of menn and womenn.” And since she knows she should only pray for
the “thynge that es his wille,” and that God both motivates the prayer itself and its
content, then it must be the case that God wills the salvation of all. Putting this in the
context of her answer to the second question above, it must not only be God’s will, but
also his plan, to save “alle maner of menn and womenn.”
Julian closes her presentation of the fourteenth revelation in the ST with a passage
that clearly contains intimations of the example of a lord and a servant. Treating of
experiences of the (seeming) absence of God in prayer, Julian insists that it is not God’s
absence but the person’s sin that keeps him from “seeing God.” God’s love is constant,
but “in the tyme that men is in synne he is so vnmyghttye, so vnwyse and so vnluffande
that he can nought love god ne hym selfe [during the time that a man is in sin he is so
weak, so foolish, so unloving that he can love neither God nor himself].” 13 In explaining
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this situation further, Julian presents the outline of the example but without the language
of the lord and the servant, and without reference to the larger soteriological themes that
occupy her in the LT:
The maste myschefe that [a man] hase es blyndnesse, for he sees nought
alle this. Than the hale luffe of god alle mighty that euer is ane gyffes hym
sight to hym selfe; and than wenes he that god ware wrathe with hym for
his synne. And than is he stirred to contricionn, and be confessyonn and
othere goode dedys to slake the wrathe of god, vnto the tyme he fynde a
reste in saule and softenesse in conscience; and than hym thynke [th]at
god hase for gyffynn his synnes, and it es soth. And than is god in [th]e
sight of (the) saule turnede in to the behaldynge of the saule, as [y]if it had
bene in payne or in presonn, sayande thus: I am gladde that [th]ou erte
commen to reste, for I hafe euer loved the and now loves the, and [th]ou
me. And thus with prayers, as I hafe before sayde, and with othere goode
werkys [th]at ere custummable(ylle) be the techynge of haly kyrche, is
[th]e soule aned to god.
[{A man’s} greatest harm is his blindness, because he cannot see all this.
Then almighty God’s perfect love, which never changes, gives him sight
of himself; and then he believes that God may be angry with him because
of sin. And then he is moved to contrition, through confession and other
good deeds to appease God’s anger, till he finds rest of soul and ease of
conscience; and then it seems to him that God has forgiven his sins, and
this is true. And then it seems to the soul that God has been moved to look
upon it, as though it had been in pain or in prison, saying: I am glad that
you have found rest, for I have always loved you and I love you now, and
you love me. And so with prayers, as I have said, and with other good
works that Holy Church teaches us to practice, the soul is united to
God.] 14

When Julian presents the example in the LT, significant elements will be both added to
and subtracted from the passage. Most importantly, “the man” will be presented as a
willing servant who, in his eagerness to do his lord’s will, falls into a ditch, and God will
be presented as seeing no blame, having no anger and, indeed, having no need to forgive.
In the LT’s treatment of the fourteenth revelation, Julian begins with the same
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questions regarding the practice of prayer, and the content of the revelation is also largely
the same:
The xiiii is that our lord god is grownd of our beseking. Heer in was seen
two fayer properties. That one is rightfull preaier; that other is verie trust,
which he will both be one lyke large. And thus our praier liketh him, and
he of his goodness fullfillyth it.
[The Fourteenth revelation is that our Lord God is the foundation of our
beseeching. In this two fair qualities were seen. One is proper prayer; the
other is true trust, and he wishes them both to be equally generous. And so
our prayer is pleasing to him, and he in his goodness fulfils it.] 15
The two “fayer properties” of the soul, prayer (or beseeching) and trust, constitute a
tension at the heart of the relation with God in this life, a tension that will not be resolved
until the eschatological fullness in which “we endlessly be alle hyd in god, verily seyeng
and fylsomly felyng, and hym gostely heryng, and hym delectably smelling, and hym
sweetly swelwyng. And ther shall we se god face to face, homely and fulsomely [we shall
be endlessly hidden in God, truly seeing and wholly feeling, and hearing him spiritually
and delectably smelling him and sweetly tasting him. And there we shall see God face to
face, familiarly and wholly].” 16 Still, in this life God may, “of his speciall grace,” “shew
hym here[show himself]” to individual souls in the form of contemplation or revelation.
When this occurs, there is no need for prayer (beseeching), since the soul already
possesses what it desires.
With chapter 45 of the LT, the most significant additions to the explication of the
fourteenth revelation begin in earnest. Julian begins to construct the aporia of salvation
and sin, building the tensions layer upon layer until they climax in the revelation of the
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example. Julian is at her strongest here, both theologically and in terms of her literary
mastery of her text. She first formulates the aporia as “two judgments,” then as “two
contemplations,” and finally, in its starkest form, as “two contraryes,” or “two
oppositions.” The opposition is between what Julian understands from her revelations on
the one hand, and what she understands from her own experience and from the teaching
of the Church on the other.
Within Julian’s prayer, there is an extraordinary performance of power in relation
to God. As the tension of the aporia heightens, Julian does not simply submit to God and,
still less, to Church teaching. Her aim is greater understanding, and she persistently and
actively pursues this understanding in prayer. Thus we see her performing the tension
between praying (beseeching) and trusting that is the central theme of the fourteenth
revelation. She beseeches God to grant her understanding, trusting at the same time that
he must grant her what she wishes since, as she argues, God is the source and ground of
the beseeching itself.
When God first answers her with the great “all will be well,” Julian’s initial
response is kenotic submission; she accepts the teaching as mystery. Yet she cannot
remain at this level. Her desire to understand moves her out of kenotic submission and
drives her to return to God with even more urgent questioning. Julian will not simply
submit to God, accepting in humility and obedience what she cannot understand. Note the
dynamic here: Turning to God in prayer requires active beseeching and trusting.
However, the power to pray (according to Julian) comes from God already (he is the
“grownd of our beseking”), and the more one prays, the more one becomes empowered to
beseech God. Julian thus negotiates power with God, a power that is certainly
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assymetrical but nonetheless really negotiated and exchanged. Julian repeatedly submits
to God’s teaching and to a lesser extent to the teachings of the Church. Even so, her
submission is not the end-point; still less is it fixed or static. She returns to God with
questions, seeking understanding, convinced that God empowers her to beseech him and
that God will respond – even submit – to her own beseeching.
Now we begin to see the radical potential of Julian’s seemingly traditional
teaching on prayer. She instructs her reader in kenotic performances of power that in turn
empower and embolden. This kind of prayer is not passive or simply submissive. Driven
by a desire to understand, Julian’s practice of prayer actively engages the mind and
compels the one praying into active discourse with God. Prayer becomes an interchange
and exchange, a dynamic engagement that leads to empowerment. This empowerment in
turn emboldens Julian to teach with authority. 17
In chapter 50 of the LT, Julian finally poses the aporia in its sharpest and most
urgent form when she tries to reconcile the reality of sin and its consequences with the
idea that God sees no blame:
But yet here I wondryde and merveyled with alle [th]e dylygence of my
soule, menyng thus: Goode lorde, I see the that thou arte very truth, and I
know tryly [th]at we syn grievously all day and be moch blame worthy;
and I may neyther leue the knowing of this sooth, nor I se nott the
shewyng to vs no manner of blame. How may this be? For I knew be the
comyn techyng of holy church and by my owne felyng that the blame of
oure synnes continually hangyth vppon vs, fro [th]e furst man in to the
tyme that we come vppe to hevyn.
[But still here I wondered and marveled with all the diligence of my soul,
after this fashion: Good Lord, I see in you that you are very truth, and I
know truly that we sin grievously all day and are very blameworthy; and I
17
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can neither reject my knowledge of this truth, nor see that any kind of
blame is shown to us. How can this be? For I know by the ordinary
teaching of Holy Church and by my own feeling that the blame of our sins
continually hangs upon us, from the first man until the time that we come
up into heaven.] 18
Julian knows from her own experience and from Church teaching that sinning is the
human condition, that it deserves blame and judgment, and that “many will be eternally
damned to hell.” 19 She will not reject this truth yet, and she insists that God show her the
meaning of it. When God grants her revelations, however, she sees neither sin nor divine
wrath, judgment, or damnation: “Then was this my merveyle, that I saw oure lorde god
shewyng to vs no more blame then if we were as clene and as holy as angelis be in
hevyn.” 20 These two contraries compel Julian to demand an answer from God. While she
admits that the opposition resides in her own reasoning, she cannot simply submit to the
mystery:
And between theyse two contraryes my reson was grettly traveyled by my
blyndnes, and culde haue no rest fore drede that his blessed presens shulde
passe fro my sight, and I to be lefte in vnknowyng how he beholde vs in
oure synne. For eyther me behovyd to se in god that synne were alle done
awey, or els me behovyd to see in god how he seeth it, wher by I myght
truly know how it longyth to me to see synne and the manner of our
blame.
[And between these two oppositions my reason was greatly afflicted by
my blindness, and I could have no rest for fear that his blessed presence
would pass from my sight, and I should be left in ignorance of how he
may look on us in our sin. For either I ought to see in God that sin was all
done away with, or else I ought to see in God how he sees it, by which I
might truly know how it is fitting for me to see sin and the way in which
we have blame.] 21
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Julian’s performance of power in relation to God now becomes insistent and bold.
She puts the aporia to God in prayer, beseeching that he answer her:
My longyng endured, hym contynuantly beholding; and yet I culded haue
no pacience for grett feer and perplexite, thyngkyng, yf I take it thus, [th]at
we be no sinners nor no blame worthy, it semyth as I shulde err and faile
of knowing of this soth. And yf it be tru that we be sinners and blame
worthy, good lorde, how may it than be that I can nott see this truth in the,
which arte my god, my maker in whom I desyer to se alle truth?
[My longing endured as I constantly beheld him; and yet I could have no
patience because of great fear and perplexity, thinking that if I were to
take it that we are not sinners and not blameworthy, it seems as if I should
err and fail to recognize the truth. And if it be true that we are sinners and
blameworthy, good Lord, how can it then be that I cannot see this truth in
you, who are my God, my maker in whom I desire to see all truth?] 22
Conscious of her boldness here, Julian steps back in order to justify this boldness in terms
of her teaching on prayer. Julian explains that she is willing to beseech God for an answer
because, first of all, what she is asking is a humble thing; secondly, because it is
something general and not “special or secret”; and thirdly because of the practical and
urgent character of the knowledge:
it nedyth me to wytt, as me thyngthyth, if I shall lyve here, for knowing of
good and evyll, wher by I may by reson and by grace the more deperte
them a sonder, and loue goodnesse and have evyll as holy chyrch techyth.
[it is something that I need to know, it seems to me, if I should live here,
so as to tell good from evil, whereby I might through reason and grace
separate them more distinctly, and love goodness and hate evil as Holy
Church teaches.] 23
Thus empowered in prayer, Julian cries out to God, demanding that he teach her and give
her understanding:
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I cryde inwardly with all my myght, sekyng in to god for helpe, menyng
thus: A, lorde Jhesu, kyng of blysse, how shall I be esyde, who shall tell
me and tech me that me medyth to wytt, if I may nott at this tyme se in in
the?
[I cried within me with all my might, beseeching God for help, in this
fashion: Ah, Lord Jesus, king of bliss, how shall I be comforted, who will
tell me and teach me what I need to know, if I cannot at this time see it in
you?]
Julian’s prayer is bold, active, demanding, and confident. In her words, it is
“generous” in both beseeching and trusting. Prayer for Julian is a performance of
relational power that is dialectically both submissive and empowering. According to
Julian’s teaching, through the practice of prayer one becomes empowered by God to seek
boldly, to ask with assurance, and to teach confidently what it is one has been granted. It
is easy to imagine a spiritual director telling Julian to simply submit to the teachings of
the Church in this regard, for fear that her desire to know and her obsessive beseeching
border on the sinful. Julian knows that the Church offers the remedy for sin in the form of
the sacraments and instruction, and as a simple daughter of the Church, she should submit
humbly and live her life accordingly. 24 However, she is not content with this and so
instructs her reader by example not to rest content with this answer either. Instead, Julian
turns to God in prayer, insisting that he teach her directly, and not only indirectly through
the Church. In doing so, Julian submits the Church’s teaching to the higher judgment that
she receives from God in prayer. Since Julian is the source of her reader’s understanding
of this judgment, she is, in effect, subjecting the Church’s teaching to her own authority
as a theologian.
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As we turn now to the example itself, it is worth repeating the significance of the
prayer context. The Showings as a whole are dialogical – Julian is continuously in
dialogue with God and with her reader. In Julian’s careful crafting of her text, her equally
careful reader has reached a point of heightened anguish along with a keen desire to
understand and a keen intellectual clarity regarding the issues at stake. At the close of
chapter 50, the tension is built to a heightened pitch, the aporia seemingly impenetrable
and irresolvable. The stage is set and her careful reader prepared for the example to be
appreciated in all its complexity and its startling teaching.

3.4 The Example of a Lord and a Servant
As answer to Julian’s anguished and insistent prayer, the example is presented in
two versions and is completed by a final scene added by Julian as part of its
interpretation. Staged as a kind of silent moving picture with very little action, the
example “shows” both the exterior actions of the characters, and their interior states and
responses. Julian’s presentation of the example is interactive; she probes and questions it,
interspersing her own interpretations, associations, and responses along the way, and
embedding it in a dialectical frame of interpretation that moves from a surface reading
into a deepening spiral of theological complexity. As Staley points out, labeling the story
an “example” already alerts Julian’s contemporary reader to the allegorical character of
the story and situates Julian as authoritative exegete and interpreter. The Middle English
word “example”, a translation of exemplum, is a synonym for parable; it thus “directs us
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to the tale’s allegory even before we read it and hence to the possibility of understanding
its higher meaning.” 25
Julian scholars have proposed various models both for Julian’s use and
interpretation of the example and for our own modern readings. Nuth proposes the model
of lectio divina, arguing that Julian’s presentation of the example and her interpretations
of it move through the levels of oratio, meditatio, and contemplatio. 26 Bauerschmidt
distinguishes between the literal sense of the example and the deeper spiritual or mystical
sense, suggesting that Julian was consciously modeling her method on the medieval
distinction between the literal and spiritual senses of scripture. 27 While these suggestions
helpfully place Julian within the broader Christian tradition of spiritual and theological
writing, I prefer to differentiate the example in terms of the three visual components (the
first two versions and the final scene) and in terms of three theological frames: the
doctrine of original sin, the Adam/Christ topos, and the myth of kenosis. After briefly
examining the visual dimensions, I will turn to the theological interpretations.
In the first, simplest, version, we are shown two obviously male characters, a lord
sitting in state and a servant standing before him waiting to do his will. The lord sends the
servant to accomplish a deed; the servant, motivated by love, dashes off at great speed,
falls into a valley, and severely injures himself. Writhing and moaning in pain and fear,
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the servant is alone, without consolation and unable to rise or help himself. His greatest
sorrow and source of pain is that he can no longer see his lord:
. . . I saw two persons in bodely lycknesse, that is to sey a lorde and a
servannt; and therwith gaue me gostly vnderstandyng. The lorde syttyth
solempnely in rest and in pees. The servannt stondyth before his lorde,
reverently redy to do his lordes wylle. The lorde lokyth vppon his seruannt
full louely and swetly and mekely. He sendyth hym in to a certeyne place
to do his wyll. The servannt nott onely he goyth, but sodenly he stertyth
and rynnyth in grett hast for loue to do his lordes wylle. And anon he
fallyth in a slade, and takyth ful grett sorow; and than he gronyth and
monyth and wallowyth and wryeth, but he may nott ryse nor helpe hym
selfe by no manner of weye. And of all this the most myschefe that I saw
hym in was feylyng of comfort, for he culde nott turne his face to loke
vppe on his loving lorde….
[. . . I saw two persons in bodily likeness, that is to say a lord and a
servant; and with that God gave me spiritual understanding. The lord sits
in state, in rest and in peace. The servant stands before his lord,
respectfully, ready to do his lord’s will. The Lord looks on his servant
very lovingly and sweetly and mildly. He sends him to a certain place to
do his will. Not only does the servant go, but he dashes off and runs at
great speed, loving to do his lord’s will. And soon he falls into a dell and
is greatly injured; and then he groans and moans and tosses about and
writhes, but he cannot rise or help himself in any way. And of all this, the
greatest hurt which I saw in him was lack of consolation, for he could not
turn his face to look on his loving lord, who was very close to him, in
whom is all consolation… .] 28
Julian goes on to describe what she understands to be the servant’s main forms of
suffering, and then briefly interjects her own commentary, to which I shall return below.
The scene continues with a description of the lord’s response to the servant’s situation.
Throughout, the lord looks on the servant with tenderness, compassion, and pity,
delighting inwardly to think of the coming rewards he will bestow on the servant because
of the servant’s steadfast good will:
And right thus contynuantly his loueyng lorde full tenderly beholdenyth
hym…[saying] lo my belouyd servant, what harme and dysses he hath had
and takyn in my servys for my loue, yea, and for his good wylle. Is it nott
28
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reson that I reward hym for his frey and his drede, his hurt and his mayme
and alle his woo? And nott only this, but fallyth it nott to me to geve hym
a [g]ifte that be better to hym and more wurschypfull than his owne hele
shuld haue bene? And ells me thyngkyth I dyd hym no grace.
[And all the time his loving lord looks on him most tenderly… {saying}
See my beloved servant, what harm and injuries he has had and accepted
in my service for my love, yes and for his good will. Is it not reasonable
that I should reward him for his fright and his fear, his hurt and his injuries
and all his woe? And furthermore, is it not proper for me to give him a gift
better for him and more honourable than his own health could have been?
Otherwise, it seems to me that I should be ungracious.] 29
Accompanying the vision, Julian is given an “inward spiritual revelation” 30 that contains
the general meaning of the image:
I saw that it behovyth nedys to be standing his grett goodness and his
owne wurschyppe, that his deerworthy servant, whych he lovyd so moch,
shulde be hyely and blessydfully rewardyd withoute end, aboue that he
shulde haue be yf he had nott fallen, yea, and so erforth that his falling and
alle his wo that he hath takyn there by shalle be turnyd in to the hye
ovyrpassyng wurschyppe and endlesse blesse.
[I saw that this must necessarily be the case, this his great goodness and
his own honour require that his beloved servant, whom he loved so much,
should be highly and blessedly rewarded forever, above what he would
have been if he had not fallen, yes, and so much that his falling and all the
woe that he received from it will be turned into high, surpassing honour
and endless bliss.] 31
After this, Julian tells us, the first version of the vision “vanished”. 32
We can see in the vision the trace elements of the ST quoted above: the image of
the fall, sin as blindness, God’s continual love and mercy. The elaborations and additions,
however, are considerable. Now we are given a drama with two actors playing the roles

29

BS 517-18/JNS 268-69.

30

BS 518/JNS 269.

31

BS 518/JNS 269.

32

BS 518/JNS 269.

145

of lord and servant, and we are granted an interior view of their motives and attitudes.
More significantly, Julian shifts from being a mere visionary, recounting what she has
seen in her visions and leaving the interpretation up to her reader, to an authoritative
exegete and interpreter of her own revelations. 33
The second telling of the example, which comes from Julian’s twenty-year
meditation upon it, elaborates on the example and its meaning in great detail. 34 The
principal visual additions to the drama include detailed descriptions of the place in which
the events occur (the lord sits “simply on the erth, bareyn and deserte, alone in
wyldernesse”), the location of the servant vis-à-vis the lord (“he stod full nere the lorde,
nott evyn for anenst hym, but in perty a side, and that on the lefte side”), and the physical
appearance and clothing worn by each character (the lord’s “clothing was wyde and side
and full seemely. . . the colour of the clothing was blew as asure, most sad and feyer”; the
servant “was clad simply, as a laborer which was dysposyd to traveyle”). 35 Each of these
details has theological significance.
There is further emphasis on the servant as a laborer and an elaboration of the
servant’s task: He is to be a servant of all trades, not only a gardener working to
transform a wilderness into a cultivated garden, but also a domestic servant, preparing the
food taken from the garden and serving it to the lord:
I beheld, thyngkyng what manner labour it may be that the servant shulde
do. And then I vnderstode that he shuld be a gardener, deluying and
dykyng and swetyng and turning the erth vp and down, and seke the
33
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depnesse and water the plants in tyme. And in this he shulde continue his
traveyle, and make swete fodys to rynne and nobylle plentuousnesse
fruyte to spryng, which he shulde bring before the lorde, and serve hym
therwith to his lykynk. And he shulde nevyr turne ageyne, tyll he had
dy[g]te this mett alle redy, as he knew that it lykyd to be [the]e lorde; and
than he shulde take thys mett with the dryngke, and bere it full
wurschypply before the lorde. And all thys tyme the lorde shulde sytt right
on the same place, abydyng the servant whom he sent oute.
[I watched, wondering what kind of labour it could be that the servant was
to do. And then I understood that he was to do the greatest labour and the
hardest work there is. He was to be a gardener, digging and ditching and
sweating and turning the soil over and over, and to dig deep down, and to
water the plants at the proper time. He was to persevere in his work, and
make sweet streams to run, fine and plenteous fruit to grow, which he was
to bring before the lord and serve him with to his liking. And he was never
to come back again until he had made all this food ready as he knew was
pleasing to the lord; and then he was to take the food, and drink and carry
it most reverently before the lord. And all this time the lord was to sit in
exactly the same place, waiting for the servant whom he had sent out.] 36
This second version of the example is richly interspersed with Julian’s commentary and
interpretations, to which I will return in detail shortly. At this point, I want only to
indicate the elements of the vision.
In concluding her meditation, Julian adds a final scene, a scene only anticipated in
the original example. In it, the lord no longer sits on the ground in a wilderness but,
rather, sits on “hys ryche and nob(lest) seet.” The servant, now restored to his role as
son, is richly clothed with a crown on his head. His tunic, also restored, is made “feyer,
new, whyt and bright, and of endlesse clennesse.” He no longer stands before the father
as a servant, but sits at the father’s right hand in rest and peace with “his lovyd wife,
which is the feyer maydyn of endlesse joy.”
Now stondyth not the sonne before the fader on the lyfte side as a laborer,
but he syttyth on the faders right hande in endlesse rest an pees. . .he
syttyth on his faders right honed, that is to sey right in the hyest nobylyte
36
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of the faders joy. Now is the spouse, goddys son, in pees with his lovyd
wife, which is the feyer maydyn of endlesse joy. Now syttyth the son, very
god and very man, in his cytte in rest and in pees, which his fader hath
dy[g]te to hym of endlesse purpose, and the fader in the son, and the holy
gost in the fader and in [th]e son.
[Now the Son does not stand before the Father on the left like a labourer,
but he sits at the Father’s right hand in endless rest and peace. . . he sits at
his Father’s right hand, that is to say, right in the highest nobility of the
Father’s joy. Now the spouse, God’s Son, is at peace with his beloved
wife, who is the fair maiden of endless joy. Now the Son, true God and
true man, sits in his city in rest and peace, which his Father has prepared
for him by his endless purpose, and the Father in the Son, and the Holy
Spirit in the Father and in the Son.] 37

3. 5 Interpreting the Example
Julian’s theological interpretations of the example are dispersed throughout the
chapter and indeed occupy her throughout the next 15 chapters of the book. 38 Focusing
on the immediate interpretations offered in chapter 51, we can distinguish three
theological frames through which the example passes, a movement from theological
surface to depth. The first frame is the doctrine of original sin expressed in the metaphor
of the fall. The second, deepening, frame is the doctrine of salvation expressed in the
Adam/Christ topos. The third and deepest theological frame, which encompasses and
interprets the first two, is that of Christic kenosis, which in Julian’s explication
encompasses creation, salvation, and eschatology. In effect, this latter includes all God’s
actions in relation to humanity.
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Julian’s first interpretation of the example, which largely correlates to its first
version, is the story of the fall. The lord is God, the servant Adam, and the example
presents the story of original human sin. At first glance, this is an obvious interpretation,
given Julian’s motivating question regarding the nature of sin and the familiar image of a
fall as metaphor for original sin. Both Baker and Nuth point out the striking similarities
between Julian’s example and an illustration Anselm uses in Cur Deus Homo to elucidate
the meaning of original sin:
[Anselm speaking to Boso]. . .Suppose that a man enjoins some task on his
servant, and charges him not to throw himself into a pit which he [the
master] points out to him, out of which he [the servant] cannot possibly
escape. But that servant despises the command and the warning of his
master and, of his own free will, throws himself into the pit that has been
shown him, so that he is unable to carry out his assigned task. Do you
think that this inability is worth anything as an excuse for not performing
the assigned task? 39
Neither Baker nor Nuth suggests that Julian necessarily knew Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo,
still less that she intentionally based her example on it (after all, in Julian’s text, the
example is given to her in the form of a revelation). Nonetheless, the Anselmian example
illustrates well the typical medieval use of the metaphor of falling to express the doctrine
of original sin: The servant “despises the command and the warning of his master, and of
his own free will, throws himself into the pit.” 40
There are also apparent allusions to the Genesis story of creation and fall in
Julian’s example, most notably the context of a garden and Adam’s labor in keeping the
garden. As Baker notes, “Julian’s imagery of productive labor alludes to two events in
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Genesis: God’s bestowal on the newly created Adam of dominion over the earth (Gen
2.19–20) and his curse on the ground to punish the disobedient Adam (Gen 3.17-19).
Medieval iconography of Adam delving typically represents the second event.” Julian,
however, stresses the former. 41
Yet on closer inspection, this interpretation of the example does not hold up
well. The parable does not contain the narrative or the symbols of the classic telling of
the story in Genesis 3 (no Eve, no tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and no
temptation by the serpent), and more importantly, as Julian points out, her example does
not in fact portray an original human sin:
I behelde with avysement to wytt yf I culde perceive in hym ony
defau[gh]te, yf the lorde shuld assign in hym ony maner of blame; and
verily there was none seen, for oonly hys good wyll and her grett desyer
was cause of his falling. And he was as vnlothfull and as good inwardly as
he was when he stode before his lorde, redy to do his wylle.
[I looked carefully to know if I could detect any fault in {the servant}, or
if the lord would impute to him any kind of blame; and truly none was
seen, for the only cause of his falling was his good will and his great
desire. And in spirit he was as prompt and as good as he was when he
stood before his lord, ready to do his will.] 42
Against the backdrop of the orthodox teaching of Julian’s time, this is a startling,
even disturbing, reading. At least since Augustine, the metaphor of falling was used to
represent human sin, specifically the evil of a human will that has chosen love of self
over love of God. 43 Not only does Julian see no blame in the servant; contra Augustine, it
is the servant’s will in particular that remains good. In fact, this very goodness of will is
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the cause of his falling. Baker neatly summarizes the Augustinian account of the will’s
implication in the fall:
Based on his reading of Genesis 3 and Romans 5, Augustine proposes a
theory of original sin to account for the depravity of the will that, he
believes, renders individuals inevitably wicked but nonetheless culpable.
By attributing the eruption of evil in creation to the free acts of rational
creatures, angelic and human, who chose to disobey divine injunctions,
Augustine and his medieval successors exonerate the all-knowing, allgood, and all-powerful Creator. Because Adam and Eve deliberately
transgressed, God justly punishes their descendants, who inherit both guilt
and weakness as a result of original sin. 44
The essential elements of this retributive model include a willful disobedience on the part
of Adam, and God’s just response in the form of judgment and punishment. This is the
standard interpretation of original sin in the medieval context, both doctrinally and in
terms of sacramental practice. 45 In sharp contrast, Julian sees no disobedience, willful or
inadvertent, on the part of Adam. More importantly for Julian, she sees no judgment or
punishment on the part of God.
Instead of explaining original human sin, Julian’s example seems to eliminate it,
forcing Julian and her reader to look deeper. While going deeper, however, Julian’s
interpretation does not leave the doctrine of original sin behind. Instead, the meaning of
the doctrine is enfolded into a larger frame. In effect, Julian is shifting the way in which
the question of the fall is posed. Rather than asking what it means from the standpoint of
humanity, Julian examines the meaning of human sin from the standpoint of God. This is,
of course, quite central to the genre of her writing (visionary literature) but also central to
44
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her theological method. She asks to “see in God” what sin is and desires to see, in
however limited a way, as God sees. Here in the example, Julian the visionary “sees” a
visual story. As a woman of prayer, she receives instruction and understanding. As
interpreter and teacher of her own visions and understanding, she instructs her reader to
shift perspective. The first level of teaching expresses this shift; Julian is instructed by
God and in turn instructs her reader to understand “how god beholdyth alle manne and
his fallying [how God regards all men and their falling].” 46 To realize that there is a
difference between how humanity sees and how God sees is only the “begynnyng of [the]
techyng” whereby we might come to know “in what manner [God] beholdyth vs in oure
synne.” 47
Thus, the servant does indeed represent Adam and his falling, but as seen from
God’s perspective: “The seruannt that stode before hym, I vnderstode that he was shewed
for Adam, that is to sey oone man was shewed that tyme and his fallyng to make there by
to be vnderstonde how god beholdyth alle manne and his fallyng [I understood that the
servant who stood before him was shown to be Adam, this is to say, one man was shown
at that time and his fall, so as to make it understood how God regards all men and their
falling].” 48 In the vision, Julian is shown no blame or wrath because, when God looks at
human falling, God sees no blame and therefore has no wrath. In contrast, from the
perspective of the servant, the falling is a cause of “great sorrow” and “cruel suffering.”
He is “hurte in his myghte and made fulle febyll [injured in his powers and made most
feeble]” by this fall, and his greatest suffering is that “neyther he seeth clerly his loving
46
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lorde whych is to hym full meke and mylde, nor he seeth truly what hym selfe is in the
sight of his louyng lord [he neither sees clearly his loving lord, who is so meek and mild
to him, nor does he truly see what he himself is in the sight of his loving lord].” 49 As
Baker points out, “Julian consistently stresses weakness rather than guilt as the legacy of
the ancestral transgression.” 50 From the servant’s perspective, however, there is blame
and punishment. In other words, the servant experiences his falling as blameworthy and
his subsequent suffering, particularly his perceived separation from his lord, as just
punishment. Yet, Julian insists, if the servant could shift his perspective to that of God’s,
he would see that the blame and the punishment are not coming from God. Rather, only
“payne blamyth and ponyschyth, and oure curteyse lorde comforthyth and socurryth, and
evyr he is to the soule in glad chere, loving to bring vs to hys blysse [ pain blames and
punishes, and our courteous Lord comforts and succours, and always he is kindly
disposed to the soul, loving and longing to bring us to his bliss].” 51
As Baker asserts, Julian rejects a punitive reading of Adam’s fall, regarding “the
Adamic narrative as a story of creation rather than transgression.” 52 What is essential to
Julian’s creative reading is the movement between two perspectives, the human and the
divine. The divine perspective does not cancel out the human; rather, it undergirds and
encompasses it. 53 God looks on human failing with compassion and desires to reward his
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servants for their good will. Essential to her theology is her idea of the “godly wylle,”
the dimension of human being that is sustained by God through human failure and sin,
even though the person sinning has no awareness of this dimension of the self. 54 Julian
does seem to be redefining both original sin and personal sin as stemming not from
depravity but from “naivete and ignorance.” 55 In any case, original sin and sin in general
are de-centered in Julian’s theology; they can only be understood in relation to the more
encompassing doctrines of creation, incarnation, and salvation.
The example as allegory for original sin is only the first level of interpretation.
The deeper meaning of the servant’s lack of willful disobedience or fault depends upon
the deeper strata of interpretation. At this first level, Julian sees the servant as Adam, in
whom there is no fault. More significantly, there is, from God’s perspective, no wrath or
will to punish. Still, Julian and her reader are left with more questions than at the outset,
only now the questions are shifting. 56
This leads to the second frame of interpretation – the doctrine of salvation
represented in the Adam/Christ topos. Found principally in the writings of Paul (Rom. 5:
12–21; 1 Cor. 15:21–22), the Adam/Christ topos links the figures of Adam and Christ as
a way of expressing the meaning of the whole of salvation history: Adam is “the one
man” through whom sin, death, and condemnation enter the world, while Christ is “the
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one man” through whom righteousness and life are restored. 57 By Julian’s time, the idea
of Adam as the type of Christ was well established theologically and a familiar figure in
sermons and popular literature. 58 Yet for Julian, the link between Adam and Christ is not
simply symbolic or external, for Christ and humanity are “onyd”, which is to say “united”
in creation, incarnation and redemption. On this second, deeper, level of interpretation of
the example, Julian teaches that in “the servant is comphrehendyd the seconde person of
[th]e trynyte, and in the seruannt is comprehendyd Adam, that is to sey all men.” 59 Thus,
the figure of the servant is not simply Adam the first man, nor is Adam simply a type of
Christ. Rather, the servant represents Adam, who not only stands for all humanity but
somehow embodies all humanity: “For in the syghte of god alle man is oone man, and
oone man is alle man [For in the sight of God all men are one man, and one man is all
men].” 60 At the same time — and here we see the deepening of interpretation compared
to the first frame —, the servant also represents the Second Person of the Trinity, who has
united humanity to himself. This gives Julian the deeper meaning of the servant’s falling.
In fact, there are two parallel falls: “when Adam felle godes sonne fell; for the ryght
onyng whych was made in hevyn, goddys sonne myght nott be seperath from Adam, for
by Adam I vnderstood alle man [when Adam fell, God’s Son fell; because of the true
union which was made in heaven, God’s Son could not be separated from Adam, for by
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Adam I understand all mankind].” 61 Or perhaps it would be better to say that there is one
fall that encompasses both humanity’s falling into suffering and blindness, and Christ’s
falling into incarnation. Incarnation is thus the principal form of God’s loving
compassion and a completion of God’s work of creation.
Julian will elaborate on this union, or “ryght onyng,” in subsequent portions of the
Showings, and I will consider some of them in more detail in the following chapter. At
this point, it is enough to underline the second theological interpretation of the example:
The servant is both Christ and Adam, where Adam incorporates all humanity. The
meanings of “humanity” are complex here: There is the human individual Adam who,
though singular, embodies all humanity, and there is Christ’s unique, personal human
nature. Christ has “onyd” (united) humanity to himself – implying both his unique
personal human nature and all humanity – and this oneness is best expressed visually as
“one man.” Julian also employs the common image, taken again from Paul, of the church
as a single human person with Christ as head and humanity as body: “For all mankynde
that shall be savyd by the swete incarnacion and the passion of Crist, alle is the manhode
of Cryst. For he is the heed, and we be his membris. . . . For Jhesu is in all that shall be
safe, and all that (shall) be safe is in Jhesu [For all mankind which will be saved by the
sweet Incarnation and Passion of Christ, all is Christ’s humanity, for he is the head and
we are the members. . . . for Jesus is in all who will be saved, and all who will be saved
are in Jesus].” 62 The metaphor of a single human being differentiated as head and body
serves the same purpose as the image of Adam as single human, for both are meant to
express the profound unity between Christ and humanity. As Bauerschmidt points out,
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Julian, consciously or not, combines here common medieval concepts of neo-platonic
exemplarity and election, “arguing for a kind of pre-existence of Christ’s human nature,
which contains within it all those who will be saved.” 63
As Julian rereads the example within this second frame, she sees humanity and
divinity differentiated yet united both in the figure of the servant and, perhaps more
surprisingly, in the figure of the lord: “The syttyng of the fader betokynnyth the godhead
. . .that he shewyth hym selfe as lorde betokynnyth to oure manhood. . . . [the servant’s]
stertyng was the godhed, and the rennyng was the manhed [The sitting of the Father
symbolizes the divinity. . . that he shows himself as a lord symbolizes our humanity. . . .
{The servant’s} rushing away was the divinity, and his running was the humanity].” 64
Julian expresses this point again in the subsequent chapter:
And thus in the servant was shewde the blyndnesse and the myschefe of
Adams falling; and in [the] servant was shewde [the] wysdom and the
goodnesse of goddys son. And in the lorde was shewde the hye noblyte
and the endlesse wurschyppe that mankynde is come to by the vertu of the
passion and [the] deth of his deerwurthy son.”
[And so in the servant there was shown the blindness and the hurt of
Adam’s falling; and in the servant there was shown the wisdom and the
goodness of God’s Son. And in the lord was shown the compassion and
the pity for Adam’s woe; and in the lord there was shown the great
nobility and the endless honour that man had come to, by the power of the
Passion and the death of God’s beloved Son.] 65
“Right onyng” thus implies distinction without separation and is key to understanding the
perspective of God the Father when he looks upon humanity. It is not the case that, in
seeing “the one man,” the Father sees only his Son. In Julian’s interpretation, he sees
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both: “the rewth and the pytty of the fader was of the falling of Adam, whych is his most
lovyd creature. The joy and the blysse was of the falling of his deerwurthy son, whych is
evyn with the fader [The compassion and the pity of the father were for Adam, who is his
most beloved creature. The joy and the bliss were for the falling of his dearly beloved
Son, who is equal to the father].”

66

The point is that the Father in his vision cannot or

will not separate humanity from his Son. Thus, the Father’s compassion accompanies
Adam in his fall just as it accompanies his Son: “The mercyfull beholding of his louely
chere fullfylld all erth, and descendyd downe with Adam into helle, with whych
continuant pytte Adam was kepte fro endlesse deth [The merciful regard of his lovely
countenance filled all the earth, and went down with Adam into hell, and by this
continuing pity Adam was kept from endless death].” 67
In uniting all humanity to himself, the Son takes upon him “all oure blame.” 68
Consequently, the Father “may nor wyll no more blame assigne to vs than to hys owne
derwurthy son.” 69 Here is the deeper theological key. Julian now sees that there is no
wrath, judgment, or punishment in God, not because humanity does not sin but, rather,
because the Son has so united humanity to himself. For the Father to blame or punish or
even forgive humanity, he would have to separate humanity from the Son. But this he is
either unable or unwilling to do. As Julian will explain with great subtlety in subsequent
chapters, the Son has so united humanity to himself in creation, incarnation, and
66
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redemption that there is no sense in which humanity is separate from him. This does not
imply that humans do not sin; rather, it is a statement about how God sees human sin.
The astounding answer to the question of how God sees sin is that God does not or
cannot separate humanity from the Son, and therefore responds to humanity as he would
to his Son.
The framework of “right onyng” repositions the question of human sin in terms of
degrees of union or separation from God. As Baker argues, while, for Augustine,
sin causes separation from God; for Julian, sin ensues from such separation.
[Julian] considers the suffering that results from sin not as a penalty inflicted by a
wrathful God, but as the natural consequence of the sinner’s violation of his or her
“feyer kynde” [fair nature], the breach of the ontological union between Creator
and creature. 70

For Julian, this breach is due principally to weakness and ignorance, not willful
disobedience. Julian’s teaching on this subject ultimately depends upon whether we read
Julian’s theology as implying predestination of the elect or universal salvation. If the
former, then we must admit that Julian is simply not shown “those who will not be
saved” and thus her theology as a whole is principally for her “evenn Christian” – those
whom God has willed to remain safely within the sacramental confines of the church, and
specifically for those “lovers of God” who desire closer relation to God in prayer. On this
reading, even the example, with its obvious universalist thrust, ultimately expresses the
condition of those predestined to salvation, not all humanity. If, instead, Julian’s theology
does imply a universalism, then the example stands as universally expressing the origins
of all humanity and their relationship to God. I argued in the preceding chapter that in
fact Julian is not consistent on this point. While universalism is certainly present in the
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example and even more so in the Jesus-as-mother developments, ultimately Julian falls
back to a position of predestination. Even in the example, she is often careful to qualify
her language regarding the humanity represented by Adam with the words “all who will
be saved.” This is itself an ambiguous phrase admitting of both a universalist and
predestinationist interpretation; “all who will be saved” might encompass all humanity, or
it might not. Julian’s ambiguity ultimately leaves the question open as she slips back
behind her visionary persona, insisting that she can “say” no more than she has been
“shown”.
The doctrine of restored union with God as expressed in the Adam/Christ topos,
however, is not the end of the story. The third and deepest theological frame is that of
kenosis. The example of a Lord and a servant is most fundamentally Julian’s own telling
of the Philippians myth. With unmistakable allusion to Philippians itself, Julian offers her
own paraphrase and elaboration:
Nott withstondyng that he is god, evyn with the fader as anenst the
godhead, but in his forseyng purpose, that he woulde be man to saue man
in fulfyllng of the wyll of his fader, so he stode before his fader as a
servant, wylfully taking vppon hym all oure charge. And than he sterte full
redely at the faders wyll, and anon he fell full lowe in the maydyns
wombe, having no regard to hym selfe ne to his harde paynes.
[even though he is God, equal with the Father as regards his divinity, but
with his prescient purpose that he would become man to save mankind in
fulfillment of the will of his Father, so he stood before his Father as a
servant, willingly taking upon him all our charge. And then he rushed off
very readily at the Father’s bidding, and soon he fell very low into the
maiden’s womb, having no regard for himself or for his cruel pains.] 71

The first half of the above quote is an obvious paraphrase of Philippians: “Though he was
in the form of God, he did not regard equality with God something to be grasped but
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rather emptied himself taking the form of a slave” (Phil. 2:6–7). The second half belongs
to Julian’s vision – the image of the eager servant rushing off to do the will of the father
and “falling” into a position of lowliness, pain, and suffering.
On Julian’s telling, the Philippians myth is principally a story of the divine Father
and Son. The purpose that motivates the performance of kenosis in the story is God’s
loving desire to unite humanity fully and completely to himself. The Father does not
demand this kenosis, but the Son willingly performs it. In fact, the Son performs kenosis
even before incarnation by giving up his power and status, and submitting to the Father’s
will as a servant rather than as Son or co-equal divine person:
Thus was he the servant before hys coming in to the erth, stondyng redy
before the father in purpose tyll what tyme he wolde sende hym to do the
wurschypfull deede by whych mankynde was brought again in to hevyn.
[Christ was the servant before he came to earth, standing ready in purpose
before the Father until the time when he would send him to do the glorious
deed by which mankind was brought back to heaven.] 72
In the position of his standing and in his clothing, we see Christ emptied of
divinity (understood in terms of both status and power) and subordinate to the Father. In a
profound shift of roles, the Son of God becomes a human servant. This shift also alters
the Father’s status and power; he becomes now a lord rather than a Father, a lord whose
power and status entail the possibility of commanding, demanding, punishing, and
rewarding. The servant’s clothes signify his human poverty and unworthiness, as well as
his role as a laborer:
The with kyrtyll is his fleshe; the singlehede is that ther was ryght noght
between the godhede and the manhede. The straight nesse is povyrte, the
elde is of Adams weryng. The defautyng is the swete of Adams traveyle;
the shortnesse shewyth the servant laborer.
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[The white tunic is his flesh, the scantiness signifies that there was nothing
at all separating the divinity from the humanity. The tight fit is poverty,
the age is Adam’s wearing, the wornness is the sweat of Adam’s labour,
the shortness shows the servant-labourer.] 73
The servant’s position vis-à-vis the lord also signifies his change of status: “The standyn
of the servant betokynnyth traveyle, and on the lyfte side betokynnyth that he was nott
alle worthy to stoned evyn ryght befor the lorde [The standing of the servant symbolizes
labour, and that he stands to the left symbolizes that he was not full worthy to stand
immediately in front of the Lord].” 74 The scriptural allusions triggered by the image of
the servant now shift to the image of the suffering servant in Isaiah. The Son’s profound
change in status is represented by servanthood, his loss of power in his pain and
suffering. 75
With the image of “falling”, Julian brings together all three theological frames:
the doctrine of original sin, the Adam/Christ topos, and kenosis. Falling signifies human
suffering, human failing, indeed, human sin. It also signifies Christ’s kenotic movement
from Sonship to servanthood, and his passion and death. Uniting these two fallings is the
deeper unity of Christ and humanity – already in creation but far more dramatically in
incarnation, the Son has united humanity to himself and thus accompanies and suffers
with and for humanity.
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Christ’s kenosis reaches its nadir with his suffering and death. At this point in the
story, Julian states most explicitly his loss of divine power:
And by the walowyng and wrythyng, gronyng and monyng, is vnderstonde
that he myght nevyr ryse all myghtly fro that tyme that he was fallyn in to
the maydyns wombe, tyll hes body was sleyne and dede, he yeldyng the
soule to the fadyrs hand.
[and by the tossing about and writhing, the groaning and moaning, is
understood that he could never with almighty power rise from the time
that he fell into the maiden’s womb until his body was slain and dead, and
he had yielded his soul into the Father’s hand.] 76
Though a free decision on the Son’s part, he is now incapable of asserting divine power;
he must finally undergo the most passive of states – death – in order for his power to be
restored.
On Julian’s telling, his “almighty power” begins to be restored or reasserted with
the descent into hell: “And at this pynte he beganne furst to show his myght, for then he
went in to helle [And at this moment [his death] he first began to show his power, for
then he went down into hell]” and raised up those who had died before him. 77 The death
thus signifies the end of his kenotic performance. The Son now re-asserts his divine
power and fully accomplishes the purposes that motivated the kenotic performance itself.
Julian follows the Philippians hymn in closing with images of exaltation, of
restored power and status. Recall that, within the hymn, Christ’s kenosis is not a
permanent change in power and status. At the end of the hymn, he is restored to power
and exalted to an even higher status that requires the submission of all:
Because of this God greatly exalted him and bestowed on him the name that is
above every name that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend of those in
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heaven, on earth and under the earth and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is
Lord to the glory of the Father.
In Julian’s telling, the restoration is a scene of restored relations between Father and Son,
relations of mutuality and equal power. Redeemed humanity is now presented not as the
male figure Adam but as the female figure (the Son’s spouse) and, also, as a crown and a
city within which God dwells. For only the second time in the example, the Holy Spirit
makes his appearance, finishing out the image in Julian’s more familiar domestic and
Trinitarian terms (which will again become dominant in the next chapter):
Now is the spouse, goddys son, in pees with his lovyd wife, whych is the
feyer maydyn of endlesse joy. Now syttyth the son, very god and very
man, in his cytte in rest and in pees, whych his fader hath dyzte to hym of
endlesse purpose, and the fader in the son, and the holy gost in the fader
and in [the] son.
[Now the spouse, God’s son, is at peace with his beloved wife, who is the
fair maiden of endless joy. Now the Son, true God and true man, sits in his
city in rest and in peace, which his Father had prepared for him by his
endless purpose, and the Father in the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the
Father and in the Son.] 78
Just as in Philippians, Julian’s presentation of Christic kenosis ends in exaltation. Julian
expands on this theme with her more familiar domestic model – restored Trinitarian
relations and restored relations between God and humanity. 79
Thus Julian’s final interpretation of the example enfolds the doctrine of original
sin and the Adam/Christ topos into the theology of kenosis. The example portrays a
“theo-drama” in Balthasar’s sense, i.e., a drama chiefly involving the divine persons of
Father and incarnate Son that encompasses within it the human drama of historical
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existence, an existence principally characterized in terms of pain and suffering. 80 In the
chapters that follow, Julian shifts perspectives in another direction. Rather than focusing
on the divine – human relation expressed in the relations between the Father and the
Incarnate Son, Julian turns her attention to relations between God and the individual
Christian in everyday life. In doing so, she shifts the central symbol from a lord and a
servant to a mother and a child, the theme of the following chapter. In the remainder of
this chapter, I examine Julian’s portrayal of Christic kenosis in more detail.

3. 6 Performing Kenosis
Recall that there are numerous relations within the example, each entailing its
own performances of power: the Son in relation to the Father, humanity in general in
relation to God, Julian as a particular human person in relation to God, and Julian in
relation to her reader. Performances of kenosis are always relational; they entail
exchanges of power between and among subjects. The correlate to the kenotic subject is
a dominant subject, but this does not mean that the kenotic subject is passive and the
dominant subject active. In Julian’s interpretation, the dominant subject (the
Father/lord/God) performs his power primarily through restraint, and the kenotic subject
(the Son/servant/humanity) is the principal agent of the work of salvation. To reiterate,
kenosis is not simply a loss of power (though it necessarily entails such a loss) but is,
more importantly, a performance of power that aims at achieving certain effects and
goals.
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I begin with the principal relation of the example – the Father and Son as
represented by a lord and a servant. I want to focus on two levels here: the social level of
the metaphor and the theological meanings the metaphor is meant to express. Julian’s use
of an example of a servant and a lord cannot be viewed independently of her social
context. She lived in a world of lords and servants, a social order structured hierarchically
in which maintaining social place through control and authority was essential to
maintaining order. In late fourteenth-century England, this order was under threat and
was consequently being rigorously defended. In particular, the Peasant Rising in 1381
and the challenge posed to both ecclesiastical and political authority by John Wyclif and
his followers produced a social anxiety that would have colored a contemporary reader’s
interpretation of Julian’s example. 81 As Staley observes, “Julian’s example would have
been disturbing for her contemporaries in ways it cannot be for late twentieth-century
readers for whom any overt references to social degree are embarrassing and class
therefore rarely acknowledged as a strictly defined category.” 82 The Peasant Rising in
particular was viewed by those in authority as an attempt to upset the social order, and it
was put down violently. The social inversion that the rising threatened was viewed in
theological as well as political terms. Thomas Brinton, the Bishop of Rochester, whom
Staley describes as “the best or most compassionate of the commentators on English
society,” portrayed the rising in his sermons as “an insurrection of servants against
masters and therefore a sign of fundamental or metaphysical chaos.” Staley continues:
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Brinton “averred that since servitude was introduced into the world by sin, social
hierarchy is a necessary manifestation of divine justice. Seen in these terms, the Rising
was doubly heinous; servants not only killed masters, but those who were unfit for rule
went on to attempt to become masters.” 83 Julian’s own bishop, Henry Despenser, led the
efforts to crush the revolt in the area of Norwich and personally killed some of the rebels
who had sought refuge in a church. 84 In an analogous way, Wyclif’s views on spiritual
dominion had social ramifications: “Wyclif’s Latin treatises on civil dominion and on
pastoral office emphasized the need for worthiness in figures of authority and
consequently the need for reciprocity of service. For Wyclif, a lord only deserved his
office if he saw himself as a servant.” 85 While Wyclif did not challenge the idea of social
hierarchy as such, he did nonetheless tend to blur “the boundaries between lordship and
servanthood.” 86
On this backdrop, Julian’s image of a lord and a servant, while having obvious
scriptural allusions and serving theological purposes, would also have resonated with
broader social anxieties. In many respects, Julian’s depiction of the lord and servant is
quite conventional, and she clearly has no intention of leveling the social order. In some
sense, she portrays an ideal of lord/servant relationship that others in her period would
have shared, including Bishop Brinton and Wyclif: the servant is loyal and obedient, the
lord benevolent and kind. In particular, Julian’s attention to the clothing details of the
lord and the servant functioned to establish and maintain their social distinction and
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rank. 87 Because the lord and the servant represent God the Father and God the Son, there
is an uniqueness and exceptionalism about the example that would immediately foreclose
any move to interpret it as having social or political ramifications. The kenotic
framework also relativizes the significance of the social differentiation, since the Son’s
servant status is only temporary and will be overcome in the final scene when he is
returned to a position of equality with the Father. Yet at the same time, as Staley argues,
there is an implicit subversiveness in Julian’s construction of the example. As with
Wyclif, Julian’s example also tends to blur the line between servant and lord, particularly
by insisting that the relationship between them is structured by love. In this sense, the
internal relationship that Julian is privileged to understand is more significant than the
external relationship signified in their clothing and positions in relation to one another.
Perhaps most significantly, the relationship of lord and servant is not structured
oppositionally, and this feature particularly distinguishes Julian’s use of the metaphor:
“Julian lived and wrote for a world conceived of as hierarchical and frequently described
as composed of oppositional pairs. Since it was a fallen world, opposition was assumed to
be an inevitable feature of any order issuing from hierarchy because what was beneath
demanded some variety of control.” 88 But contrary to hierarchic assumptions, the lord of
Julian’s example is not dominating and controlling. Rather, he is compassionate and
restrained in his exercise of power in a way that contrasts significantly with typical
exercises of lordship in Julian’s own context. The servant, while idealized as obedient
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and subservient, is nonetheless humanized as an extremely sympathetic figure who
evokes concern. While the theological inversion of portraying power in the form of
service is a common New Testament theme, Julian’s use of it has an especially touching
quality within her social context. In Staley’s words,
In the Servant, Julian describes a person drawn from the margins of her
own society – an itinerant worker? An agricultural laborer, whose clothes
are ragged and sweat-stained? – and performs an act of exegesis upon that
body that leads us to understand the nature of Christ by means of that
picture. Where her contemporaries assigned brutish and barely sensate
qualities to those who occupied the margins, Julian finds in Adam’s face,
our face, the face of God’s love. 89
I turn now to the theological meanings Julian attributes to the example, which like
the social meanings, are at once conventional and subversive. Julian’s interpretation of
the example presupposes that the Father and Son are co-equal in status and power. The
Showings as a whole are profoundly Trinitarian, and Julian scrupulously avoids any hint
of subordinationism. The three persons, while distinct, are essentially united, equal in
power and status. The following quote is representative of the subtlety and care that
characterize Julian’s Trinitarian formulations:
As verily as god is oure fader, as verily is god oure moder; and that
shewde he in all, and namely in theysw swete wordys there he seyth; I it
am; that is to sey: I it am, the myght and the goodnes of faderhode, I it am,
the wysdom and the kyndnes of moderhode, I it am, the light and the grace
that is all blessyd loue; I it am, the trynyte, I it am, [th]e vnyte….
[As truly as God is our Father, so truly is God our Mother, and he revealed
this in everything, and especially in these sweet words where he says: I am
he; that is to say: I am he, the power and goodness of fatherhood; I am he,
the wisdom and the lovingness of motherhood; I am he, the Trinity; I am
he, the unity.] 90
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Julian’s use of the first- and third-person singular consistently speaks of the unity or
oneness of the Trinity. At the same time, she employs a series of attributes and titles to
differentiate the three. The most significant differentiations among the three persons are
in terms of their “work” in relation to humanity:
I beheld [th]e werkyng of alle the blessyd trynyte, in whych beholldyng I
saw and vnderstode these thre properties: the properte of the faderhed, and
the porperte of the mother hed, and the properte of the lordschyppe in one
god. In our fader almighty we haue oure kepyng and oure blesse … and in
the seconde person in wytt and wysdom we haue oure k(e)pyng … for he
is oure moder, broder and savyoure; and in oure good lorde the holy gost
we haue oure rewarding and oure yeldyng for oure lyvyng and oure
travyle . . . .
[I contemplated the work of all the blessed Trinity, in which
contemplation I saw and understood these three properties: the property of
the fatherhood, and the property of the motherhood, and the property of
the lordship in one God. In our almighty Father we have our protection
and our bliss… and in the second person, in knowledge and wisdom we
have our perfection… for he is our Mother, brother and saviour; and in our
good Lord the Holy Spirit we have our reward and our gift for our living
and our labour… .] 91
Note again the care with which Julian differentiates and unites the three persons into one.
Thus, the three persons are equal in power, dignity, and status, and differentiated in terms
of their work and relations with humanity.
The Son’s equality of power and status with the Father is the particular condition
of his performance of kenosis. Recall that all performances of kenosis presuppose power
and status on the part of the kenotic subject, though this power and status need not be
equal to that of the dominant subject. In the case of the Son, his power and status are
equal to those of the Father. The Son initiates his kenotic performance even before
incarnation by willingly placing himself in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the Father.
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Thus, it is not simply his humanity that is subordinate to the Father; the son performs
kenosis as a condition of incarnation. This willing subordination entails both a loss of
power and a change in status. He now relates to the Father, not as a co-equal person or
even a son, but rather as a servant in relation to a lord or master. His loss of power and
status, though temporary, is real. Without this reality, the performance would lose its
effectiveness. Christ will have his full power and status restored to him but only after
enduring the humiliation of his loss of status, laboring with his reduced power, and
undergoing great pain, suffering, and death. The death of a divine person is arguably the
most extreme loss of power and status imaginable – to move from a position of infinite
power and eternality (which necessarily implies immortality) to a position of
powerlessness and death poses the kenotic loss in its most extreme terms. However,
though the reduction of power and status is real, it is not permanent. The Son will be
restored once the purpose motivating the kenosis is achieved. That purpose is the
salvation of humanity through the empathic kenosis of the son.
In the example, the Son’s change in status and power is registered in numerous
ways: the position of his standing before the Father and his clothing signify his loss of
status, his falling signifies a loss of power. Though reduced in power and status,
nevertheless it is the Son and not the Father who must do the principal labor of restoring
humanity. Thus, his kenosis is not a passive undergoing or a condition of being acted
upon. Rather, the Son is the primary agent of the work of both Father and Son. 92 So,
while the Son has kenotically reduced his power and status, he is nonetheless the
principal agent of the tasks at hand. Thus we see in Julian’s theology that kenosis is by no
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means synonymous with passivity or powerlessness; it is an intentional reduction of
power and status that is effective in bringing about the desired ends. His reduction
becomes powerlessness and passivity in the absolute sense only when he undergoes
death.
Finally, the Son’s power and status are fully restored to him, a restoration that is
also necessary to the achievement of the intended goals. The Son begins to re-assert his
power with the descent into hell, and this is completed with his return to the Father,
where his honor, power, and status are fully restored. As in Philippians, so too in Julian’s
text, the Son is not simply restored but exalted in some sense to a state higher than the
one he had initially. Julian may even imply that, in some sense, his status becomes higher
than that of the Father’s presumably because of his willing kenosis. This is expressed in
the image of his clothing: In the final scene, Christ’s clothing is “feyer and rychar than
was the clothing whych I saw on the fader [fairer and richer than the clothing which I saw
on the Father].” 93 The overall theme, however, is a restored equality of status: The Son
sits “on the faders ryght hande in endlesse rest an pees.” 94
Since kenosis is relational, the Father’s power and status cannot be unaffected by
the Son’s performance. The Father’s power is increased vis-à-vis the Son – he now has
the power to command, control, punish, and reward. The Father now becomes the
dominant subject in relation to the Son. This change in status and power is symbolized in
his change from Father to lord. As lord, he has supreme power over the servant; the
servant is his to command. The servant is subordinate and at his mercy. That the Father is
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now a lord implies sovereign power or dominance. This does not mean that the
Father/lord will perform his power as domination, but it does mean that the possibility
and the threat of his doing so are present. Yet, in Julian’s telling, the Father resists any
hint or threat of domination. His primary way of expressing his power is in the form of
restraint. Though as a lord he can claim sovereignty, he does not do so. Julian symbolizes
this restraint in the image of the lord’s sitting. Rather than sitting on his “ryche and
nob(lest) seet,” which is his right, he sits “symply on the erth, bareyn and deserte, alone
in wilderness [unadorned, on the ground, barren and waste, alone in the wilderness].” 95
This restraint on the Father’s part is central to his response to the Son’s kenosis. The
place of the Father/lord’s sitting symbolizes his free decision not to claim fully his status
as all-sovereign Lord and God. Julian explains the symbolization at some length:
But his syttyng on the erth, bareyn and desert, is thus to mene: he made
mannes soule to be his owne cytte and his dwelling place, whych is most
pleasing to hym of all his workes. And what tyme man was fallyn in to
sorrow and payne, he was not all seemly to serve of [th]at noble office;
and therefore oure kynde fader wolde haue dyght hym noon other place
but to sytt vppon the erth, abydyng man kynde, whych is medlyd with
erth, tyll what tyme by his grace hys deerwurthy sonne had grought
agayne hys cytte in to the nobyll feyernesse with hise traveyle.
[But his sitting on the ground, barren and waste, signifies this: He made
man’s soul to be his own city and his dwelling place, which is the most
pleasing to him of all his works. And when man had fallen into sorrow and
pain, he was not wholly proper to serve in that noble office, and therefore
our kind Father did not wish to prepare any other place, but sat upon the
ground, awaiting human nature, which is mixed with earth, until the time
when by his grace his beloved Son had brought back his city into its noble
place of beauty by hard labour.] 96

95

BS 523/JNS 271.

96

BS 525–26/JNS 272.

173

The Father thus desires to dwell in the human soul, but as fallen, humanity is not worthy
of the Father’s dignity. Rather than choose another place, the Father waits, sitting upon
the ground – a place not adequate to his nobility and sovereignty – for the Son to
complete his labor. The Father thus chooses a kind of passivity, a stance of anticipation
or waiting for the work of the Son to be completed. For Julian, this lack of agency on the
part of the Father follows in part from his dignity in that the work of the servant/Son is
below the status of the divinity: “the syttyng of the fader betokynnyth the godhead, that is
to sey for shewing of rest and pees, for in the godhead may be no traveyle [the sitting of
the Father symbolizes the divinity, that is to say to reveal rest and peace, for in the
divinity there can be no labour].” 97 Yet I think it fair to say that the Father’s stance vis-àvis the Son and humanity in general is one of restraint. It might be tempting to define the
Father’s posture here as kenotic; he is refusing to use his power and putting himself, in
some sense, in a passive or less powerful role. However, the Father’s acting is not
kenotic; rather, it is a performance of dominance in the form of self-restraint, which is not
a kenotic practice since there is no loss of power or status vis-à-vis the servant/Son and
he could reassert his dominant power at any time. Indeed, the Father/lord’s power and
status are increased through the Son’s kenosis. Yet the Father/lord practices his power by
restraining it or refraining from its use so that the Son can perform the labor that is
required. In the final scene of the vision, the Father returns to his rightful seat joined now
with his son who is returned to power, with the Holy Spirit, and with a restored humanity.
Julian’s images and descriptions of the Father/lord are thoroughly without any
traces of domination or violence, so much so that he is presented as incapable of blaming,
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judging, or punishing, all acts which his dominant position entails. He looks upon his
servant/Son “full tenderly… full mekly and myldely, with gree rewth and pytte (most
tenderly… very meekly and mildly, with great compassion and pity).” 98 Inwardly, he
rejoices to think of the great reward He will grant to the servant/Son for his labors.
The startling character of Julian’s portrayals of both lordship and divine power are
brought out in contrast to contemporary views of each. As Both Staley and Jantzen
remark, Julian’s image of a lord contrasts sharply with the historical figure Lord Henry
Despenser, Bishop of Norwich. Despenser belonged to an aristocratic family and spent
his younger years in Italy in the army of the Pope. After being named Bishop of Norwich
in 1370, he was personally involved in putting down the peasant revolts in his area and in
1383 led Urban VI’s failed crusade against the followers of Clement of Avignon.
Despenser was also among those English bishops who requested of Henry the IV the use
of the death penalty against the Lollards. Contemporary account describes the young
bishop-lord as “wrathful, fully armed, young and bloodthirsty.” As Staley points out, in
some ways this “warlike behavior was simply an inextricable feature of a society whose
aristocrats subscribed to the values and myths of chivalry.” 99 In this sense, Despenser
was not exceptional; he “personified the aggression, the temper, the noblesse oblige, the
power (even when threatened) of the male aristocrat. He publicly enacted a quality of
‘lordship at the time when lordship appeared under attack.’” 100 Thus Despenser presents
an actual portrait of lordship that contrasts sharply with the lordship enacted in Julian’s
example. This is not to say that Julian intentionally constructed her image of a lord in
98
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contrast to Despenser, still less as a kind of rebuke to him. The purpose of Julian’s
example is not to offer a model of political or ecclestiastical lordship but, rather, to
portray the way in which God exercises power in relation to humanity. Still, as Jantzen
suggests, we can certainly assume that Julian knew the person of her bishop and the kind
of lordship he embodied. 101 In contrast, Julian’s image of a lord is one who eschews all
violence and domination, who performs his power as restraint, and whose primary
characteristics are mildness, sweetness, and loving compassion.
Julian’s theology of divine power, particularly in relation to human sin, also
contrasts starkly with contemporary views. The theology of Catherine of Siena, Julian’s
near contemporary, is illustrative. 102 Catherine is told repeatedly by the father that sin
offends him deeply and that those who offend him deserve and receive eternal damnation.
The God of Catherine’s dialogue is a God of wrath and vengeance. 103 He is also a God of
love – a love expressed as damnation for those who refuse his mercy and as salvation for
those who are humble and contrite: “Do you not know, my daughter, that all the suffering
the soul bears or can bear in this life are not enough to punish one smallest sin? For an
offense against me, infinite Good, demands an infinite satisfaction.” 104 In contrast,

101

As Jantzen points out, it was “this bishop who would have been responsible for judging Julian suitable
for the life of an achoress.” See Jantzen, Julian of Norwich, 9. Had Despenser read Julian’s text with its
emphasis on the unity of love, Jantzen suggests, he “would not have been amused” (Jantzen 12). And it
would not have been beyond his authority or character to investigate Julian’s orthodoxy. In 1389 the
anchoress Matilda was interrogated regarding her views and reportedly “sent away for correction, thus
deprived of her anchorhold and reintegrated into the community of the faithful until her beliefs were judged
properly orthodox.” See Staley, “Julian of Norwich and the Crisis of Authority,” 129, n. 48.

102

There is no suggestion here that Julian would have been familiar with Catherine’s Dialogue. It was not
translated into English until later in the fifteenth century. I use Catherine as representative of views of
divine judgment common at the time.

103

Catherine of Siena, The Dialogue, e.g., 50 – 53.

104

Ibid., 28.

176

Julian’s God cannot experience wrath; this is contrary to his nature. He does not judge or
punish or even forgive. Thus, Julian’s portrayal of divine power is one infused with love,
forbearance, kindness, and compassion. As a correlate to her teaching on human sin, it
expresses the radicality of her teaching. A critical theological view of this position raises
all sorts of questions not only regarding the “orthodoxy” of her teaching, but more
importantly in my view, regarding whether her teaching ultimately does justice to human
experience, particularly the experience of evil. 105 This latter issue will be considered in
the final chapter.
Since the example is principally a theo-drama -- that is, a drama between and
among the divine persons -- the relation between God and humanity is not thematic as it
will be in the latter part of Julian’s explication of the fourteenth revelation. In the
example, it is the humanity of the Son that is paramount, and as united to the Son,
humanity shares in his experience of kenosis. Nonetheless, humanity itself, as distinct
(though never separated) from the Son, does not perform kenosis. Humanity’s weakness
and suffering is a result of both nature and ignorance; there is no willed or intended
decision to reduce status or power on the part of humanity in relation to God or, for that
matter, to other human authorities, the church included. This is clearly not the purpose of
the example. As we saw in the previous chapter and will examine in the next, Julian does
indeed instruct her reader on performances of power, yet this is not the purpose of the
example. It remains a theo-drama throughout.
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Regarding the gendering of power in the example, Julian does not feel compelled
to follow a conventional model. Both the dominant and the kenotic subjects are
masculine, and gender does not function to indicate a power differential. In the
theological symbolization at work in the example, there is no need for a female
counterpart to Adam or to Christ, since the two male figures subsume the female into the
universal “man” and Julian instructs her reader to do likewise: “For in the syghte of god
alle man is oone man, and oone man is alle man” and Christ’s humanity is “the ryghtfull
[true] Adam.” 106 Yet at the same time, Julian positions herself, in her authorial role, as
the representative human, thereby inviting her reader – male or female – to do the same.
Drawn into the universal “we” of her text, all Julian’s readers are to identify with Adam
as everyman and thus to see, in the unity of Christ and Adam, the unity of Christ with
each of “us”. The move here entails maintaining the normativity of the masculine as
representative of the human while at the same time making gender largely irrelevant,
since each of her readers, whether male or female, is encompassed by Adam, and thus
each – whether male or female – is Adam. More significantly, in the final scene of
restoration, the figure of universal humanity is transgendered: No longer the male figure
of Adam, humanity is now represented by the female figure of “beloved wife” and “fair
maiden.” Thus Julian uses conventional gendered roles – Adam in the role of everyman
united to Jesus our “brother” (i.e., our fellow human), all humanity in the role of wife and
fair maiden united to Jesus as spouse – , yet she instructs her readers to move between the
roles and thus to envision their relations with Jesus in a multiplicity of ways.
In conclusion, what can we say about Julian’s portrayal of Jesus as servant, and
how does she instruct her reader to relate to him? On the deepest level, Jesus’s
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servanthood in the parable describes his relationship to God the Father, not to humanity.
He is not humanity’s servant, but God the Father’s. On this level, Julian does not instruct
her readers to enter into this relationship as much as she instructs them to observe this
relationship and reflect on its significance for humanity. To quote David Aers (though
Aers makes this point regarding Julian’s vision of the passion, not the parable), Julian
places the reader “in a rather detached, speculative relationship to images which have
been designed to emphasize their constructedness, their rhetorical composition.” 107 Even
more than in the passion scenes, the parable is presented as a construct, an allegory
through which the reader is enabled to move beyond towards its deeper meanings. Julian
reminds her readers explicitly that the images of lord and servant are human
constructions that cannot be said literally of God, yet they serve to illuminate the
mysterious relationships that define kenosis. 108 At the same time, Jesus as servant is also
united to humanity as everyman and as brother. He is thus the good Son who is also the
good servant, and he teaches humanity how to properly relate to God. In this way, the
reader is to see in Jesus the servant how to be both a good servant and a good child in
relationship to God. To express the more personal “I-thou” relationship between her
readers and Jesus, Julian shifts roles and genders, transforming Jesus from servant to
husband, and transforming humanity from Adam to the fair maiden. On this reading, both
Watson’s and Staley’s interpretations detailed at the beginning of the chapter are borne
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out. While the roles are conventional in their content, their pairings are not oppositional,
and the reader, along with Julian herself, is instructed to transgender with the figures of
Adam and the fair maiden.
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Chapter Four

Maternal Performances of Creative and Kenotic Power
“We wytt that alle oure moders bere vs to payne and to dyeng. A, what is
that? But oure very moder Jhesu, he alone beryth vs to joye and to endless
levyng” 109

4.1 Introduction
Immediately following the conclusion of the example of a lord and a servant,
Julian introduces her second model of divine-human relationship: a mother and a child.
Chapter 52 begins: “And thus I saw that god enjoyeth that he is our fader, and god
enjoyeth that he is our moder, and god enjoyeth that he is our very spouse, and our soule
his lovyd wyfe [And so I saw that God rejoices that he is our Father, and God rejoices
that he is our Mother, and God rejoices that he is our true spouse, and that our soul is his
beloved wife].” 110 Julian’s common practice of beginning a new chapter with the
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conjunction “and” alerts her readers to the thematic links between the explication of the
example in chapter 51 and the development of her Trinitarian theology and theological
anthropology in the remaining chapters of the fourteenth revelation. 111 The opening
sentence also seamlessly inserts the title “mother” among the more familiar titles of
“father” and “spouse”, thereby signaling what Julian later makes explicit: The symbol of
maternity is as revelatory of God’s relation to humanity as is the canonical symbol of
paternity.
This chapter focuses on Julian’s development of the mother-child relationship and
explores the performances of power this model contains. As a model of power
performance, the mother-child symbol differs from the Philippians model of Christic
kenosis in a number of significant ways. In the first place, the mother-child model shifts
the focus from the relationship between the Father and the (divine-human) Son to the
relationship between God (and more specifically Christ) and the individual Christian. In
doing so, it explores performances of power within a far more radically asymmetrical
relationship. Whereas, in the Philippians myth, Christ moves from a position of equality
with the Father to subordination and vulnerability before returning to full equality, in the
mother-child relationship, there is never any equaling-out of the relationship; despite the
fact that he performs kenosis in relation to the child, Christ the mother remains God –
omnipotent and source of all that is – and the individual human being remains human,
i.e., utterly dependent on and subordinate to the all-powerful other. This does not mean
that there is no dynamism in the relationship; the performances of power by both the
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mother and the child shift and change in relation to one another. Still, there is no sense in
which the child and the mother aim at or achieve a relationship of equality. Secondly, the
kenosis performed by the Mother is quite different from that performed by the Son.
Whereas, in the Philippians myth (as in the symbol of a lord and a servant), the Son
intentionally reduces his power and submits to the power of the other (principally the
Father, but also to those who put him to death), in the mother-child model, the divine
mother uses her power in order to birth and nurture the child, and later restricts her power
so that the child can grow in freedom and maturity, but she does not intentionally reduce
her power and make herself subordinate to a more powerful other. Rather, she makes
herself vulnerable to a less powerful other (the child), and, rather than reducing her power
and making herself subordinate, she alternately asserts and restrains her power in order to
empower the child. This type of kenosis, what I will now call maternal kenosis, is
marked by an oscillating restriction of power: The all-powerful mother restrains her
power as the child grows so that the child can learn and mature. At the same time,
however, the mother’s assertive, productive power remains at the ready in order to
protect the child from any serious harm. This leads to a third significant difference
between the Philippians model and the maternal one introduced by Julian: The mother’s
performance of power is never simply kenotic; it is constantly shifting – sometimes
assertive (creating, commanding, and guiding), other times kenotic (self-constricting,
submitting in vulnerability). The mother births, nurtures, and teaches in ways that
presuppose productive power and dominance (vis-à-vis the child) as well as kenotic
restraint. In other words, the Divine Mother’s performances of power are themselves
dynamic and shifting, at times productive and forceful, at other times restrained and
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vulnerable. Finally, the culmination of the kenotic movement in the mother-child model
is not really an exaltation in the sense of a return to power after a kenotic loss. Julian
presents the mother-child dynamic as a never-ending cyclical movement of birth, growth,
and rebirth. The divine mother is ever busy with her maternal work, and her children are
forever being birthed: Christ is “oure very moder, in whome we be endlesly borne and
[we] nevyr shall come out of hym [our true Mother, in whom we are endlessly born and
out of whom we shall never come].” 112
In what follows, I begin by examining Julian’s development of the theme of Jesus
as mother in comparison to other medieval uses of the theme. I then turn to
contemporary feminist re-appropriations of the maternal symbol in order to draw out
some of the ambiguities of the symbol and to articulate some feminist cautions regarding
its use in theological contexts. Finally, I turn to reading passages of Julian’s text where
the motherhood theme is developed explicitly, tracing the complex performances of
power that Julian’s maternal symbol encapsulates and comparing them to the Christic
models of kenosis found in Philippians and in the example of a lord and a servant.

4.2 The Distinctiveness of Julian’s Theology of the Maternal
Representing the divine in maternal and more generally feminine terms has roots
in Scripture. The most overt examples include the Sapiential literature’s personification
of God’s wisdom in the feminine, Second Isaiah’s use of maternal imagery to express
God’s care for Israel, and Matthew’s portrayal of Jesus as a mother hen brooding over her
young. 113 Development of this Scripture-based feminine imagery for the divine is found
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intermittently in the writings of the Fathers and the Scholastics, but proliferates in what
Barbara Newman calls medieval “imaginative theology,” i.e., medieval literary genres
(both allegorical and visionary) that employ “personification” to explore manifestations
of and encounters with the divine. 114 Philosophically, these personifications were
understood within a broadly Platonic frame as “divine names, ideas, primordial causes,
theophanies, or energies (virtutes), and as universals in which believers participate to the
degree that they are virtuous.” 115 In imaginative theology, however, they could, almost
literally, take on a life of their own:
[to] personify these virtues, to give the divine attributes body and voice, is
to make them accessible as mediators not only for the intellect but also for
the imagination. One may “envision” them, enter into dialogue with them,
take them as mothers or lovers, teachers or partners, mistresses or friends
– and by means of these relationships encounter God. 116
From Hildegard of Bingen and Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth century, to the great
Beguine mystics of the thirteenth, to Henry Suso in the fourteenth and Christine de Pizan
in the fifteenth century, God’s love and wisdom have been portrayed and encountered as
powerful feminine figures who mediate between human beings and the divine persons.
Divinity, chap. 1; and Ritamary Bradley, “Patristic Background of the Motherhood Similitude in Julian of
Norwich.”
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Maternal imagery became particularly associated with the humanity of Christ in
the Cistercian tradition, as Caroline Walker Bynum has demonstrated. 117 Anselm of
Canterbury, Bernard of Clairvaux, Guerric of Igny, and Aelred of Rievaulx all use
maternal imagery to express Christ’s nurture and care in relation to the individual soul
and to represent the role of the abbot in relation to his spiritual sons.118 Along with
Bynum’s study, those of Jennifer Heimmel, Eleanor McLaughlin, and Valorie Lagorio
have established that, by Julian’s time, the symbol of Jesus as mother was common
enough to be unremarkable in devotional and mystical writings. 119
Julian was most likely formed by some or even much of this literature: Certainly,
she was well acquainted with the Old Testament Wisdom texts and probably the major
works of affective spirituality influential in fourteenth-century England. 120 Regarding the
former, Julian’s writing shows a profound familiarity and ease with the Wisdom tradition
– she regularly refers to the Second Person of the trinity as Wisdom and explicitly links
Wisdom with divine maternity. As regards the genre of affective spirituality, College and
Walsh have recorded in detail the similarities with, allusions to, and borrowings from the
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dominant traditions of spiritual writing that can be found throughout Julian’s
Showings. 121 Certainly, as a devout fourteenth- century woman, Julian would have sought
out these texts or at least been familiar with their language and symbols.
According to Bynum, three basic stereotypes of the maternal underpin the variety
of medieval usages in both women’s and men’s writings: (1) The mother is “generative
(the foetus is made of her very matter) and sacrificial in her generation”; (2) the mother is
“nurturing (she feeds the child with her own bodily fluids)”; and (3) the mother is “loving
and tender (she cannot help loving her own child).” 122 Thus, a mother generates, she
births, she feeds and nurtures. In Holy Feast and Holy Fast, Bynum argues that, in
women’s writings in particular, the association of Jesus’ humanity with these maternal
practices (and physicality in general) allowed women to identify with this “feminized
Jesus,” and thereby achieve union with the divine in and through their own feminized
bodies and practices. 123 The association of the feminine with the bleeding, birthing,
feeding body of Jesus on the cross encouraged women to seek union especially through
profound physical and psychological suffering as well as (maternal) service to others:
Women were drawn to identify with Christ’s suffering and feeding flesh
because both men and women saw the female body as food and the female
nature as fleshly. Both men and women described Christ’s body in its
suffering and its generativity as a birthing and lactating mother and may at
some almost unconscious level have felt that woman’s suffering was her
way of fusing with Christ because Christ’s suffering flesh was
“woman.” 124
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In the examples culled by Bynum from women’s writings, the maternity of Christ
is principally based on his suffering, broken, nourishing body on the cross. In this
imagery, Jesus’s maternity, while life-giving, is always suffering and sacrificial.
Religious women could not only identify with this image, but could also seek its literal
embodiment through self-inflicted suffering. 125 Though the suffering itself is powerful,
since it allows the subject to participate in Christ’s redemptive power, it is nonetheless
also defined by a type of passio, i.e., a suffering and dying which, while actively sought,
is nonetheless passively undergone. The strategy in these texts is to intensify a state of
(female) powerlessness which then becomes paradoxically powerful because it is inserted
into the redeeming power of Christ’s (feminized) suffering. 126
Julian’s use of the mother symbol certainly reflects the themes Bynum enunciates
– generation, nurturance, and loving care – though, as we shall see, her development of
the symbol goes in directions quite different from the writings of both the men and the
women Bynum characterizes. In the first place, Julian does not restrict the maternal
symbol to the humanity of Jesus; she quite clearly employs the symbol to express Christ’s
divinity as well. In doing so, Julian disrupts the binary, highlighted by Bynum, according
to which the humanity of Christ is femininized, the divinity masculinized. 127 Secondly,
Julian’s portrayal of divine and human maternity is not characterized principally by
passivity, either understood as being acted upon by an initiating (male) other or as
endured suffering. The maternal divine actively creates, sustains, and engages with
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humanity, and, though the maternal Jesus certainly suffers and dies, his suffering and
death are undergone and passed through in a continuous process of active working. More
importantly, Jesus’s suffering and death are not the endpoint of his activities as a mother;
after dying in giving birth to his children, Mother Jesus continues to nourish, guide,
protect, and teach humanity. Thirdly, as David Aers argues, Julian’s use of maternal
imagery and her portrayals of Christ’s humanity in general “decisively set aside voluntary
imitations of the tortured, wounded, nurturing body on Calvary and in late medieval
Eucharistic devotion.” 128 In other words, Julian’s representations of Christ generally do
not invite the penitential and self-harming practices that Bynum’s subjects engage in. A
fourth way in which Julian’s Jesus-as-mother figure deviates from other uses of the
model explored by Bynum is that Julian takes human maternity seriously, allowing it to
be not merely a metaphor but potentially revelatory of the divine. For Julian, since
motherhood is archetypically divine, human motherhood can image or make visible “a
function and a relationship that is first and foremost in God.” 129 Finally, unlike the use of
the maternal found in the literature Bynum so amply illustrates of both male and female
writers, Julian’s use of maternal imagery is not sporadic or accidental; it is carefully and
thematically developed in a Trinitarian context that arguably treats the maternal symbol
with as much seriousness as the tradition has given to paternal figuration. It is no
exaggeration to say that, until recent developments in feminist theology, Julian has stood
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alone in the tradition as a theologian bold enough to symbolize God systematically in
both male and female terms. 130
This last remark warrants some qualification. Julian undoubtedly develops the
symbol of divine maternity in a positive and substantive way. However, it is worth noting
that the maternal title is not integrated throughout the Showings as a whole. It is briefly
mentioned in chapters 48, 52, 54, and 83 of the long text, and is thematically treated in
chapters 58-63, which amounts to, all told, roughly 37 out of 453 pages (in College and
Walsh’s critical edition). The Second Person of the Trinity is the person most often
symbolized as mother but is more frequently referred to with the traditional titles of
“son”, “brother”, “Lord”, and “Savior”; and in the parable of a lord and a servant, he
appears incarnate in the role of a male servant. Despite the brevity of this explicit
treatment, Julian nonetheless gives the motherhood symbol extensive theological weight
as a key to interpreting her visions. Of the sixteen visions granted her, Julian explicitly
applies the motherhood symbol to interpret the theological significance of seven of them
(visions 1, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 16), as well as to interpret the "all will be well" theme.
Thus, while it is important to avoid reducing Julian's theology to the God-as-mother
theme, it is equally important to avoid downplaying its interpretive importance.

4.3 Feminist Re-Appropriations of the Maternal
In the example of a lord and a servant, Julian’s displacement of the image of a
wrathful, judging father/lord with a courteous, loving father/lord incapable of anger and
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judgment is a startling subversion of stereotypical representations of paternal/patriarchal
power. At first glance, Julian’s representations of maternity are less obviously
subversive; the nurturing Mother Jesus who sacrifices himself for his children seems to
reflect stereotypical images of maternity, both in Julian’s context and our own. 131
Feminist thinkers have rightly been wary of adopting the maternal as an alternative to
patriarchal symbols of power: Maternity has long been viewed in essentialist terms and
manipulated to re-enforce patriarchal structures; it is highly susceptible to sentimental
idealization and has often been employed to restrict women’s opportunities. Julian’s use
of the maternal seems susceptible to these conventional, sentimentalized interpretations
of maternity, interpretations that draw on and reinforce essentialist constructions of
maternal practices and roles. 132
Until recently, maternity – as practice or symbol -- has not been considered a
serious object of study and consequently has received little investigation in the social
sciences let alone in theology. 133 As Clarissa Atkinson points out, traditionally,
motherhood has been “too thoroughly identified with the private sphere and with the
‘changeless’ biological aspects of the human condition” and was therefore “not perceived
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as an institution shaped by culture and subject to history.” 134 A related difficulty arises
from the fact that maternity is often studied from outside rather than from within the
experience; it is still too often the case that, in Susan Rubin Suleiman’s words, the
emphasis “continues to be on the mother-as-she-is-written rather than on the mother-asshe-writes.” 135 Feminist re-appropriations and revisions have begun to correct this
imbalance and to provide new critical models of maternity. Drawing on this work, I
propose a number of critical points that can provide a way of reading Julian’s use of the
maternal in a way that highlights its originality and its liberating potential.
The first point derives from Sara Ruddick’s focus on maternity as praxis.
Ruddick’s purpose is to deconstruct idealized essentialist views of maternity by
“identifying mothers by the work they set out to do” and the modes of thinking to which
their distinctive work gives rise. 136 In Ruddick’s words:
Maternal practice responds to the historical reality of a biological child in
a particular social world. The agents of maternal practice, acting in
response to the demands of their children, acquire a conceptual scheme – a
vocabulary and logic of connections – through which they order and
express the facts and values of their practice. In judgments and selfreflection, they refine and concretize this scheme. Intellectual activities are
distinguishable but not separable from disciplines of feeling. There is a
unity of reflection, judgment, and emotion. This unity I call “maternal
thinking.” 137
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Ruddick does not define maternity biologically but, rather, in terms of praxis. Typically,
those engaged in mother-work are biological mothers, yet they need not be: “Mothers are
people who see children as ‘demanding’ protection, nurturance, and training; they
attempt to respond to children’s demands with care and respect rather than indifference or
assault.” 138 Identifying mothering as praxis has a number of advantages: It underscores
the practical, productive character of mother-work, it highlights the active agency of
mothers, and it insists that their work embodies and can thus give rise to particular
epistemologies and ethics. Ruddick identifies preservation, nuturance, and training as
three foundational categories of mother-work. Preservation designates attitudes and
activities of attentiveness aimed at protection and the minimizing of risks; nurturance
defines the complex of activities that aim at fostering and sponsoring “the physical,
emotional, and intellectual growth” of children; 139 and training connotes the activities
that intend to help children “become people who will be reliably moral when they are
alone or among peers.” 140
As we shall see when we turn to Julian’s text, mothering is above all praxis for
her; she most commonly refers to it as “working” and identifies it with a series of
activities that are concrete, engaged, varied, and adaptable. There is nothing passive or
even complementary (vis-à-vis the activities of a father) about mother-work, for it
contains its own inherent meanings and criteria of effectiveness. Keeping in mind the
potentially vast differences between maternal praxis in late medieval England and late
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twentieth-century America, Ruddick’s categories of preservation, nurturance, and
training provide a useful tool for differentiating among Julian’s descriptions of motherwork.
A second set of critical tools is drawn from feminist theologians’ critical reevaluations of agape. Whereas traditional models of agapic love often define it as
radically impartial, totally other-regarding, and disinterested, Sally Purvis and Christine
Gudorf argue that a model based on maternal (or parental) love yields a more relational,
mutual model. 141 Purvis observes that, ideally, mother-love is both “intensely involved
and other-directed,” calling on its subject “to be fully mindful of the concrete realities of
persons,” to be “present, connected, involved, [and] intensely caring.” 142 It is decidedly
not disinterested or detached insofar as it is responsive to the other. On this model of
agape, the opposition between self-interest and self-denial is displaced by an
understanding of love as deeply relational and premised on personal engagement with the
other. Traditional models of agape also often emphasize its sacrificial component,
characterizing it as a unidirectional giving of the self that seeks no return or mutuality.
Because it is constructed as not informed by the needs or interests of the loving agent –
even the interest of self-preservation – the self-gift of agapic love is seen as unbounded
and is paradigmatically expressed as a self-sacrificing-unto-death. Reflecting on the
experiences of parental love, Christine Gudorf re-orients its sacrificial component in
terms of mutuality. All love, she says, is “directed at mutuality” (even when the mutuality

141

I am drawing principally from Sally Purvis, “Mothers, Neighbors, and Strangers: Another Look at
Agape,” and Christine Gudorf, “Parenting, Mutual Love, and Sacrifice.” While Purvis speaks specifically
in terms of mother-love, Gudorf prefers to speak more generally of parental love.

142

Purvis, “Mothers, Neighbors, and Strangers,” 26, 33.

194

is more promise than actuality), and all love is expressive of both “gift” and “need”. This
is no less true of parental love, whose sacrificial dimension is not “one-sided, but
mutually beneficial.” 143 Parental interests are intimately bound up with the interests of
their children, as parents seek to be personally enhanced by the flourishing of charges and
by the establishment of mutuality.
On the traditional model of agape, mother-love gets mixed reviews. On the one
hand, mother-love invariably falls short because of its failure to be disinterested and
impartial. On the other hand, it is idealized as an archetype of a one-sided, self-sacrificing
love-unto-death. By reconfiguring mother love in terms of engaged responsiveness, eros,
and sacrifice-aimed-at-mutuality, Purvis and Gudorf offer both a richer picture of mother
(parental) love and a healthier model of agape.
Likewise, Julian’s depiction of mother-love allows for such an interpretation.
Jesus-as-mother is deeply engaged with and responsive to his child. And even though
Jesus’s mother-love includes a sacrifice-unto-death, in Julian’s presentation, this is not
the pinnacle of Jesus’ love but, rather, to use Gudorf’s words, a moment “in a process
designed to end in mutual love.” 144 In other words, the whole point of Jesus’s motherly
actions is to bring the child into fuller relationship with God; while this entails Jesus’s
death, the dying is not an act of finality but a step in a life-giving, ultimately
reciprocating, process.
The third and final perspective I take from feminist re-appropriations of the
maternal concerns the limitations of the motherhood symbol as a model of the divine. As
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Sallie McFague points out, all metaphors or symbols of divinity are partial and limited,
and there can be no single, all-encompassing symbol that exhausts the meanings of
relationship to the divine. At their best, particular symbols pick out particular dimensions
of the human-divine relationship, thereby elucidating and enhancing the meanings and
values of the relationship itself. When overused, particular symbols can restrict and
distort the human-divine relationship, which subsequently leads to the distortion of all
human relationships. The antidote is to elaborate an array of symbols and metaphors that
can serve to enrich and expand our understanding of modes of relationship with God,
with others, and with the world.
Symbolizing God as Mother is enriching and expansive in a number of ways. As
McFague points out, it powerfully decenters the patriarchal model of God and
“recontextualise[s] the paternal mode in a parental direction” (i.e., imaging God as
loving, life-giving parent, not as dominating, commanding Father-Lord). 145 Further, the
maternal divine accentuates the vital, life-giving, nurturing dimensions of God and the
“interdependence and mutuality of all life” (human and nonhuman). 146 The maternal
divine evokes images of embodiment, materiality, dependence, vulnerability,
relationality, sustenance, and care. As such, it potentially elicits a praxis of
interdependence, mutuality, and care for all that lives and all that serves life. 147
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As with all symbols, the maternal has its limits. In the first place, the symbol
becomes restrictive when it encompasses or exhausts all female symbolizations of the
divine. We can and must speak of God, as McFague argues, in other female terms such
as sister, midwife, or lover. 148 This is because an exclusive identification of the female
divine with maternity “gives power to the one role that has probably oppressed women
more than any other over the centuries,” particularly where maternity is constructed as
passive and self-sacrificing-unto-death. Secondly, “if the parental model, mother or
father, is used exclusively for God, it places us always in the role of children,” thereby
retarding individuation and maturation. 149 By offering an image of God that “suggests
that the ‘great mother’ or ‘great father’ will take care of our crises of poverty,
discrimination, [and] damage to the ecosystem,” the parental model can effectively keep
us from taking adult “responsibility for our world and its well being.” 150 Finally, the
maternal divine is potentially damaging when it ignores or continues to repress the dark
side of the maternal – the mother who, by controlling, dominating or abusing, frustrates
her child’s individuation, separation, and growth. Such repression risks reinforcing these
processes in the psyches of individual women and men. 151
Julian’s use of the motherhood symbol would appear to anticipate many of these
critical cautions. She resists simply projecting conventional images of maternity onto
God, carefully distinguishing divine maternity from its imperfect, often failed, human
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counterparts. 152 Though Julian does not diversify her female images of God into, e.g.,
sister, midwife, or female lover, she does identify God’s maternity with God’s wisdom,
thus placing her theology squarely within the Sophia tradition with its personification of
divine wisdom in female form, a form that includes but is not limited to the symbol of
maternity. 153 Julian also avoids an exclusive use of the maternal symbol by situating it
alongside a plurality of symbols: God is evoked most frequently as lord and father, and
less frequently as spouse or lover. Admittedly, these are traditional authoritarian male
symbolizations, but they do serve to balance and even highlight by contrast the meanings
of the maternal. More importantly, Julian’s constant focus on God as love, and her
portrayal of God’s love as all-encompassing, all-sustaining, and all-renewing,
intentionally counter patriarchal models of a God of wrath and judgment. This countering
is central to Julian’s theological purpose: She searches for wrath and judgment in God yet
does not find it. On the contrary, she discovers that wrath contradicts the very nature of
God, “for he is God, he is good, he is truth, he is love, he is peace; and his might, his
wisdom, his charity and his unity suffer him not to be wrathful.” 154 This decentering of
the patriarchal model is particularly remarkable in Julian’s social and theological context,
a context dominated by the devastation of the Black Death, 155 the papal schism, the
English rising, and ecclesiastical crackdowns on theological speculation in reaction to the
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Lollards. 156 One might expect, in such a context, a reassertion of divine power and
authority as a justification for political and ecclesiastical authority, as well as a focus on
human sin as cause of divine punishment and anger. Instead, Julian offers a God of
tireless compassion who “constantly works to bring us into endless peace.” 157
Perhaps the one caution not explicit in Julian’s text is the concern that a parental
model may foster childish dependency instead of spiritual maturity. Julian clearly
proposes the mother-child relationship as a paradigm of the spiritual life, a model that
could be read as discouraging growth and responsibility. Yet even here, Julian’s teaching
allows for other readings, particularly when placed within its eschatological framework.
Childlike trust and confidence in God do remain basic to the spiritual life, yet this life is
oriented toward a fullness of love and understanding that, though only realized fully in
the life to come, may be begun by those who seek it. Further, though the mother-child
relationship is one of the dominant symbols of the human-divine relationship in the
Showings, it is by no means the only one – arguably, the most significant model is the
one offered by Julian herself, who is anything but childish in her spiritual practice and
relation to God. Finally, though Julian does not invite her readers explicitly to do so, I
suggest that we also view Julian’s representation of divine mother-work as a model for
adult human practices, for if, as Julian believes, Jesus both reveals divinity and models
the perfection of humanity, “our mother Jesus” instructs both in his teaching and by his
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example. Thus, Jesus’s mature maternal practice can serve as a model for mature human
relations as well.
With these critical re-evaluations of the maternal in hand, I now want to turn to a
reading of Julian’s own theology of divine maternity. Before doing so, however, a brief
summary of Julian’s anthropology is required, since the motherhood themes are
intimately bound up with it.

4.4 The Dual Nature of Human Being and Mutual Indwelling
There are three interrelated themes that characterize Julian’s anthropology: the
duality of human nature as both substantial and sensual, the “godly will,” and mutual
indwelling. 158 As Nuth and Baker have shown, Julian’s anthropology assumes a broadly
Augustinian framework, though Julian’s language and development of these themes,
particularly of the first two, are distinctive and highly creative. 159 Julian speaks of the
human person in terms of a “double” or dual nature. Substantial nature refers to an
atemporal, non-embodied mode of being that always remains “in” God, while sensual
nature refers to the embodied, temporal mode of being that characterizes human life from
birth to death, from its dynamic process out away from God to its eventual return. 160
Related to this distinction is the idea of the “godly will,” a deep, pre-conscious dimension
of the self that continually remains “in” or with God and therefore does not cooperate in
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sinning. Finally, there is the related theme of mutual indwelling – God in the soul and the
soul in God. This indwelling is complicated by the distinction between the substantial and
sensual; while the substantial self or soul is always in God and God in it, in the case of
the sensual self/soul, this mutual indwelling has yet to be achieved (through the process
of exitus and reditus) -- and presumably, this achievement could fail to happen. Here
again, we encounter the tension between the impulse to universalism in Julian’s thought
and her explicit pre-destinationism. Julian is typically careful to say that only “those who
will be saved” possess the godly will and achieve this mutual indwelling. Nonetheless,
some of her formulations seem to apply to all human beings without qualification. I will
now elaborate on each of these themes in a bit more detail.
Since Julian does not use the language of substance and sensuality uniformly, it
can be difficult to indicate its precise meaning. Infrequently, it is used to express the
distinction between body and soul; 161 more often, it correlates to the traditional
distinction between higher and lower faculties of the soul, or higher and lower parts of
human nature; 162 most often, Julian simply refers to “our substance” and “our sensuality”
as two modes of existence, or two ways of being human. 163 In this last sense, substance
and sensuality refer to two modes or stages of being, the first atemporal and in some
sense “prior” to embodiment, while the second is temporal and embodied. 164 Though
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Julian’s language is idiosyncratic, 165 the distinction she employs assumes neo-platonicAugustinian exemplarism and Augustine’s idea of a double creation. 166 According to the
first, Christ’s humanity is the exemplar of all human nature and exists in an ideal form
prior to creation and prior to Christ’s actual incarnation. 167 According to the second,
creation is complexly double: God first creates human beings virtually – by means of the
rationes seminales -- and subsequently as actual beings in their temporal, embodied
form. 168 For Julian, “substance” refers to the nontemporal, virtual mode of existence,
“sensuality” to the embodied, temporal mode. In Julian’s words, “We be doubell of gods
making, that is to sey substannciall and sensual.” 169 As applied to Christ, this means that
Christ’s humanity exists ideally in the mind of God prior to both creation and incarnation;
using Julian’s language, we can say that Christ’s humanity exists in God substantially
(i.e., ideally) for all eternity. With the incarnation, Christ’s substantial humanity now
enters temporality and materiality; in other words, it becomes embodied or sensual, and it
is this sensuality that enables suffering and death. Moving from a purely substantial
mode of being into the sensual initiates the great movement out and away from God and
165
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makes possible the eventual return. Julian calls Christ’s sensual incarnation a “falling”,
not in a moral sense but, rather, as a necessary stage of created being, since created
beings begin in God, but become differentiated and distinct in order to return to God with
a greater fullness. 170 Thus, Christ’s humanity always exists in God substantially; it
undergoes differentiation and separation through embodiment (sensuality), suffering, and
death, and eventually returns to God as a unity of both the substantial and the sensual. 171
Since Christ’s humanity is the exemplar for each individual human being,
every human person also exists substantially “in” God, and sensually as
embodied and temporal. 172 Thus, there is a dimension of all humanity and
of each human being – substantiality – that always exists in God and
remains in God. There is also the sensual dimension that is differentiated
from God in its becoming and is thus in some sense lacking; it must
undergo a process of returning to God, which is at once a process of
unifying (the substantial and the sensual) and a fulfillment. In Julian’s
words: “And thus in oure substance we be full and in oure sensualyte we
feyle, whych feylyng god wylle restore and fullfyll by werkyng of mercy
and grace, plentuously flowing in to vs of his owne kynde goodnesse [And
so in our substance we are full and in our sensuality we are lacking, and
this lack God will restore and fill by the operation of mercy and grace,
plentifully flowing into us from his own natural goodness].” 173
An individual person’s existence is thus a dynamic movement or journey that begins in
God substantially, undergoes differentiation from God by virtue of embodiment, and is
destined to return to God as a unity of substantiality and sensuality. 174 This journey out
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of God and back is not principally the work of the individual person but is instead God’s
work through both nature (creation) and grace (redemption and sanctification). God,
specifically in the person of Christ, undergoes this movement as the exemplar, and
thereby accomplishes the human journey with and for humanity: “And thus in Crist oure
two kyndys be onyd [in Christ our two natures are united].” 175 As Newman summarizes
it:
Our “substance” is not merely a dormant capacity for union with God,
waiting to be actualized in contemplative prayer or after death. Rather, it is
an actual union, already given by the fact of creation. This “substance”
can be defined most broadly as the eternal being of humankind and each
member of it – before creation as an idea in the mind of God, in the course
of history as a real (though not consciously realized) unity with God, and
hereafter as the fulfillment of the blessed in the city of God. The
“sensuality” on the other hand, stands most broadly for humanity’s
empirical being in time – embodied, limited in perception, fallen, yet still
united with the human nature of Christ through the Incarnation… . 176
Related to the duality of human nature is Julian’s notion of the “godly will.”
Julian first introduces this idea in chapter 37, in the context of her discussion of sin, and
returns to it in chapter 53, where she develops her theological anthropology. The godly
will is a faculty of the predestined that deeply unites them to God. While other
dimensions of human willing cannot avoid sinning, the godly will never consents to sin:
For in every soule that shalle be savyd is a godly wylle that nevyr
assentyth to synne, nor nevyr shalle. Ryght as there is a bestely wylle in
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the lower party that may wylle no good, ryght so there is a godly wyll in
the higher party, whych wylle is so good that it may nevyr wylle evylle,
but evyr good.
[For in every soul that will be saved there is a godly will which never
assents to sin and never will. Just as there is an animal will in the lower
part which cannot will any good, so there is a godly will in the higher part,
which will is so good that it cannot ever will evil, but always good.] 177
Baker suggests that Julian’s distinction between the “godly” and the “bestely” will
parallels Bernard of Clairvaux’s distinction between different states of freedom (which is
in turn drawn from Augustine): the freedom of nature, the freedom of grace, and the
freedom of glory. According to Bernard, the freedom of grace or counsel (liberum
consilium) was the state of freedom lost by Adam and restored by Christ. This graced
power is itself differentiated into a higher freedom – the inability to sin – and a lower
freedom – the ability not to sin. 178 While Julian may well have been familiar with this
distinction among kinds of freedom, she develops the distinction with her characteristic
creativity. For Julian, the godly will of the elect is rooted in substantial nature and thus
remains “in” God. As a dimension of human freedom that is essentially united to the will
of Christ, it never cooperates in sin. Along with its essential goodness, the godly will
deeply unites the person to God:
we haue all this blessyd wyll hole and safe in oure lorde Jhesu Crist, for
that ech kynde that hevyn shall be fullfyllyd with behovyd nedys of
goddys rygh(t)fullness so to be knytt and onyd in hym that there in were
kepte a substannce whych myght nevyr nor shulde be partyd from hym,
and that thorow his awne good wyll in his endlesse forse(ing) purpose.
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[we have all this blessed will whole and safe in our Lord Jesus Christ,
because every nature with which heaven will be filled had of necessity and
of God’s rightfulness to be so joined and united in him that in it a
substance was kept which could never and should never be parted from
him, and that through his own good will in his endless prescient
purpose.] 179

This will is a cooperative power, by virtue of the union between the substantial human
being and God, that is not reducible simply to a human power or a divine one; it seems to
represent a kind of synergy of the human and the divine that functions on a level deeper
than consciousness. This godly will is only activated in those predestined to be saved.
The third and final theme of Julian’s anthropology is the concept of mutual
indwelling. We have already seen that, for Julian, there is a dimension of human being
that always remains in God (substantial nature). With this concept, Julian comes closest
to stating an “autotheism,” i.e., the claim that some dimension of the human person is
identical with or indistinguishable from God, like that found in Mechthild of Magdeburg,
Meister Eckhart, and Angela of Foligno: 180 And I sawe no difference between god and
oure substance, but as it were, all god; and yet my vunderstandyng toke that oure
substance is in god, that is to sey that god is god and oure substance is a creature in god
[And I saw no difference between God and our substance, but, as it were, all God; and
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still my understanding accepted that our substance is in God, that is to say that God is
God, and our substance is a creature in God].” 181
In her vision, Julian sees no difference between God and “our substance.” Yet,
with her characteristic caution, she immediately qualifies the claim, interjecting the
proper metaphysical distinctions: God is God, the human being a creature, and the human
soul is, as Julian states earlier, “made of nought.” 182 The preposition “in” allows Julian
to both differentiate between God and the human being and, at the same time, convey the
way in which the soul has its “ground” in God. 183 In other words, as created, the human
being is not God, and yet the substance of the human has its source in God and is always
united to God: “I saw that oure kynde is in god hole [I saw that our nature is wholly in
God].” 184 Unlike Mechthild, Eckhart, and Angela, Julian never speaks of an experiential
fusion with God: Julian’s God never says, as Angela’s does, “You are I and I am you.” 185
Characteristic of her mysticism as a whole, Julian’s style is more intellectual than
experiential, her point primarily metaphysical, for she wants to state as clearly as she can
the way in which human being is distinct from divinity and yet not separable, dissimilar
yet utterly dependent on God as source, and in some sense a discrete being yet always
181
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profoundly united with God. Elsewhere, Julian states, “And thus is mannys soule made
of god, and in the same poynte knyte to God [And so is man’s soul made of God, and in
the same moment joined to God].” 186
The unity and distinction of the divine and the human can also be expressed in
terms of the exitus–reditus: “the myd person [i.e., the second person of the trinity] wolde
be grounde and hed of this feyer kynde out of whom we be all come, in whom we be alle
enclosyd, in to whom we shall all goo [The mediator wanted to be the foundation and the
head of this fair nature, out of whom we have all come, in whom we are all enclosed, into
whom we shall all go].” Thus, God (specifically the Second Person) is ground, head, and
womb of human nature; creation is a “birthing” out of God and, at the same time, a
continual enclosure and place of return.
The language of indwelling also serves the purpose of communicating the
complexity of divine-human differentiation and unity:
Hyely owe we to enjoye [th]at god dwellyth in oure soule; and more hyely
we owe to enjoye that oure soule dwellyth in god. Oure soule is made to
be goddys dwelling place, and the dwelling of oure soule is god, whych is
vnmade. A hye vnderstandyng it is inwardly to se and to know that god,
whych is our maker, dwellyth in oure soule, and a higher vnderstandyng it
is and more, inwardly to se and to know oure soule that is made dwellyth
in god in substance, of whych substance by god we be that we be.
[Greatly ought we to rejoice that God dwells in our soul; and more greatly
ought we rejoice that our soul dwells in God. Our soul is created to be
God’s dwelling place, and the dwelling of our soul is in God, who is
uncreated. It is a great understanding to see and know inwardly that God,
who is our Creator, dwells in our soul, and it is a far greater understanding
to see and know inwardly that our soul, which is created, dwells in God in
substance, of which substance, through God, we are what we are.] 187
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Playing with the language of “made” and “unmade” (created and uncreated), Julian
marvels at the mystery of divine-human unity: The unmade God and the made soul can
and do mutually indwell, because the human soul is substantially “made of” God.
The mutual indwelling of God and the soul does not occur only on the level of the
substantial soul, however; God also desires to dwell in the sensual soul and to bring
sensuality (i.e., embodiment) into the life of the Trinity. This indwelling of sensuality
happens principally through the incarnation (when the Second Person takes on human
sensuality or embodiment) and subsequently through all the workings of grace, but it is
also ordained from the moment of creation: “For I saw full surely that oure substance is
in god, and also I saw that in oure sensualyte god is, for in the same point that oure soule
is made sensuall, in the same point is the cytte of god, ordeyned to hym fro without
begynnyng [For I saw very surely that our substance is in God, and I also say that God is
in our sensuality, for in the same instant and place in which our soul is made sensual, in
that same instant and place exists the city of God, ordained for him from without
beginning].” 188
God’s intention for all eternity is to create humanity, both substantially and
sensually, out of himself and subsequently to unite humanity (substantially and sensually)
to himself through mutual indwelling. This process involves not only creation, but also
incarnation, redemption, and sanctification.
In summary, humanity has its origins in God for all eternity; it undergoes a
process of differentiation through embodiment and is meant to return to God as
embodied. That God desires to dwell in humanity (both in substantiality and in
188
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sensuality) is the principal motive for the incarnation and redemption. In fact, for Julian,
mutual indwelling is the realization of love, what love aims to accomplish. God’s
“loving humanity” is God’s desire to penetrate all that is, to indwell all that is. The work
that God does in and for humanity is to unite what is differentiated (the substantial and
the sensual, the individual and God) and to power the exitus-reditus process of going out
from God and returning. 189
Julian uses both technical philosophical-theological language (“substance and
sensuality”, “nature”, and “grace”) and metaphor (“indwelling”, “enclosure”, “birthing”)
to give expression to what even the most rationalistic of scholastics would grant is a
mystery – the distinction and relation between God and humanity. Julian’s development
of the maternal metaphor serves in part to express the dynamic and complex ways in
which the human being comes from God, differentiates and then returns to God, all the
while being united with God through both nature and grace. 190 We now turn to her
development of the maternal theme in detail.

4.5 Maternal Performances of Power
Julian’s mastery of Trinitarian logic runs throughout the Showings but reveals
itself especially in her development of the concept of divine maternity. She moves
effortlessly between speaking of the divine unity (God as a single “it” or “I”) and God’s
189

“And alle kyndes that he hath made to flowe out of hym to werke his wylle, it shulde be restoryd and
brought agayne in to hym by salluacion of man throw the werkyng of grace [And all natures which he has
made to flow out of him to work his will, they will be restored and brought back into him by the salvation
of man through the operation of grace].” BS 611–12/JNS 302–03.

190

Julian deftly works with the scholastic distinction between nature and grace throughout the Showings.
For an overview of the complexity of medieval uses of the nature/grace distinction, see Henri De Lubac,
The Mystery of the Supernatural.

210

differentiation as three persons (subjects). In doing so, she clearly attributes the
performance of maternal power to both the divine as such (in its unity), while specifically
locating its extension to humanity in the Second Person:
As verely as god is oure fader, as verily is god oure moder; and that
shewde he in all, and namely in theyse swete wordys there hy seyth: I it
am, that is to sey; I it am, the myght and the goodness of faderhode, I it
am, the wysdom and the kyndnes of moderhode, I it am, the lyght and the
grace that is all blessyd loue; I it am, the trynyte, I it am, [th]e vnyte; I it
am, the hye sourereyn goodnesse of all manner of thing. . . .
[As truly as God is our Father, so truly is God our Mother, and he revealed
that in everything, and especially in these sweet words where he says: I am
he; that is to say: I am he, the power and the goodness of fatherhood; I am
he, the wisdom and the lovingness of motherhood; I am he, the light and
the grace which is all blessed love; I am he, the Trinity; I am he the unity;
I am he, the great supreme goodness of every kind of thing. . . .] 191
God in God’s unity is the power of fatherhood, the wisdom of motherhood, the light and
grace of love. 192 At the same time, these performances or properties also differentiate
among the three persons, and in this differentiation, maternity is identified with the
Second Person; God’s Wisdom or God’s Son is the one who distinctly relates to
humanity as mother: The “high myght of the trynyte is oure fader, and the depe wysdom
of the trynyte is oure moder; and the grete loue of the trynyte is oure lorde [The high
might of the Trinity is our Father, and the deep wisdom of the Trinity is our Mother, and
the great love of the Trinity is our Lord].” 193
Just as Trinitarian logic requires one to speak simultaneously of unity and
differentiation in God, so too the work of the economic Trinity is united as one yet
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differentiated into stages; God’s work operates in a seamless continuity that nonetheless
can be differentiated, at least from a human perspective, into the initial work of creation,
the restorative work of redemption, and the ongoing perfection of humanity that is
realized fully with the return to God after death. 194 Julian employs various sets of three
to express this differentiated work: making/restoring/rewarding,
being/increasing/fulfilling, nature/mercy/grace. 195 In Julian’s words,
For alle oure lyfe is in thre: in the furst (we haue) oure beying, and in the
seconde we haueoure encresyng, and in the thyrde we haue oure
fullfyllyng. The furst is kynde, the seconde is mercy, the thurde is grace.
[All our life consists of these three: In the first we have our being, in the
second we have our increasing, and in the third we have our fulfillment.
The first is nature, the second is mercy, the third is grace.] 196
Thus in oure fader god almyghty we haue oure beyng, and in oure moder
of mercy we haue oure reforming and oure restoring. . .and by yeldyng
and gevyng in grace of the holy gost we be fulfyllyde.
[Thus in our Father, God almighty, we have our being, and in our Mother
of mercy we have our reforming and our restoring. . .and through the
rewards and the gifts of grace of the Holy Spirit we are fulfilled.] 197
While all three persons of the Trinity are united in this work, it is
especially the Second Person who mothers humanity and solely the
Second Person who takes on human sensuality: “I saw that the seconde
person, whych is our moder, substanncyally the same derewurthy person,
is now become oure moder sensuall, for we be doubell of gods making,
that is to sey substannciall and sensual [I saw that the second person, who
is our Mother substantially, the same beloved person, has now become our
194
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mother sensually, because we are double by God’s creating, that is to say,
substantial and sensual].” 198

Here, we see the link with Julian’s anthropology discussed in the last section. While our
substance is “in” all three persons united as one, our sensuality resides uniquely “in” the
Second Person. Consequently, Julian speaks of the motherhood of nature (related to
human substantiality) flowing into the motherhood of mercy and grace (sensuality).199
The first is performed by the Second Person simply in his divine mode; the second
performance of maternity (the administration of mercy and grace) he performs as
incarnate (i.e., embodied).
The motherhood of grace begins with the incarnation, when Christ unites his
human substantiality with human sensuality. The incarnation itself is imaged in maternal
terms; the Second Person begins his motherhood of grace by becoming enclosed in the
womb of a human mother:
Oure kynde moder, oure gracious modyr, for he wolde all hole become
oure moder in alle thyng, he toke [th]e grounde of his werke full lowe and
full myldely in the maydens wombe. And that shewde he in the furst,
wher he broughte [th]at meke maydyn before the eye of my
vnderstondyng, in [th]e sympyll stature as she was whan se conceived;
that is to sey oure hye god, the souereyn wysdom of all, in this lowe place
he arrayed hym and dyght hym all redy in oure poure flessch, hym selfe to
do the service and the officie of moderhode in all thing.
[Our mother in nature, our mother in grace, because he wanted to be our
mother in all things, made the foundation of his work most humbly and
most mildly in the maiden’s womb. And he revealed that in the first
revelation when he brought that meek maiden before the eye of my
understanding in the simple stature which she had when she conceived;
that is to say our great god, the supreme wisdom of all things, arrayed and
198
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prepared himself in this humble place, all ready in our poor flesh, himself
to do the service and the office of motherhood in everything.] 200

In this passage, Julian returns to the theme of Christic kenosis. Whereas, in the example
of a lord and a servant, the Philippians model is followed closely, here, Julian offers a
startlingly different image; she replaces the image of God becoming a slave and dying on
a cross with the image of God humbling himself by becoming a fetus in the womb of a
young mother. Essential elements of Christic kenosis are present here: a movement from
divine power and stature to humility and powerlessness (as a human fetus), and a
submission to one who is more powerful (a mother). Yet the differences in the images are
more significant than the similarities. The maternal image presents Christic kenosis
paradigmatically as conception rather than as death, as the beginning of life rather than its
end, and as submission to the processes of growth within the womb of a human mother,
rather than as submission to the coercive agents of capital punishment. Thus, rather than
imaging Christic kenosis as a dead man on a cross, the violated victim of violence, Julian
presents an image of vulnerable new life in the womb of a mother who is barely more
than a child herself. Both are images of profound vulnerability, yet the vulnerability of a
growing fetus is one of promise, oriented toward growth and life, as well as a
vulnerability that elicits an active, caring response. On the other hand, the vulnerability of
the abuse victim is that of helpless violation, eliciting responses of terror or outrage. The
kenotic performance in the maternal model is described in terms of humility, mildness,
simplicity, meekness, and poverty, but these attributes characterize Christ’s human
mother as much as, or even more than, they characterize Christ himself. Although Christ
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remains “oure hye god, the souereyn wysdom of all,” he is made weak and vulnerable by
entering the womb of a simple maiden. Rather than submitting to one who is more
powerful than himself as in the Philippians model, here, Christ submits to the vulnerable
and relatively powerless (m)other. Thus, Christ’s vulnerability in part consists in his
dependence on someone who is not powerful, someone who herself is profoundly
vulnerable. Of course, relatively speaking, a mother is more powerful than her fetus, but
in Julian’s image, the mother is a simple maiden vulnerable to the power of others. Her
own vulnerability heightens his; she is nearly a child herself -- a child with child. In this,
we encounter an essential dimension of maternal kenosis: While Christ remains “oure hye
god,” this maternal submission is to one who is less powerful rather than submission to a
more powerful human other, making oneself vulnerable to the vulnerability of the other.
The incarnation initiates Christ’s “moderhed of grace [motherhood of grace]” and
“moderhed in werkyng [motherhood at work],” and Julian quickly moves from the image
of Christ as a vulnerable infant to Christ as an active, creative, productive mother who
births, feeds, guides and educates her children. 201 With the exception of his death on the
cross (imaged as a birthing that results in the death of Mother Jesus), Christ’s
motherhood is not characterized by vulnerability, violence, or powerlessness; on the
contrary, it is intentionally contrasted to the vulnerability and powerlessness of human
mothers, who cannot protect their children from harm and death:
We wytt that alle oure moders bere vs to payne and to dyeng. A?, what is
that? But oure very moder Jhesu, he alone beryth vs to joye and to
endlesse levyng, blessyd mot he be.

201

BS 593/JNS 297.

215

[We know that all our mothers bear us for pain and death. O what is that?
But our true mother Jesus, he alone bears us for joy and endless life.] 202
And though oure erthly moder may suffer hyr chylde to peryssch, oure
hevynly moder Jhesu may nevyr suffer vs [th]at be his children to
peryssch, for his is almyghty, all wysdom and all loue, and so is none but
he, blessyd motte he be.
[And though our earthly mother may suffer her child to perish, our
heavenly mother Jesus may never suffer us who are his children to perish,
for he is almighty, all wisdom, and all love, and so is none but he, blessed
may he be.] 203
A certain ambivalence characterizes Julian’s references to the powerlessness of human
mothering insofar as mothers bear their children to “payne and to dyeng,” and are
powerless to prevent their children from perishing. Behind this language surely is
Julian’s experience of mothers suffering the deaths of their children. 204 Julian’s own
mother was present at what was thought to be Julian’s deathbed, powerless to save her
(adult) child. 205 Infant mortality in late medieval England, already high, was
dramatically increased by the repeated occurrences of the plague. 206 A mother suffering
“hyr chylde to peryssch” provides a poignant image of the powerlessness and
202
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vulnerability of all love, but particularly mother (or parental) love in the face of a child’s
suffering and death.
In contrast to this, Julian presents Mother Jesus’s love as “almyghty” and never
failing. Jesus’s maternal love prevails over all pain and suffering, even the terrible
suffering of death itself, for he will not suffer “his children to peryssch.”

Thus, Julian

images perfect love, i.e., divine love, as a maternal love that cannot fail. As divine, it is
invulnerable to the failings inherent in human mothering, to the vulnerability of not being
able to protect a child from harm, particularly the ultimate harm of dying. Julian, of
course, knows that Mother Jesus does not protect against actual, physical death. She
must therefore transform dying, as she does birthing, into an essentially spiritual reality,
thereby relativizing the significance of physical death. The key point for Julian is that the
more significant spiritual birthing accomplished by Mother Jesus does not lead to
spiritual death, for to be born of Christ is to birthed to “endlesse levyng.”
In contrast to many other medieval women mystics, Julian does not image the
perfection of love (i.e., divine love) as erotic or spousal – a passionate, inexhaustible, allconsuming love that fulfills all desire yet is never sated. 207 For Julian, perfect love is
maternal: preserving, nurturing, educating, and above all, protecting from ultimate harm.
As a performance of power, divine mother-love certainly can suffer (as we shall see
below) yet cannot fail, especially in the face of death. For Julian, maternal love is the
love “stronger than death,” and a child granted this love is always “safe.”

207

On the ideal of erotic, romantic, or spousal love in the writings of women mystics, see McGinn, The
Flowering of Mysticism, 168–70, particularly on the beguines (Hadewijch, Mechthild and Marguerite),
chap. 5, and on the women of Helfta, 267–82. On Gertrude the Great, see Alexandra Barratt, “ ‘The
Woman Who Shares the King’s Bed’: The Innocent Eroticism of Gertrud the Great of Helfta.” See also
Barbara Newman, “La Mystique Courtoise: Thirteenth-Century Beguines and the Art of Love.”

217

Julian describes divine mother-work dynamically in terms of a child’s growth and
maturation: gestating/birthing, breast-feeding, protecting, and teaching. Mother-work, as
an expression of mother love, is adaptive but constant: “and evyr as [the child] waxith in
age and in stature, she changyth her werkes, but nott her loue [And always as the child
grows in age and stature, she acts differently, but she does not change her love].” 208
Mother-work is sometimes assertive, at other times constrained. Since maternal
performances of power are at the service of the child’s welfare, they unavoidably entail
suffering for the child (particularly in birthing), yet even the suffering is never simply a
kenotic loss of power on the part of the mother. Let us look at the various stages in turn.
The first stage of Jesus’s mother-work is bearing and birthing, a work that
culminates in Jesus’s death on the cross. Julian contrasts Jesus’s dying-to-birth with that
of human mothers:
We wytt that alle oure moders bere vs to payne and to dyeng. A what is
that? But oure very moder Jhesu, he alone beryth vs to joye and to
endlesse levyng, blessyd mot he be. Thus he usteyneth vs with in hym in
loue and traveyle, in to the full tyme [th]at he wolde suffer the sharpyst
thornes and grievous paynes that evyr were or evyr shlle be, and dyed at
the last. And whan he had done, and so borne vs to blysse, yet myght nott
all thys make a seeth to his marvelous loue. And that shewd he in theyse
hye ovyrpassyng wordes in loue: If I myght suffer more, I wold suffer
more. He myght no more dye, but he wolrde nott stynte of werkyng.
[We know that all our mothers bear us for pain and death. O what is that?
But our true mother Jesus, he alone bears us for joy and endless life,
blessed may he be. So he carries us within him in love and travail, until
the full time when he wanted to suffer the sharpest thorns and cruel pains
that ever were or will be, and at the last he died. And when he had
finished, and had borne us so for bliss, still all this could not satisfy his
wonderful love: if I could suffer more, I would suffer more. He could not
die anymore, but he did not want to cease working; therefore he must
needs nourish us, for the precious love of motherhood has made him our
debter.]
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Human mothers bear their children “in traveyle,” a process involving “payne” and often
ending in death for the mother, the infant, or both. Even in successful births, Julian
implies, mothers often merely bear their children into lives of pain and suffering that
inexorably lead to death. In a similar way, Mother Jesus bears in travail and suffering,
and also dies in giving birth. Yet, unlike his human counterparts, Mother Jesus births to
“joye and to endlesse levyng,” and his death does not mark the end of his “werkyng”.
Once again, Julian spiritualizes birthing and dying in such a way that physical death (both
Jesus’s and ours) is not only not final; it is itself a kind of birthing into a fuller, more
complete living – into eternal life.
As with the incarnation, so too with Christ’s dying on the cross, Julian re-images
Christic kenosis as maternal kenosis. Recall that, in the Philippians model, Christ gives up
his divine power and submits himself to a violent death, after which he is exalted and
returned to power. While the maternal model parallels this movement, it presents a
strikingly different set of meanings. The maternal kenotic movement begins with Christ’s
own birth from a humble, powerless child-mother; it reaches its nadir with his own
maternal dying in childbirth; and it concludes with him moving through death to a
continuous “werkyng” for the good of his children. On the maternal model of kenosis,
Christ’s ultimate vulnerability is imaged as a painful, difficult birthing that costs him his
life but is only one stage in the continuous process of mothering. As with the image of
Christ being borne by a young mother, the image of Christ’s death presented here
contrasts significantly with the Philippians image in that it is cast as part of the active
work of bringing-to-life. In the Philippians model, Christ submits passively to the greater
violence and power of others, while in the maternal model, he submits to the process of
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birthing (with all its labor and pain), even to the point of death, yet this death is simply
passage to a fuller, greater life. The overall emotive meaning in Julian’s image is one of
joy and happiness; the suffering is temporary, passed through for the sake of something
profoundly good – the birth of a child into joy and bliss. Moreover, the dying to give
birth is not an end in itself, nor does it represent the obliteration of the mother; it is part of
an active process that leads to reciprocal satisfaction and joy. The overriding image is of
a woman actively birthing a child – an image, in other words, of suffering as active
working rather than passive subjection. Mother Jesus dies actively and with a purpose;
the dying is not an endpoint but one stage in an ongoing creative process.
The second stage of Jesus’s mother-work is presented in two images of
breastfeeding:
The moder may geue her chylde sucke hyr mylke, but oure precious
moder Jhesu, he may fede vs with hym selfe, and doth full tendyrly with
the blessyd sacrament, that is precious fode of very lyfe; and with all the
swete sacraments he systenynyth vs full mercifully and graciously. . . .
[The mother can give her child suck of her milk, but our precious mother
Jesus can feed us with himself, and does, most courteously and most
tenderly, with the blessed sacrament, which is the precious food of true
life; and with all the sweet sacraments he sustains us most mercifully and
graciously.]
The moder may ley hyr chylde tenderly to hyr brest, but oure tender
mother Jhesu, he may homely lede vs in to his blessyd brest by his swet
opyn side, and shewe vs there in perty of the godhed and [th]e joyes of
hevyn, with gostely suernesse of endlesse blysse.
[The mother can lay her child tenderly to her breast, but our tender mother
Jesus can lead us easily into his blessed breast through his sweet open
side, and show us there a part of the godhead and of the joys of heaven,
with inner certainty of endless bliss.] 209
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In both quotes, Julian is drawing on familiar medieval iconography. The Eucharist was
often depicted as breast-feeding, and Christ’s wound on the cross that exuded water and
blood was associated with a breast exuding nourishing milk. 210 At the same time, the
contrasts with human mothering are once again stressed in order to underline the
perfection of Jesus’s mothering, for a human mother “merely” nourishes with her milk,
while Mother Jesus feeds with his very self; a human mother embraces her child at her
breast, while Mother Jesus can lead a child “into” the breast, or heart, of divine life.
Much of the image has to do with the sacraments and with the way in which an opening
in Christ’s body (his wound) is a passageway to greater union with God (or more
precisely, to a “vision” or knowledge of God). 211 In particular, the sacrament of the
Eucharist is envisioned as a (breast)feeding by which the child is nourished and
sustained. This work of sustaining the child presupposes a powerful mother who can
provide for the child’s most basic needs, and the embrace of the breastfeeding mother is
symbol of a profound union.
The next stage of mother-work is imaged as a nursemaid guarding and protecting
a toddler who is on the move:
The swet gracious handes of oure moder be redy and diligent a bout vs; for
he in alle this werkyng vsth the very office of a kynde norysee, that hath
not elles to done but to entende about the saluation of hyr chylde.
210
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[The sweet gracious hands of our mother are ready and diligent about us,
for he in all this working uses the very office of a kind nurse, that has
nothing else to do but attend to the safety of her child.] 212
The language here suggests an image of a toddler on the move, learning to walk and run,
a caretaker walking or running alongside the child with hands outstretched, ready to catch
the child and keep her upright and out of danger. This is the attentive, hands-on, adaptive
work that Ruddick calls “preservation and nurturance.” Recall that, for Ruddick,
“preservation” refers to the attentive attitudes and activities aimed at protecting the child
and minimizing risks, while “nurturance” defines the complex of activities that aim at
fostering and sponsoring “the physical, emotional, and intellectual growth” of children. 213
In Julian’s image, the one caring for the child, whether mother or nurse, “woot and
knowyth the neyde of hyr chylde, she kepyth it full tenderly [knows and sees the needs of
her child (and) guards it very tenderly].” 214 This hands-on work of a mother or “kynde
norysee” with a very young child symbolizes for Julian the intense and close-up care with
which God nurtures human growth. 215 The maternal performance of power is active and
attentive, now in relation to the energetic but precarious movements of a toddler. In
Purvis’s words, this is a performance of power that is “present, connected, involved,
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[and] intensely caring.” 216 It is thoroughly other-focused (the kind nurse “hath not elles
to done but to entende about the saluation of hyr chylde”), but it is not essentially kenotic.
On the contrary, it presupposes an assertion of power on the part of the mother/nurse in
relation to the child, a power that is always “redy and diligent” to ensure the safety of the
child.
The next stage of mother-work consists in teaching an older child the activities
that Ruddick identifies as “training”. We have moved from the womb to birth to feeding
at the breast to a toddler learning to walk to, now, a growing child. Here, the key
mothering activities are those of teaching, instructing, and mentoring:
He kyndelyth oure vnderstondyng, he prepareth oure wyes, he esyth oure
consciens, he conforyth oure soule, he lyghteth oure harte and gevyth vs in
party knowing and louyng in his blessydfull godhede, with gracious
mynde in his swete manhode and his blessed passion, with curtesse
mervelyng in his hye ovyr passing goodnesse, and makyth us to loue all
the he louyth for his loue, and to be well apayde with hym and with alle
his werkes.
[he kindles our understanding, he prepares our ways, he eases our
conscience, he comforts our souls, he illumines our hearts and gives us
partial knowledge and love of his blessed divinity, with gracious memory
of his sweet humanity and his blessed passion, with courteous wonder
over his great surpassing goodness and makes to love everything which he
loves for love of him, and to be well satisfied with him and with all his
works.] 217

There are a numerous activities catalogued here, including comforting and “maky[ng] us
to loue,” but I want to focus on those related to teaching: kindling understanding, easing
conscience, preparing the way, illuminating the heart, and imparting knowledge -- all the
activities that Ruddick gathers under the term “training”. The teaching includes
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providing knowledge, but it is also the fostering of a committed relationship of moral and
spiritual formation that aims at preparing the child for adulthood. Once again, the
performances of power are deeply personal, engaged, attentive, and caring. In keeping
with the model of child development Julian assumes, we are now dealing with an older
child who is not only being cared for by the mother but is also expected to begin to take
some responsibility for her own actions. At this stage of development, the mother gives
the child space to fall and to fail, yet is ever-vigilant to ensure that no serious harm can
come to the child:
The moder may suffer [th]e chylde to fall some tyme and be dyssesed on
dyuerse manner, for the one profyte, but she may nevyr suffer that ony
manner of perell come to her chylde for loue.
[The mother may sometimes suffer the child to fall and to be distressed in
various ways, for its own benefit, but she can never suffer any kind of
peril to come to her child, because of her love.] 218

In this image, the mother pulls back from the hands-on work that characterized her
activities with her toddler, and, in allowing the child to grow into her own, she must also
allow her to fall and to fail. Here, the performance of maternal power entails a certain
restriction of the mother’s power; she makes space for the child to act, even when that
acting entails failure and suffering. 219 The purpose of this modulated restriction is
always educative, as it is only through failing that the child learns true self-knowledge,
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gains a sense of virtue, and above all, becomes aware of the unfailing love of mother
Jesus. 220
And yet aftyr thus he sufferyth some of vs to falle more hard and more
grievously then evyr we dyd before, as vs thyngkyth. And than ween we
that be nott alle syse that all were nou[gh]te that we haue begonne. But it
is nott so, for it nedyth vs to falle, and it nedyth vs to see it; for yf we felle
nott, we shulde nott knowe how febyll and how wrchyd we be of oure self,
nor also we shulde not so fulsomly know [th]e marvelous loue of oure
maker.
[And yet after this he allows some of us to fall more heavily and more
grievously than ever we did before, as it seems to us. And then we who are
not all wise think that everything which we have undertaken was all
nothing. But it is not so, for we all need to fall, and we need to see it; for if
we did not fall, we should not know how feeble and how wretched we are
in ourselves, nor too, should we know so completely the wonderful love of
our Creator.] 221
This returns us to the theme of chapter 2, Julian’s overriding concern with
the meaning of human sin and the way in which God responds to sin. It is the
mother-child relationship that ultimately explains this mystery on both the
theological and existential levels. Imaged as a child falling or making herself
dirty, 222 the act of sin is unavoidable and educative; without it, there would be no
growth. 223 In terms of Mother Jesus’s performance of power, he allows his
children to fall yet remains near and ever ready to protect them from real harm
and to receive them back into his arms. His protective power, though constrained
in such experiences, is always present: “he shewde his blyssyd myght. . . [and]
that he kepyth vs in this tyme [he revealed his blessed power. . . and that protects
220
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us at all such times].” 224 This is the theological key for Julian: God’s love is everpresent and unfailing. Its protective power is kenotic only insofar as it is
restrained. Were it to be kenotic in a Christic sense (a real giving up or handing
over of power), God’s love could not accomplish the central task that Julian
requires of it in its maternal dimension: that of keeping his children safe.
In summary, throughout Julian’s extensive use of the maternal symbol, maternal
power is performed dynamically in relation to the child, changing and adapting as the
child grows and matures. Maternal performances of power are active rather than passive;
they are protective, nurturing, and educative. Though maternal performances of power
include kenotic dimensions (e.g., suffering to give birth, attentive focus on the child’s
well-being, restraining power so that the child can act), the kenotic performances are
always de-centered and performed dynamically as part of a continuous, creative,
productive process. As kenotic, these performances differ from the Philippians model of
Christic kenosis in significant ways: The restriction of power is aimed at the growth and
maturation of a less powerful other; though restricted, maternal power can re-assert itself
whenever the child is in real harm; and the submission undergone in these performances
is not to a more powerful other but, rather, to one who is less powerful. Maternal
performances of kenosis entail becoming vulnerable to the vulnerability of another, rather
than to the other’s greater power.
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4.6 A Child’s Response
The final theme to be examined here is the way in which Julian characterizes the
child’s response to the love of Mother Jesus. As a relational performance of power,
maternal love elicits a response from the child, and Julian is concerned that her reader
respond rightly, especially to Jesus’s constriction of his love, which, from the child’s
perspective, may appear to be abandonment or punishment. In the culmination of the
mother-child symbol, Julian presents not only the perfect mother (a mother whose love
never fails and who ensures her child’s safety) but also the “natural child,” or the child
who has been (adequately) loved. In Julian’s depiction, a loved child instinctively turns
to the mother in times of need and fear, and instinctively trusts. Julian assumes that this
stance will not be easy for her readers. Just as it is difficult to imagine God as a loving
mother, so too it is difficult to see oneself as a loved child. Nonetheless, the final hurdle
for understanding experiences of sin and suffering is an acceptance of childlike
vulnerability and powerlessness in relation to a mother’s love.
On the existential level, Julian often describes sin as blindness and weakness.
Within the framework of the mother-child symbol, the dominant indicators of sin are
feelings of profound fear, shame, filth, and powerlessness:
But oft tymes when oure fallyng and oure wrechydnes is shewde vs, we be
so sore adred and so gretly ashamyd our ourse selfe that vnnethis we witt
wher [th]at we may holde vs. But then wylle nott oure curtess moder that
we flee away, for hym were nothing lother; but he wyll than that we vse
the condicion of a chylde. For when it is disseyd and a feerd, it rynnyth
hastely to [th]e moder; and if it may do no more, it cryeth on the mother
for helpe with alle [th]e myghtes. So wyll he that we done as [th]e meke
chylde, seyeng thus: My kind moder, my gracious moder, my deerworthy
moder, haue mercy on me. I haue made my selfe foule and vnlyke to thee,
and I may not nor cann amende it but with thyne helpe and grace.
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[But often when our falling and wretchedness are shown to us, we are so
much afraid and so greatly ashamed of ourselves that we scarcely know
where we can put ourselves. But then our courteous mother does not wish
us to flee away, for nothing would be less pleasing to him; but he then
wants us to behave like a child. For when it is distressed and frightened, it
runs quickly to its mother; and if it can do no more, it calls to the mother
for help with all its might. So he wants us to act as a meek child, saying:
my kind mother, my gracious mother, my beloved mother, have mercy on
me. I have made myself filthy and unlike you, and I may not and cannot
make it right except with your help and grace.] 225
For Julian, it is precisely from within the experience of shame, fear, and filth that the
person ought to be childlike in relation to God, running to the loving mother as a loved
child instinctively does: “For when it is disseyd and a feerd, it rynnyth hastely to [th]e
moder.” Even when paralyzed within an experience of shame, the child “cryeth on the
mother for helpe with alle [her] myghtes.”
Julian grants that this childlike response (running to the mother, crying out) does
not always bring comfort and ease. Feelings of abandonment and rejection can still
predominate. Julian instructs that, in such cases, Mother Jesus is allowing emotional
suffering, not as punishment, but because it furthers growth:
And if we feele vs nott than esyd, as sone be we suer [th]at he vsyth the
condycion of a wyse moder. For yf he see that it be for profyte to vs to
morne and to wepe, he sufferyth with ruth and pytte in to [th]e best tyme
for loue. And he wylle then [th]at we vse the properte of a chylde, that
evyr more kindly trustyth to the loue of [th] moder in wele and in woo.
[And if we do not then feel ourselves eased, let us at once be sure that he
is behaving as a wise mother. For if he sees that it is profitable to us to
mourn and weep, with compassion and pity he suffers that until the right
time has come, out of his love. And then he wants us to show a child’s
characteristics, which always naturally trusts in its mother’s love in wellbeing and in woe.] 226
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In such experiences, Julian presents God as the wise mother who “sufferyth with ruth and
pytte.” Mother Jesus “sufferyth” in the sense that he allows suffering, yet he also
“sufferyth with,” in the sense of a co-suffering. The loved child’s response is a
spontaneous, “natural” trust in the mother’s love, in both “wele and in woo.”
As the correlate to the perfect maternal love of Jesus, the loved-child is one whose
“natural virtues” include “myldnesse and mekenesse,” and, above all, trust in the neverfailing love of the mother:
Feyer and swete is our hevenly moder in [th]e sight of oure soule, precious
and louely be [th]e gracious children in [th]e sight of oure hevenyly moder,
with myldnesse and mekenesse and alle [th]e feyer vertuse that long to
children in kynde. For kyndly the chylde dyspeyreth noot of the moders loue,
kindly the chylde presumyth nott of it selfe, kyndely the chylde louyth the
moder and eche one of them other.
[Fair and sweet is our heavenly mother in the sight of our soul, precious and
lovely are the children of grace in the sight of our heavenly mother, with
gentleness and meekness and all the lovely virtues which belong to children
by nature. For the child does not naturally despair of the mother’s love, the
child does not naturally rely upon itself, naturally the child loves the mother
and either of them the other.] 227
The image here is profoundly relational. The child’s acceptance of her vulnerability and
relative powerlessness can only happen as a response to the powerful love of the mother.
In other words, for Julian, there is no embrace of one’s powerlessness and vulnerability
except within a framework of safety and trust, a safety and trust that is experienced and
assured through the protective, nurturing, educative love of a powerful mother.
The child-mother relationship is the final key to understanding the great “all shall
be well” theme in Julian’s theology. A loved child can trust, even within experiences of
profound vulnerability and powerlessness, because a powerful mother’s love has
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accompanied the child from the beginning and will ultimately bring the child back to her
place of origin:
and I vnderstode none hygher stature in this lyfe than chydlehode in
febylnesse and faylyng of myght and of wytte in to [th]e tyme [th]at oure
gracious moder hath brought vs vpp to oure fadyrs blysse. And ther shall it
verily be made knowen to vs, his menyng in the swte woordes wher he
seyth: alle shalle be welle, and thou shalt see it thy selfe, that alle manner
thyng shall be welle. And than shalle [th]e blysse of our moderheed in
Crist be new to begynne in the joyes of oure fader god, whych new
begynnyng shall last, without end new begynnyng.
and I understood no higher stature in this life than childhood in feebleness
and failing of might and of wit until the time that our gracious mother has
brought us up into our father’s bliss. And there shall it verily be made
known to us, his meaning in the sweet words where he says: all shall be
well, and you shall see it yourself, that all manner of thing shall be well.
And then shall the bliss of our motherhood in Christ begin anew in the
joys of our father God, which new beginning shall last, newly beginning,
without end.] 228
Childhood, though feeble, is the stature to be achieved in this life, for to achieve it is to
embrace vulnerability and weakness, not for their own sakes, but in order to truly
experience the safety provided by the loving mother. Only when the great cycle of going
out from God and returning is completed will human beings understand the full meaning
of human existence, both its suffering and its joys. Julian offers childlike trust in the
power of a loving mother as a model of the spiritual life. Though one should not strive to
be more than a child (there is “none hygher stature in this lyfe”), Julian’s image of the
child is not static; the child grows from infancy, through the toddler stage, to the stage of
an older child learning a relative autonomy. What Julian does not want to lose in this
image is the relationship to the powerful mother who keeps the child in safety. In other
words, childlike trust ensures salvation not because an authoritarian God demands
obedience, but because a powerful divine mother ensures safety and care. A fuller “adult”
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understanding of the deep meaning of “all shall be well’ is also promised but will be
achieved only eschatologically, and bringing the person to this fuller understanding is
also the task of the mother. That is, after bearing, birthing, nourishing, teaching, and
guiding her children, the mother’s final task is to bring them back, whole and complete,
to the place of their beginning. Only at the end does the image of “oure fader god”
appear. The completion of the child’s growth is a return to a father who has not been
present throughout the process. It is divine maternity that accompanies the human person
through life; paternity plays a role only in the image of completion. However, even here,
the cycle of maternal birthing is the larger frame: “the blysse of our moderheed in Crist
be new to begynne in. . .whych new begynnyng shall last, without end new begynnyng.”
As an image of completion, the return to the father within the cyclical birthing of
the mother contrasts in a startling way with the image of exaltation offered in Christic
kenosis. There is no lordship, no cosmic submission, no reassertion of power over one’s
enemies. It also differs from the scene of domestic harmony that Julian presents as the
culmination of the example of the lord and the servant. Recall that, in that example’s final
image, the servant is restored to his status as son, and, united as husband with his fair
maiden (humanity), he is reunited with his father. Within the mother-child model, the
image of completion is more primal and cyclical. It is a return to the divine maternal
womb (accompanied by the joys of a father), an eternal “new begynning” in divine
motherhood (“oure moderheed in Christ”). Power in this image is not hierarchical but
cyclical; not a power-over but a creative, generative power that issues eternally in new
beginnings.
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In closing, I propose that Julian’s image of the mother-child relationship is not
essentially kenotic, neither in its beginnings nor in its completion, either on the part of the
mother or the child. There are certainly vulnerabilities and various submissions on both
sides, but the overall image is not one of self-emptying, obedience, and self-sacrifice
followed by exaltation. It is, rather, an image of the power of love to create, protect, and
nurture life. The maternal performances of protecting, nurturing, and teaching create the
conditions for the child’s response of trust; only as response to this love is the child’s
acceptance of vulnerability and trust “natural”. As performances of power in an
asymmetrical relationship, the creative, productive power of the mother’s love enables
the child’s trust, which in turn enables growth, maturation, and mutuality.
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Chapter Five
Vulnerability and Empowerment in Recovery from Abuse:
Does Kenosis Have a Place?
“No intervention that takes power away from the survivor
can possibly foster her recovery.”229
5.1 Introduction
The final section of chapter 1 raised questions about the ethics of kenosis from a
feminist standpoint. In this concluding chapter, I return to those questions within the
framework of recovery from abuse and trauma. This is not an arbitrary test case; from a
feminist standpoint, no model of power that fails to confront and respond to the reality of
violence can have moral legitimacy.
I begin by summarizing key elements of my analysis of kenosis, starting with the
definition I proposed in chapter 1 and the ethical cautions drawn from a feminist
standpoint. Turning next to the chapters on Julian, I summarize the ways in which Julian
reconfigures the symbol of kenosis in both its Christic and maternal forms. The remainder
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of the chapter examines the validity of kenosis in the situation of recovery from trauma
and abuse. In this section, I take Aristotle Papanikolaou’s article, “Person, Kenosis and
Abuse: Hans Urs von Balthasar and Feminist Theologies in Conversation,” as a starting
point. Using the work of Judith Herman, Papanikolaou proposes that the performance of
kenosis is essential to recovery. I argue instead that kenosis in its Christic form cannot
function as a model of power in the context of recovery. On the contrary, in this context,
Christic kenosis mimics the experience of abuse itself and thus can only re-enforce the
psychological process of victimization. There is a place, however, for maternal kenosis
on the part of persons committed to supporting abuse survivors in their work of recovery.

5.2 Defining Kenosis
My first goal was to formulate a definition of kenosis that was both rooted in the
ur-text of Philippians and capable of being used to describe a range of inter-human
relationships. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, I defined kenosis as a relational
performance of power within which one (or more) subject(s) intentionally reduces or
restricts his or her productive power in relation to another, thereby making the other more
powerful. In reducing his or her power, the kenotic subject submits to the greater power
of the other and becomes vulnerable to the possibility of violence and violation. Thus, the
key elements of a kenotic performance are intentional loss of productive power,
submission, and vulnerability. The reduction of power and its attending vulnerability is
not performed as an end in itself; to put it in broad terms, the kenotic performance is
meant to achieve a greater flourishing for one or both subjects (or more, in its communal
form). Ideally, it is temporary and passed through to enhanced or renewed productive
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performances of power (e.g., renewed relationship, creativity, effectiveness). The
assumption is that this greater flourishing is best achieved through this intentional
reduction of power and consequent vulnerability.
The Philippians myth presents the paradigm of Christic kenosis. In it, an
essentially equal, symmetrical relationship (between God the Father and God the Son)
becomes profoundly asymmetrical and unequal as one of the members (the Son) willingly
reduces his productive power and status vis-à-vis the other. The primary expression of the
kenotic subject’s submission is obedience to the now-more-powerful other (the Father),
an obedience that leads to a violent death at the hands of the ruling worldly political
powers. The relationship is finally restored to one of equality and symmetry (between
Father and Son), and the former kenotic subject now has even greater productive power
over those who violated him. In fact, a cosmic reversal takes place in which the violated
one now commands the complete submission of not only those who violated him, but that
of all others. 230
For Paul, this Christic kenosis becomes a model for relations within the Christian
community (communal kenosis) and between the Christian community and the hostile
political powers who put Christ to death (political kenosis). In both cases, Paul advocates
an ethical stance of vulnerability and submission to the other; however, the meaning of
the performances differs profoundly in each case. Within communal kenosis, the ideal is
a non-hierarchical community characterized by humility and service to others. The
phronesis of this community requires that each member enact kenosis in relation to each
other member, and that no one claim power over. At first glance, this seems to fall
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outside my definition of kenosis since, if everyone is performing kenotically, there is no
more-powerful-other to whom one submits. However, this is not the case. With each
member performing kenotically, each member, in effect, submits to each other member.
The assertion of dominating power on the part of one individual or faction within the
community is always possible (this is what Paul is precisely warning against in his letter);
but this is precisely the challenge and risk of communal kenosis. Each individual is to
practice kenosis with the full knowledge that some member(s) could abuse and
manipulate the situation by asserting dominating power and thereby undermining the
aimed-for equilibrium and unity. The risk inherent in kenosis is always present and
requires a fundamental trust that all members of the community are sincerely practicing
power kenotically.
Political kenosis is proposed by Paul as a response to the political vulnerability of
the Christians at Philippi. Paul instructs the Philippians’ community to accept this
vulnerability and place it within the framework of Christ’s own kenotic performance.
Political kenosis in this context is the acceptance of persecution, abuse, and possibly
execution. However, the fulfillment of this performance is exaltation; for instance, the
Christian community, in suffering in and for Christ, will share not only in his violating
death but also in his resurrection and exaltation. The Christians are to suffer now in order
to partake in the great cosmic reversal in which those who dominate in the present order
will be subjugated, and those who are now oppressed will reign with Christ.
Late modern retrievals of the symbol of kenosis propose it as a model for both
divine and human performances of power. In response to the horrific levels of violence
that marked the twentieth century, theologians have sought to image divine power as
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essentially kenotic. Balthasarian theologians define kenosis in terms of mutual self-gift
and receptivity to the other. Moving beyond the Christ event to the Trinitarian persons,
they identify personhood and even being itself with kenosis:
Balthasar’s Trinitarian theology claims that being itself is a gifted event,
even the being of the divine persons themselves. God’s being is an event
of communion of persons. This communion is freely constituted in
relations that are kenotic; i.e., mutually self-giving and receptive. Each of
the divine persons is an ecstatic movement toward the other, and openness
for the other. The persons are infinitely distant from each other, each
being infinitely unique and “not-Other” to the “Other.” The distance is not
separation, but is itself constituted by the infinite nearness of the persons
united in a love freely given. 231
By locating the paradigm of kenosis within the Trinity, the Balthasarian theologians
effectively remove the risk of violence from the kenotic performance; the vulnerability of
kenosis in the Trinity is enacted within relationships of profound mutual trust and without
the possibility of domination. In effect, they propose an ideal of communal kenosis that
is without risk, since each member engages in complete (infinite) self-gift and complete
(infinite) receptivity.
Within this Balthasarian frame, Christ is the link between the divine and the
human. By becoming human, he is both the model of “and the condition for the
possibility of human personhood.” 232 Christic kenosis is defined in terms of Christ’s
relationship to the Father, which is characterized essentially as obedience. This obedience
is a further expression of the self-gift/receptivity to the other that characterizes Trinitarian
relations. who says this:“Human personhood is constituted through an imitation of Jesus’
obedience to the Father.” In effect, humans “become ‘persons’ in and through an
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obedient response to God’s call or mission.” 233 This obedience entails an acceptance of
one’s own vulnerability and an act of entrustment. In opening themselves to God in this
way, human persons become capable of relationships constituted through mutual self-gift
and receptivity to the other. The kenotic performance, defined as self-gift/receptivity to
the other, is thus essential to all authentic personal relationship. 234
In order to evaluate the validity of this model as a paradigm for inter-human
relations, I proposed a number of ethical qualifications or conditions derived from a
feminist standpoint. The first qualification requires that kenosis be concretely situated
and contextualized. In order to propose kenosis as an ethical model, it is necessary first
to ascertain the already existing power differentials that constitute specific relationships.
Since factors such as race, gender, class, status, role, education, and personality traits
already influence the structure of most relationships, proposing kenosis as a universal
model risks re-enforcing existing power imbalances and re-enacting abuse unless these
factors are made explicit and their significance taken into account.
The second related ethical caveat concerns the issue of symmetry and asymmetry.
The meaning of kenosis changes significantly depending on the degree of symmetry
structuring the relationship. Symmetrical relationships are ones in which both (or all)
parties are already relatively equal in power and status, or relationships that aim at
achieving this kind of symmetry, e.g. egalitarian friendships and partnerships, and
organizations that intentionally resist hierarchical structures. In these relationships,
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productive power is distributed relatively equally and is practiced (relatively)
cooperatively. In asymmetrical relationships, one (or more) of the subjects has
significantly more productive power vis-à-vis the other, as is the case in parent-child,
teacher-student, therapist-patient, employer-employee, and prisoner and guard
relationships;in patriarchal marriages, the relationship between husband and wife is
understood as asymmetrical. Whereas in symmetrical relationships, kenosis might be
performed mutually and dynamically, in a kind of give and take that both (or all) subjects
negotiate, in asymmetrical relationships, the performance of kenosis is far more
problematic, particularly if it is proposed as a model for the less powerful subject. Since
the power in asymmetrical relationships is inherently unbalanced, the possibility of
exploitation and violation are considerably increased.
A third consideration concerns the recognition of the risk of violence inherent in
kenotic performances. Ideally, the more dominant subject in an asymmetrical
relationship would not perform his or her power as domination or exploitation, and the
less powerful subject would not succumb to self-abnegation or a passive-aggressive
manipulation of his or her relative powerlessness. Yet the threat of violence, exploitation,
and domination are inherent in these relationships. The myth of Christic kenosis
recognizes this explicitly; Christ’s violation stands at the center of the myth. Even if
Christ’s violent death is interpreted as an unintended yet unavoidable consequence of his
kenotic performance, the violence and violation embody the nadir of his kenotic descent.
It is precisely his kenosis that provokes and enables the violence done against him (if he
had not given up his productive power, he would not have been subject to the violence).
Thus, Christic kenosis invites violence. To deny or de-center the violence not only
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radically modifies the myth; it makes kenotic performances even more dangerous
because the threat of violence remains implicit and unacknowledged.
A fourth ethical caveat concerns the centrality of the kenotic model within an
ethical system. Some theologians of kenosis tend to identify kenosis with love itself and
therefore have proposed it as the Christian ideal for the performance of power. But
clearly there are other, equally significant and ethically essential, performances of power.
To take initiative, to be an effective agent of change, to resist injustice, to create new
models of relation and social organization -- these productive performances of power are
as important for human flourishing as are kenotic performances. The ethical challenge is
to know when to act productively and when kenotically, and to learn how to negotiate
power within relationships so that all members flourish.
A final ethical qualification concerns the theme of exaltation within the Christic
myth. Many modern theologians who work with the kenotic model avoid its closing
symbol of cosmic reversal. The problem with this avoidance is related to the decentering or denial of violence in the myth. What both the violence and the exaltation
remind us, is that kenosis is about power. It is not the opposite of power; rather, it is a
particular performance of power, and power (at least in its human forms) always involves
the risk of domination. The myth should remind us of the ubiquity of power and the way
in which it is essential to relationships, positively and negatively. Just as we cannot
forget the risk of violence entailed in kenosis, so too we need to be reminded of the ways
in which kenotic performances can be informed by resentment and the desire for reversal.
This is a subtle temptation inherent in kenotic performances; one is motivated to perform
kenosis now with the expectation that eventually the power relations will be reversed and
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the kenotic victim of violence will be able to perform power as domination. In this sense,
the exaltation is essential to the myth as a warning: Even when domination is explicitly
rejected, its seduction remains; even when dominating performances of power are
intended to be used for good, they open the possibility of abuse and violence.

5.3 Julian Resources
In turning to Julian’s development of kenotic performances, the definition of
kenosis broadened out into two distinct forms: Christic kenosis and maternal kenosis.
I will briefly summarize each.
As a woman of her time and place, Julian assumes the centrality of Christic
kenosis in understanding the meaning of human existence. Her visionary experience,
arising out of an experience of intense fear regarding her own death, centers on Christ’s
suffering and dying on the cross. When she moves from the level of vision to that of
theological interpretation, she examines Christic kenosis within a soteriological
framework. Her primary concern is with the relationship between God’s allencompassing love and the reality of human sin, or, specifically, how the promise of
universal salvation can coexist with the reality of hell. The resolution to this aporia lies
within the vision of Christ on the cross, but in disclosing the meanings of that vision,
Julian moves away from the central image of violation and violence to reflections on love
as the essential nature of God and God’s relationship to the world. Julian thus de-centers
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the image of Christ’s violent death in order to remove kenosis from the framework of
judgment and damnation. 235
Within Julian’s telling of the Christic myth, there is no threat of domination, no
demand for submission, no judgment or punishment, no power practiced as command and
control. Though she uses the class symbols of a lord and a servant, she displaces the
dialectic of power that this relationship would normally imply. God the Son, motivated
by love, freely chooses to become a human being. In doing so, he temporarily gives up
the status and power that belong to him in his divinity and joyfully sets out to complete
the task that God had given humanity. This task is nothing other than the task of human
existence itself: the movement out from God’s being and the return to God. Because of
the weaknesses inherent in the human condition, this task entails suffering and failure;
humans lose their way and, most importantly, lose sight of the unfailing love of God.
The Son, in becoming human, accompanies humanity on its journey and, in doing so,
endures all the pain, suffering, and failure that are part of human life. Throughout this
kenotic journey, the Father looks upon the Son with love and mercy, and thinks primarily
about the great reward he will give to the Son (and to the humanity that accompanies the
Son) when the task is completed.
It is particularly in Julian’s portrayal of the Father that we see the absence of
patriarchal domination-and-submission models of power. The Father does not command
obedience or submission; he does not judge or demand justice; he does not abandon the
Son or in any way withhold his love. The Father’s primary way of performing power is
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as constraint and anticipation as he waits for the Son to finish the task so that he can
reward him. As a correlate to the Father’s performance of productive power, the Son’s
kenotic performance, though entailing pain and suffering, is not characterized as
violation. He labors, suffers, and eventually dies. But his performance in relation to the
Father is characterized by eagerness, good will, and hard work.
The completion of the Son’s kenotic movement is not exaltation or dominion.
He returns to the Father, having completed the human journey with and for humanity,
which now shares in his renewed relationship with the Father and the Spirit. Julian’s
preferred image of eschatological fulfillment is that of a joyous medieval banquet hosted
by a generous father/lord: God the Father sits at one end of the table beaming his
pleasure; God the mother (Christ) is ensuring that everyone has a seat and a full plate of
food; and God the Spirit is busy giving out party favors. The overall image is one of
inclusion, plenty, gaiety, and familial love. 236
In de-centering the theme of violence and removing the theme of divine
judgment, Julian effectively empties the kenotic myth of the risk of domination and
violation. This is both a strength and a weakness. It allows Julian to portray divine power
purely in terms of love. This is a divine power incapable of performing power as
domination, command, or judgment, let alone of condoning violence or abuse. At the
same time, Julian leaves the problem of violence and domination unexplained, both in its
origins and in God’s response to it. While it may be consoling to image God as a loving
Father who sees human sin as the unavoidable consequence of growth and development,
the image is utterly inadequate to the larger questions of theodicy. How does one image
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a loving God in the context of war, institutionally sponsored persecution, torture, and
execution? What of the context of domestic abuse, especially child abuse and sexual
abuse? These are all “sins” Julian would have encountered in her cultural context. The
de-centering of violence in the Christic myth, while purifying the image of God, leaves
human violence itself unexplained and without an adequate response.
The second model of divine-human relationship that Julian develops is that of
mother and child. In this model, kenosis is seen primarily as the action of a powerful
mother responding to the powerlessness, vulnerability, and dependence of her child.
Motivated by a divine maternal love, Christ becomes human in order to mother humanity
more intimately and fully. Here, too, violent death is de-centered. Even Christ’s
suffering on the cross is viewed as maternal labor that results in life; his own death is
only momentary and does not interrupt his maternal care. Julian presents maternal power
as active, dynamic, and highly adaptive to the needs of the child. Mother Jesus births,
nourishes, protects and educates. He is an attentive, active Mother putting all his power at
the service of the child’s growth and development. Jesus’s mother-love is unfailing, as he
never judges, punishes, or abandons his children to their own fates, even when they stray
or fall (or especially when they stray or fall). Above all, he is powerful in his ability to
protect his children and keep them safe.
However, while there are kenotic elements in maternal love (and maternity
explains the kenosis of the incarnation), it is not essentially kenotic. For Julian, Mother
Jesus is powerful in that he performs his power productively in order to nourish, protect,
and educate. Given the all-important task of keeping her child safe, a Mother’s power
must be productive. In other words, a Mother who kenotically renounced or reduced her
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power in relation to a more powerful other would fail in her primary task as a mother; she
would be unable to protect her child and keep her safe. In what sense, then, is maternal
love kenotic? In the first place, Mother Jesus places his power at the service of the child
and, in doing so, submits his power to the needs of the child. Secondly, his maternal love
opens him to a profound vulnerability, but, unlike the case of Christic kenosis, this is not
a vulnerability to the greater power of another. Rather, Jesus’s maternal love makes him
vulnerable to one who is more vulnerable than he is. In loving the child and investing
himself in the child’s well-being and growth, Mother Jesus becomes vulnerable to the
inevitable pain and suffering that accompanies his love for the growing the child. Third,
as the child grows, Mother Jesus restrains his love in order to create a space within which
the child can act, learn, and, inevitably, fail. Yet these kenotic performances (putting his
power at the service of the child, becoming vulnerable to the child’s vulnerabilities,
restraining his power so that the child can perform power) do not replace the productive
performances of Mother Jesus. Mother Jesus’s power to protect his child and to bring the
child’s growth to completion is never withdrawn or diminished.
One of the strengths of Julian’s image of divine maternal power is that it decenters kenosis itself as the primary image of divine love. God’s love is profoundly active
and productive; it is engaged, creative, protective, nurturing, and educative. The kenotic
dimensions are important, but they are placed within a continuous, dynamic process that
does not value the kenotic above other performances of power. A weakness is that the
maternal image also sidesteps the problem of violence, though less thoroughly than in
Julian’s presentation of Christic kenosis. On the maternal model, God does respond to the
danger of violence: Mother Jesus always keeps his children safe from harm. At the same
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time, by imaging human beings as perennial children, the reality of adult human violence
is kept outside the analysis and so remains unexamined and unexplained.

5.4 The Ethics of Kenosis: General Conclusions
I now want to draw some general conclusions regarding kenosis as a model of
human relationship. The first conclusion is that kenosis, in both its Christic and maternal
forms, is an ethical model for the strong: those who are psychologically healthy and
practiced in the use of productive power (due to their social status, developed abilities
and accomplishments). In largely symmetrical relationships where there is a high degree
of mutuality and trust, both subjects can meaningfully practice both kenotic and
productive power. In asymmetrical relationships, the performance of kenosis is only
appropriate to the stronger, more powerful subject. This is not to say that the less
powerful subject cannot be giving in the relationship or cannot find strength in
vulnerability. However, giving of the self and vulnerability by themselves do not define
kenotic performances. Kenosis entails intentionally reducing one’s power vis-à-vis the
other, thereby making the other more powerful. Since, in an asymmetrical relationship,
the less powerful subject is already in a position of vulnerability and (to varying degrees)
submission, calling on her to reduce her power even further cannot serve the goal of
flourishing.
Even in the case of the relatively powerful, the model of Christic kenosis should
be used with care. It is extremely difficult to free Christic kenosis from the dynamic of
domination and submission. Given this fact, it may be best to limit it to its negative role;
it can serve as needed reminder that all relations are structured by power, and thus always
entail the risk of violence and domination. Particularly for people who have a
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disproportionate degree of power in relation to others, the kenotic myth could serve as a
needed caution. The Christic model might also play a role in the recovery process of
abusers, particularly long-term, serial abusers. In order to recover himself, an abuser has
to intentionally give up the power and status that enabled his violation of others. He must
open himself to the profound vulnerability and risk of violation that he inflicted on
others, and on some level, experience the helplessness, fear, and terror that he routinely
inflicted on others. In this case, Christic kenosis might provide a path through this
experience of recovery to a healthier performance of power. Even here, however, there is
the danger that the model will simply reverse the relation of domination and submission,
turning the abuser into a victim of abuse. For the model to function positively in this case,
it has to explicitly reject all dominating, violating performances of power.
In contrast to Christic kenosis, the maternal model presents a far more positive
way of performing power within asymmetrical relationships. Maternal kenosis consists
in putting one’s greater productive power (i.e, intelligence, training, capabilities, status,
wealth) at the service of others who are less powerful. Ideally, it is non-coercive and
non-manipulative, and aims at the greater empowerment of others. On this model, kenotic
performances are important, but they are de-centered and enacted alongside productive
performances of power (including protecting others in their vulnerability). In this way,
kenosis is not privileged as the ideal expression of love but is seen as a part of a larger
dynamic relationship of nurturing, caring, and educating. On the maternal model, the
more powerful subject expects her power to decrease, not because she is renouncing it
but, rather, because the less-powerful other is growing in his or her capacity to perform
power productively. In a word, the maternal model aims at greater empowerment, not
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less. It has its own vulnerabilities and risks: The tasks to nurture, protect, and educate
could fail; the more powerful person could succumb to the temptation to dominate and
control; the relationship could become rigid and fixed (never moving beyond the parentchild symbolization); the less powerful person could reject the performances of the more
powerful other or manipulate the relationship through passive-aggressive behavior.
As with any model, maternal kenosis has its limits. The symbolism of parent-child
cannot function as an all-encompassing model of relationship. In fact, no model can.
Using parental models for adult relationships is particularly problematic, since they risk
sliding into paternalism, thus impeding maturity and growth. This can be especially
harmful for women in paternalistic institutions and for survivors of child abuse.
Foucault’s warning is worth recalling here: All relationships of power tend to become
rigid and fixed, and when they do so, they invariability become structured by domination.
I would add that allowing any one model of relationship to dominate inevitably produces
the rigidity that enables domination. The variability and dynamism of human
relationships require creative thinking and multiple models. As an alternative to the
Christic model, maternal kenosis works as an important corrective, but it is only one
alternative.
5.5 Empowerment and Trust in Recovery from Abuse
The final conclusion I wish to draw, and the one that will occupy me through the
remainder of this chapter, regards the place of kenosis in the context of recovery from
abuse. Kenosis of any kind cannot be an appropriate model for those recovering from
repeated trauma and abuse; this is a context within which the model of kenosis ought to
be absolutely excluded. However, in the relationship between a therapist and an abuse
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survivor, maternal kenosis may serve to guide the therapist’s performance of power.
In order to flesh out this final point, I turn to Judith Herman’s Trauma and
Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence – From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror. In his
article, “Person, Kenosis and Abuse,” Aristotle Papanikolaou, also drawing on the work
of Herman, argues that kenosis is in fact an essential part of recovery from abuse:
The entering into a therapeutic relationship is itself a kenotic act on the
part of the victim of trauma in so far as it involves a self-emptying of fear
for the sake of the other (the therapist initially, but more stable, intimate
relationships in the long term), as well as risk, vulnerability and trust. The
path toward a reconstructed self involves the risk of surrendering oneself
over to another. 237
I agree with Papanikolaou that the therapeutic relationship, if it is to be successful,
requires the survivor to accept the risk of vulnerability and to enter into an unequal
relationship of power. In Herman’s words, the survivor enters the therapeutic
relationship because she recognizes that she needs help and care, and by “virtue of this
fact, she voluntarily submits herself to an unequal relationship in which the therapist has
superior status and power.” 238 The language of submission is misleading here. Herman’s
point is that the survivor who enters a therapeutic relationship is provisionally willing to
expose her vulnerability to a more power other. However, using kenosis as a model in
this case seriously distorts Herman’s description of recovery and, more importantly,
distorts the survivor’s performance of power. The courage and the strength the survivor
draws on to willingly enter a therapeutic relationship is a productive performance of
power; it is decidedly not kenotic. Aware of the power differential, she must sufficiently
trust the therapist to do her no harm, but she is not submitting to the therapist; rather, she
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submits to the process of therapy within an asymmetrical relationship that, if successful,
will allow her to trust the therapist to be a supportive witness and ally in her own
recovery. I will now develop this argument in more detail.
Trauma and abuse are performances of power that reduce the victim to
psychological powerlessness. Whether in the case of a single traumatic event or repeated,
long-term abuse, the victim is “rendered helpless by overwhelming force,” and the
ordinary psychological systems that “give people a sense of control, connection and
meaning” are overwhelmed. 239 The breakdown of the system of self-defense affects the
entire person, physiologically, emotionally, and mentally -- and can endure long after the
traumatic events have passed:
Traumatic reactions occur when action is of no avail [against the
violence]. When neither resistance nor escape is possible, the human
system of self-defense becomes overwhelmed and disorganized. Each
component of the ordinary response to danger, having lost its utility, tends
to persist in an altered and exaggerated state long after the actual danger is
over. Traumatic events produce profound and lasting changes in
physiological arousal, emotion, cognition, and memory. Moreover,
traumatic events may sever these normally integrated functions from one
another. The traumatized person may experience intense emotion but
without clear memory of the event, or may remember everything in detail
but without emotion. She may find herself in a constant state of vigilance
and irritability without knowing why. Traumatic symptoms have a
tendency to become disconnected from their source and to take on a life of
their own. 240
Once traumatized, the survivor’s basic system of self-preservation and self-care is
severely impaired and her ability to be safe within relationships is undermined:
Traumatic events call into question basic human relationships. They
breach the attachments of family, friendship, love and community. They
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shatter the construction of the self that is formed and sustained in relation
to others. They undermine the belief systems that give meaning to human
experience. They violate the victims’ faith in a natural or divine order and
cast the victim into a state of existential crisis. 241
In order to recover herself, the survivor must relearn the basic functions of selfpreservation and self-care that make relationship possible. She must recover “the basic
capacities for trust, autonomy, initiative, competence, identity and intimacy” that the
trauma “damaged or deformed.” 242 Because trauma renders the person powerless and
undermines the normal systems of self-preservation, the fundamental and guiding
principle of recovery must be the empowerment of the survivor:
The first principle of recovery is empowerment of the survivor. She must
be the author and arbiter of her own recovery. Others may offer advice,
support, assistance, affection, and care, but not cure. Many benevolent
and well-intentioned attempts to assist the survivor founder because this
fundamental principle of empowerment is not observed. No intervention
that takes power away from the survivor can possibly foster her recovery,
no matter how much it appears to be in her immediate best interest. 243
While all survivors of repeated trauma experience this impairment of the
fundamental systems of self-preservation and self-care, it is particularly acute for
survivors of chronic child-abuse because the trauma disrupts the normal processes of
psychological development. For normal development to occur, the child depends upon “a
caretaker’s benign use of power.” In being provided a basic level of care, the child gains
self-esteem and develops autonomy (“a sense of her own separateness within a
relationship”), as well as the ability to “control and regulate her own bodily functions”
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and to “form and express her own point of view.” 244 As she moves into adolescence and
young adulthood, she learns to resolve conflicts over autonomy, initiative, competence,
and intimacy. 245
For the survivor of repeated child abuse, all of these normal developmental
processes have been disrupted and deformed. In a context of “profoundly disrupted
relationships,” an abused child’s developmental tasks are monumental:
She must find a way to form primary attachments to caregivers who are
either dangerous or, from her perspective, negligent. She must find a way
to develop a sense of basic trust and safety with caregivers who are
untrustworthy and unsafe. She must develop a sense of self in relation to
others who are helpless, uncaring or cruel. She must develop a capacity
for bodily self-regulation in an environment in which her body is at the
disposal of other’s needs, as well as a capacity for self-soothing in an
environment without solace. She must develop the capacity for initiative
in an environment which demands that she bring her will into complete
conformity with that of her abuser. And ultimately, she must develop a
capacity for intimacy out of an environment where all intimate
relationships are corrupt, and an identity out of an environment which
defines her as a [out of context here?whore and a slave.] 246
In normal development, a child’s “secure sense of autonomy” is achieved “by forming
inner representations of trustworthy and dependable caretakers, representations that can
be evoked mentally in moments of distress.” For the chronically abused child, these
“inner representations cannot form in the first place” because “they are repeatedly [and]
violently shattered by traumatic experience.” Denied the ability to internalize “a sense of
safety” and “a secure sense of independence,” she seeks “desperately and
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indiscriminately” for “external sources of comfort and solace,” and for people upon
whom to depend.” 247
When a child’s primary relationships are structured by abuse, she must eventually
search for a “system of meaning” that can justify and explain it.
Inevitably the child concludes that her innate badness is the cause. The child
seizes upon this explanation early and clings to it tenaciously, for it enables her to
preserve a sense of meaning, hope and power. If she is bad, then her parents are
good. If she is bad, then she can try to be good. If, somehow, she has brought this
fate upon herself, then somehow she has the power to change it. If she has driven
her parents to mistreat her, then, if only she tries hard enough, she may some day
earn their forgiveness and finally win the protection and care she so desperately
needs. 248
As she moves into adulthood and the tasks of establishing independence and
intimacy, the survivor faces formidable obstacles. Lacking the most basic capacities of
self-care, security, and autonomy, the adult survivor often “develops a pattern of intense,
unstable relationships, repeatedly enacting dramas of rescue, injustice and betrayal.” 249
Because she has difficulty with the basic functions of self-protection, forming appropriate
boundaries, and assessing genuine risk, the survivor is often highly susceptible to
repeated abuse:
Almost inevitably, the survivor has great difficulty protecting her-self in
the context of intimate relationships. Her desperate longing for nurturance
and care makes it difficult to establish safe and appropriate boundaries
with others. Her tendency to denigrate herself and to idealize those to
whom she becomes attached further clouds her judgment. Her empathic
attunement to the wishes of others and her automatic, often unconscious
habits of obedience also make her vulnerable to anyone in a position of
power or authority. Her dissociative defense style makes it difficult for
her to form conscious and accurate assessments of danger. And her wish
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to relive the dangerous situation and make it come out right may lead her
to reenactments of the abuse. 250
This abuse is not typically sought out in an active way but is “passively experienced as a
dreaded but unavoidable fate and is accepted as the inevitable price of relationship”:
Many survivors have such profound deficiencies in self-protection that
they can barely imagine themselves in a position of agency or choice. The
idea of saying no to the emotional demands of a parent, spouse, lover or
authority figure may be practically inconceivable. 251
The process of recovery from chronic abuse is complicated, lengthy, and fraught
with difficulty. Renewed personal relationships within which the survivor is able to
practice self-care and safety, trust and autonomy, are both the goal of recovery and also
the means. The difficulty is that the very means of recovery (the ability to form renewed
personal relationships) are precisely what have been damaged or deformed by the abuse
itself. The therapeutic relationship can play a crucial role in the process of recovery
because, unlike other relationships with, for example, family and friends, its sole purpose
is the work of recovery. Establishing safety and trust within a therapeutic relationship can
provide a way for the patient to regain safety and trust within other relationships as well.
However, the therapeutic relationship can also be experienced as profoundly threatening
and unsafe. In agreeing to speak about, recover, and relive her traumatic experiences, the
patient becomes extremely vulnerable to the helplessness, fear, and terror that constituted
the trauma itself.
Herman distinguishes three basic stages in the recovery process: establishing
safety, remembrance and mourning, and reconnection with ordinary life. 252 The first

250

Ibid.

251

Ibid, 112.
Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 155.

252

254

stage is absolutely crucial; it is nothing less than the recovery or reformation of the basic
capacities of self-preservation and self-care that make relationship possible. The
experience of trauma robs the victim of power and control and renders her utterly unsafe
(emotionally, psychologically and often physically). The abuser invades her mind (and
often her body), and undermines her ability to protect and care for herself. Feelings of
“intense fear, helplessness, loss of control, and threat of annihilation” are common to all
experiences of trauma. 253 In the case of long term, repeated abuse, these feelings form
the basic foundation of the victim’s experience of her self.
In entering a therapeutic relationship, the patient must establish a sufficient sense
of safety in relation to the therapist; otherwise recovery cannot proceed:
Trauma robs the victim of a sense of power and control; the guiding
principle of recovery is to restore power and control to the survivor. The
first task of recovery is to establish the survivor’s safety. This task takes
precedence over all others, for no other therapeutic work can possibly
succeed if safety has not been adequately secured. No other therapeutic
work should even be attempted until a reasonable degree of safety has
been achieved. 254
Essential to the establishment of safety is the survivor’s recovery of power and control.
The trauma and abuse undermined these capacities at the most basic level; the survivor
must be able to re-constitute them to a sufficient degree in order to trust the therapist with
her story. Even the decision to enter therapy can provoke feelings of helplessness and the
fear of violation.
Often it is necessary for the therapist to reframe accepting help as an act of
courage. Acknowledging the reality of one’s condition and taking steps to
change it becomes signs of strength, not weakness; initiative, not
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passivity. Taking action to foster recovery, far from granting victory to
the abuser, empowers the survivor. 255
From the beginning of the relationship, the patient must feel that she is the agent of her
own recovery, that she is capable of practicing self-care, and that she can be safe within
the therapeutic relationship because she has power within it.
This foundational task is formidable. Since the therapeutic relationship is
structured by power imbalance (“the therapist has superior status and power” and the
patient is expected to expose her vulnerabilities), 256 the threat of exploitation is inherent
to it:
Though the traumatized patient feels a desperate need to rely on the
integrity and competence of the therapist, she cannot do so, for her
capacity to trust has been damaged by the traumatic experience…. The
patient enters the therapeutic relationship prey to every sort of doubt and
suspicion. She generally assumes that the therapist is either unable or
unwilling to help. Until proven otherwise, she assumes that the therapist
cannot bear to hear the true story of the trauma. 257
From the outset, the establishment of the therapeutic relationship must be seen as
a cooperative effort; the patient must be enabled to regain a sense of agency and
control; the therapist must become “the patient’s ally, placing all the resources of
her knowledge, skill, and experience at the patient’s disposal.” 258 Still, the
“alliance of therapy cannot be taken for granted:”
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it must be painstakingly built by the effort of both patient and therapist.
Therapy requires a collaborative working relationship in which both
partners act on the basic of their implicit confidence in the value and
efficacy of persuasion rather than coercion, ideas rather than force,
mutuality rather than authoritarian control. These are precisely the beliefs
that have been shattered by the traumatic experience. Trauma damages
the patient’s ability to enter into a trusting relationship. 259

The conditions that make a trusting relationship possible have to be established;
they cannot be assumed. For the patient, these involve reforming the basic capacities of
self-preservation and self-care through the exercise of agency:
the patient is called upon to plan and initiate action and to use her best
judgment. As she begins to exercise these capacities, which have been
systematically undermined by repeated abuse, she enhances her sense of
competence, self-esteem, and freedom. Furthermore, she begins to develop
some sense of trust in the therapist, based on the therapist’s reliable
commitment to the task of ensuring safety. (167)
For the therapist, the work of establishing trust includes respecting the patients autonomy
by “remaining disinterested and neutral” while at the same time forming an empathic
connection, and establishing and maintaining appropriate boundaries. 260
The trust required to move forward to the stage of remembrance and mourning
cannot be established until and unless the survivor is sufficiently empowered. She must
recover or reform the most basic capacities of self-preservation and self-care and practice
them; she must learn to take initiative, form judgments and act on them; she must regain
a positive sense and trust in her own agency and her own judgment.
Only when a sufficient degree of empowerment is restored is trust possible, and
only when trust is in place in the relationship is it emotionally and psychologically safe
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for the patient to directly revisit the vulnerability of the trauma and move into the painful
and difficult work of remembrance and mourning and finally to the more constructive
work of reconnection. 261
As she moves into the work of these later stages, empowerment remains the
essential goal and symbol. Though the process of recovery from prolonged abuse is
ongoing and never fully completed, real progress is possible. Herman describes this hard
won recovery of the self:
By the third stage of recovery, the survivor has regained some capacity for
appropriate trust. She can once again feel trust in others when that trust is
warranted, she can withhold her trust when it is not warranted, and she
knows how to distinguish between the two situations. She has also
regained the ability to feel autonomous while remaining connected to
others; she can maintain her own point of view and her own boundaries
while respecting those of others. She has begun to take more initiative in
her life and is in the process of creating a new identity. With others, she is
now ready to risk deepening her relationships. With peers, she can now
seek mutual friendships that are not based on performance, image or
maintenance of a false self. With lovers and family, she is now ready for
greater intimacy. 262

Drawing on Herman’s descriptions of trauma and recovery, I return now
to the question of the place of kenosis in the context of recovery. Trauma and
recovery are essentially about power; trauma robs the victim of power through
domination and violation, recovery is about restoring power through relationships
of mutuality and trust. Since kenosis is a performance of power that essentially
entails reducing one’s productive power in relation to a more powerful other, it is
the opposite of empowerment and therefore cannot function as a model of
recovery for survivors. In fact, Christic kenosis in this context is a model of
261
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abuse, not recovery, and can only function to trap the survivor within the
psychological framework of abuse by valorizing her powerlessness and
victimization.
It is profoundly true that survivors must learn to trust and be able to
experience vulnerability in relationships, but this ability presupposes a stable and
practiced performance of productive power. This is the sin qua non of recovery.
The survivor needs to rebuild the most basic functions of a stable identity. She
must learn to practice self-care, to provide safety for herself, to trust her own
judgments, to take initiative, be able to say no to other’s needs and demands, learn
how to resolve conflicts directly, learn how to fight for her own safety and the
safety of others. She must relearn (or, if a child abuse survivor, learn for the first
time) the practices of power that enable trust, power-in-vulnerability, and
intimacy.
Within the therapeutic relationship, maternal kenosis may be one helpful model
for guiding the therapist’s relationship to the survivor. The good enough therapist is, in
the first place, healthy and practiced in productive performances of power. Aware of her
greater power in the relationship, she commits herself to using the “power that has been
conferred upon her only to foster the recovery of the patient, resisting all temptation to
abuse.” Committed to the cooperative work of empowering the survivor (restoring the
survivors power and control in her own life), the therapist places “all the resources of her
knowledge, skill, and experience at the patient’s disposal.” 263 The good enough therapist
respects and encourages the autonomy of the survivor and sets clear boundaries within
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their relationship. She is an attentive listener and an empathic witness to the survivor’s
trauma and recovery. Ultimately, the good enough therapist (like the good enough
mother) wants the survivor to gain sufficient maturity and health so that she can move on
from the therapeutic relationship itself into a future of relationships that sustain the
survivor’s flourishing and allow her to participate in and contribute to the flourishing of
others.

……………………………………

Violence is at the center of Christic kenosis: a violated man, dead on a cross. To grasp
this symbol’s power, we need to stand with the world’s victims of violence. This is the
absolute starting point; there can be no other. If an interpretation of this symbol as
healing is possible, it will come from the experience of victims and in the voices of
survivors who have made the journey through to recovery. But as Rita Nakashima Brock
and Rebecca Ann Parker remind us, not everyone survives:
Recovery can be impossible. Legacies of violence bequeath the isolation
of the lone sufferer, the denial of pain, acts of rage against others, the acid
of cynicism, fragmentation of the soul, the inertia of passivity and despair,
and the wish to die. The journey back to self and God can be a descent
into hell, even when we have the support of friends and family. Many
cannot make the descent and live half-lives. Others descend, fragment
completely and never return. They cannot respond, even to the most tender
of mercies. 264
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